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Purpose:  To compare the differences and similarities that apart the corporate 
governance systems of Pakistan and Sweden by using a research 
model developed for this purpose. The same model will compare 
how major companies of the countries are expressing this in 
information to shareholders.  
 
Conclusion:  After conducting the research, mainly three conclusions are drawn. 
Firstly, it is inappropriate to rate corporate governance mechanism 
solely based on country level or company level. Secondly, 
Pakistan seems to bring its corporate governance system closer to 
best practices in the world by setting down hard rules and explicit 
laws whereas it is found to be comparatively open and flexible in 
case of Sweden. Lastly, convergence was observed in situations 
where either law became closer to each other at country level or 
voluntary efforts matched at company level. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter the introduction to the thesis is stated. The authors aim to give the reader an 
initial introduction to corporate governance, which will guide the reader to following 
problem discussion where the stated problem will evolve. They are finally stated in the 
research questions and purpose of the study. To end the first chapter is delimitations and a 
thesis outline. 
 
1.1. Background Introduction to Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate Governance has been a critical feature since the evolution of corporate entities. 
Over time, the corporations evolved and became more advanced, sophisticated and took more 
people into service. The need for more capital was the result of such developments
1
. So, 
shareholders provided corporations with capital and consequently became owners but 
delegated the control to skilled managers
2
. Due to this separation of ownership and control, 
the relationship between management and shareholders and aligning manager‘s interests with 
the shareholders interest has been the core issue of corporate governance
3
. Even though, the 
term ―Corporate Governance‖ is in view since 1980‘s it has not enjoyed the spotlight until 
very recent
4
.
 
As mentioned not until very recent, corporate governance practices were 
considered to be unrelated with corporation‘s performance but lately, it has emerged as an 
important and sensitive corporate issue especially after the mayhem created by corporate 
scandals from all over the globe
5
. For over a decade, more and more attention has been gained 
by this vital system of directing and controlling business as a result of failures of corporate 
giants like WorldCom, Tyco, Parmalat, Hollinger etc. Especially the legendary collapse of 
Enron made Corporate Governance more of an issue. Such scandals from all over the world 
have highlighted how the nonexistence of effective corporate checks and balances that could 
expose a company and its investors into jeopardy
6
. 
 
                                               
1 Kruk and Nilsson, 2006 
2 Berle and Means, The Modern Corporations and Private Property, Commerce Clearing House, 1933 
3 Monks and Minow, Corporate Governance, 2001 
4 Kruk and Nilsson, 2006 
5 Gry, Dual-Class Share Structures and Best Practices in Corporate Governance, 2005 
6 Ibid 
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Many definitions of corporate governance are available, which describes it as a mechanism of 
checks and balances on corporate practices. A more precise explanation is a system through 
which companies are directed and controlled
7
. The main purpose of corporate governance is 
to align, to a maximum extent, the interests of corporations, individuals and society
8
. OECD 
explains it as a mechanism for directing and controlling business organizations. This system 
suggests the allocation of rights and responsibilities to various participants in the corporation, 
i.e. the board, management, shareholders and other stakeholders. This system presents the 
rules and procedures for decision-making on corporate matters, structure for setting 
company's objectives and the means for fulfilling them and an effective way of monitoring 
performance
9
. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997): 
 
"Corporate governance ensures fairness, transparency, accountability, 
sustainable financial performance, increased shareholder confidence, 
access to external finance and foreign investment, fair treatment of 
the stakeholders in a company, maximization of shareholders' value 
and the enhanced reputation of a company, nation and economy"
10
. 
 
This mechanism of controlling and directing aims at providing protection to investors and 
other stakeholders.  Although research show inconsistent results about relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance, but it is a general belief that investors protection 
provided by good corporate governance not only improves the firm value but can also give 
more depth to capital market and consequently to economy of a country.
11
 However, countries 
differ in the way protection is provided to investors or other stakeholders. The difference can 
be due to cultural aspects or influence of religion on business practices. Variations can also be 
outcomes of laws and legislation or corporate governance models adopted. 
 
The effect of different corporate governance models is quite visible on the object ive of 
corporations. Corporate Governance systems are often described as a member of different 
corporate governance models globally. Anglo Saxon model, which is often taken as the 
dominant global model, focus on serving the shareholder‘s interest as the primary motive for 
                                               
7 Cadbury, Report of the Committee on the financial aspects of corporate Governance,1992 
8 Cadbury, 2000 
9 OECD, 1999 
10 Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 
11 La Porta, R. et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1139 (1997); 
Levine R., Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, 8 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 8, 24 (1999)   
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corporations
12
 whereas other stakeholders like creditors, employees, suppliers, customers etc. 
get protection for their rights through contractual and regulatory means instead of being a 
participant in the corporate governance.
13
 On the other hand, other models like Germanic 
attempts to maximize the interests of a wider set of stakeholders. Due to this fact, companies 
in the Germanic system are conceived as a coalition of various stakeholders
14
, which is not 
the case in the Anglo-Saxon system where management and shareholders are the main 
entities. 
 
Ownership structure is an important element of corporate governance system as it has 
implications on issues like separation of ownership and control, minority shareholders‘ 
protection etc. This factor is very central in the two above discussed models as it exposes the 
investors to separate set of strengths and weaknesses. Anglo-Saxon model possesses a widely 
dispersed equity ownership structure where institutional shareholding is a significant part of 
it
15
. However, studies also talks about the importance of individual investors as these 
investors provide expansion and liquidity to the stock market
16
. On the contrary, bank based 
system, unlike Anglo Saxon model, is characterized by concentrated ownership
17
 where 
majority or significant amounts of stockholding is kept by few numbers of large investors
18
.  
These large dominating investors can be classified into wealthy individuals and families as 
the primary stockholders whereas large banks and non-financial firms play a secondary role in 
both in ownership structure and as disciplinary mechanism. Such large block holders take a 
more active part in governance of corporations and business matters due to the fact that they 
are more informed about the matters of corporation
19
, which is not the case with the dispersed 
ownership of Anglo-Saxon system. Here, it is interesting to see that although ownership and 
control are separated in both the systems but ownership in one system i.e. the Germanic 
seems to have considerable influence on the management. This is not the case with Anglo-
Saxon system where the firm‘s owners are widely dispersed. 
 
Similarly, Boards are the pivotal element of corporate governance as they are supposed to 
provide leadership and guidance to the corporate entity. They serve as a link between the 
                                               
12 Clarke, International Corporate Governance, A comparative study p.129, 2007 
13 Hansmaan and Krakmaan, 2002 
14 Moerland, 1995, cited by Weimar and Pape, 1999 
15 Ibid 
16 Aguilera and Jackson, 2003 
17 Coffee, A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the USA and Europe Differ, p.198-209, 2005 
18 Clarke, International Corporate Governance, A comparative study p.170-171, 2007 
19 Coffee, A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the USA and Europe Differ, p.198-209, 2005 
 8 
management and owners of the company to ensure harmony between them and safeguard the 
interests of shareholders mainly and of various stakeholders too.
20 
Many variations of boards 
exist among countries such as unitary or two tier boards, separation or non-separation of 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman, representation of executive and non-executive 
directors etc. One tier board structure is followed in the Anglo-Saxon model whereby the 
board contains both independent and executive directors. Germanic countries may have two 
tier board structures 
21
 where the lower tier, called management board, consists of full time 
executive members or managing directors whereas the upper tier, called supervisory board, 
consists of non-executive directors only, which are representatives of various stakeholders
22
. 
These two boards are independent of each other
23
. Asian countries have one tier board 
consisting mainly of controlling family representatives or other dominant shareholders. Even, 
if there are separate positions of CEO and chairman, the separation of these roles doesn‘t exist 
due to the family relationships exist between management and directors.
24
 The role of 
independent or non-executives directors is very important, as they are the ones who are 
primarily supposed to safeguard the interest of shareholders
25
. Typically, the role of Chairman 
and CEO is either combined or they work closely with each other.
26
 However, in United 
States of America, the role of chairman and Chief Executive Officer can be seen together in 
contrast to Germanic and other models
27
. No matter what region of the world it is, corporate 
scandals have occurred which make issues like affectivity of board structures, composition, 
size, processes etc. a matter of continual concern.   
 
Short term and long term orientation of managers is also a matter of concern for shareholders 
who are having different investment and risk profiles. For the purpose of meeting the 
expectations of the company‘s shareholders, the Anglo-Saxon firms generally seek short-term 
profitability and efficiency instead of long-term growth, survival and growth
28
, which is in 
general the case with Germanic firms. For the purpose of aligning the management‘s interest 
towards above-mentioned motive, often the executive remuneration is attached with the 
                                               
20 Clarke, International Corporate Governance, A comparative Study, p.33-36, 2007 
21 Ibid 
22 Clarke, International Corporate Governance, A comparative Study, p.48-49, 2007 
23 International Chamber of Commerce 
24 ibidClarke, International Corporate Governance, A comparative Study, p.48-49, 2007 
25 Lorsch and McIver, 1989 
26 International Chamber of Commerce 
27 Clarke, International Corporate Governance, A comparative Study, p.48-49, 2007 
28 International Chamber of Commerce 
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performance of firm
29
. The most well known form is stock options; the result is often in the 
form of increased focus on keeping the share price high as per expectations of shareholders. 
For this, Anglo-Saxon firms maintain high levels of transparency and disclosures whereas 
Germanic firms comparatively lag behind a bit.
30
  
 
The strength and efficiency of the stock market is also important as a strong stock market acts 
as a protective mechanism over corporate activities. Due to the dispersed ownership and 
short-term business approach, Anglo-Saxon countries may also have a strong external 
takeover market, which serves as a protective mechanism for investor
31
. In contrast, Germanic 
countries have relatively smaller and under-developed securities market
32
. Consequent to this 
fact, the Germanic corporations are more reliant on the debt financing which banks in the 
form of loans provide
33
. Because of developing securities market in Germanic countries, its 
role as active market for corporate control is minimized and is substituted by financial 
institutions. Much emphasis is also paid on the safety of interests of minority shareholder 
through codes, company and security laws
34
. Whether, it is stock market or the financial 
institutions serving as protective mechanism over firms, both have failed to avoid corporate 
scandals that points out the presence of inefficiencies in them. 
 
Apart from governance model‘s related attributes, a general worldwide phenomenon i.e. 
globalization is of supreme importance. Globalization has affected the business in several 
different ways whereby corporate governance is one such issue. The technological advances, 
liberalization of capital markets and more shifts of production factors are the underlying 
aspects of globalization.
35
 Also, poor performance by a previously protected local firm is 
more visible and will result in loss of market to competitors.
36
 Due to the ease of capital 
mobility around the globe, the global investors are willing to invest in good cross-border 
business opportunities and earn some money. But investing in a company across the border is 
not similar to investing in local company. Even investing in local-based Multi National 
Companies (MNCs) that are set up and listed at some other country‘s stock exchange, is 
altogether a different situation as they are subject to different rules and regulations. The legal,  
                                               
29 Weimar and Pape, A Taxonomy of Systems of Corporate Governance, 1999 
30 Coffee, A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the USA and Europe Differ, p.198-209, 2005 
31 Franks and Mayer, 1990 cited by Grahovar and Ackssen, 2004 
32 Aguilera and Jackson, 2003 
33 Ibid 
34 Clarke, International corporate governance, A comparative study, p.129, 2005 
35 OECD, 1996: 9 
36 Gordon and Roe, 2004: 2 
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economic, and cultural circumstances prevailing in a country affects the governance practices 
in a country to which many investors are unsure and conscious of. Not only the differences 
exist at country level but also various governance practices and level of compliance varies at 
company level among countries. The level of protection that a country‘s laws and regulations 
provide to investors from mismanagement of managers or expropriation by controlling 
owners differs among countries. Here, the affectivity of enforcement of such laws and 
regulations also remains to be an issue
37
 especially when it comes to emerging markets. 
Along with this, governance practices at firm level also vary due to many factors including 
ownership structure, cross share holdings etc. The developed as well as emerging economies 
carries their own strengths and weaknesses.  
 
Firms aiming at penetrating new emerging markets prefer offering stocks to local investors as 
entrance costs. So, to make them buy and hold stock, firms have to adapt to local governance 
standards as local investors favor them.
38
 Also, investors who are new to a governance system 
often believe that the governance system, which they have been subject to if better one and by 
adopting that system, the local firm can improve their stock value.
39
 Likewise, local investors 
can also demand new reforms in existing governance system, as they feel more protected and 
optimistic if some new global practices are adopted.
40
 The importance that investors give to 
good governance can be understood by the findings of McKinsey‘s survey conducted in Asia, 
Europe and Unites states and South America. According to the survey, 75% of the investors 
stated that they do pay equal importance to good governance and investment performance 
while choosing a firm
41
. One other finding disclosed that 80% of investors preferred to invest 
in firms having more effective boards with comparable financial value.
42
 In case of Asia and 
Latin America where reporting standards are relatively narrow, the survey showed that 
investors from all over the globe felt their investments to be safer with better governed 
firms.
43
 McKinsey‘s survey concludes that firms that fail to reform their governance standards 
in this global environment will face a competitive disadvantage against their global 
ambitions.
44
 Such level of importance given to corporate governance practices by global and 
                                               
37 La Porta, Rafael, Lopez de Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W., Investor Protection 
and Corporate Governance, June 1999  
38 Gordon and Roe, 2004: 2 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid 
41 Coombes and Watson, p.74-76, 2000 
42 Ibid 
43 Ibid 
44 Coombes and Watson, p.74-76, 2000  
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local investors, increasing role of institutional investors shows the need to improve corporate 
governance standard to be more competitiveness. 
 
Such issues have opened the debate for the need for a global corporate governance system and 
various dominating corporate governance systems are contested for being the most optimal 
system. Although, OECD, World Bank, IMF and other international agencies have not kept 
the one-size-fits-all approach but still they have often favored the Anglo-Saxon‘s dispersed 
ownership system due to its ability of being more competitive and attracting more 
investment.
45
 During 1990s, world experienced a shift towards market-based Anglo-American 
system. It seemed more dynamic and successful due to many factors like huge financial flows 
that provided Anglo-Saxon countries and firms with liquid markets that could maintain 
certain acceptable governance levels, growing impact of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
NASDAQ and LSE (London Stock Exchange) due to the listing of world‘s biggest firms 
irrespective of their home country, amplified investing by Anglo-American based institutional 
investors, huge revenue growth and market capitalization of many Anglo-American 
corporations etc.
46
 Due to adoption and increased convergence of accounting and auditing 
standards, and the development of possible international codes and standards of corporate 
governance added up to the convergence debate. 
 
OECD, supported by World Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank, UN and other 
international bodies, has been at forefront for issuing global corporate governance best 
practices. Various rating agencies like ISS, FTSE, and S&P also rate corporate governance 
practices of companies from all over the world using a standard set of variables for all to keep 
the global investors informed. The world has seen a move towards a global governance 
system but possibility of adoption of those practices that are alien to a system due to cultural, 
religious and regional beliefs remains to be a grey zone
47
. But it can be assumed that the 
system that will provide better protection and value to investors with low adoption cost for 
corporations will be the winner of this governance models contest.
48
 
 
                                               
45 Clarke, International Corporate Governance, A comparative Study, p.229-231, 2007 
46 Clarke, International Corporate Governance, A comparative Study, p.228-229, 2007  
47 Dignam and Gilanis, 1999: 399 
48 Ibid 
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1.2. Problem discussion  
 
The first motive to conduct this study is to compare the Pakistani and Swedish corporate 
governance systems. This is to understand the country-level set-up of corporate governance in 
each presented country. To extend the scope and not limit the study as Jackson and Moerke 
and many other studies, to only country-level comparison, this study will engage as second 
component, a pilot study to examine the corporate governance at company-level
49
. The 
company-level will focus on the extent to which companies follow the national corporate 
governance related legislation based solely on information disclosed in their annual reports 
and websites. Additionally, inferences will be drawn for possibility of convergence or 
divergence based on the findings of the underlying study. As an extension to country level 
study, the company-level will give extra understanding to the research. 
 
Much has been written on developed countries like comparative studies of UK and USA, UK 
and Europe, Japan and Europe
50
. A lot of studies on corporate governance of Sweden along 
with its comparison with other developed countries have been conducted such as comparison 
study of Sweden and Germany, Sweden and France, Sweden and UK but very few studies 
compare the corporate governance systems in developed and developing countries
51
. The 
situation of corporate governance varies between countries and this fluctuation is even higher 
when it comes to emerging markets, which can be seen, by corporate governance surveys 
conducted by international bodies like World Bank, IMF etc. With the rise of China, India, 
Malaysia, Singapore etc. as huge potential markets, more Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) is 
expected to flow towards them, which makes it necessary to examine the business situation of 
this region. Major emerging economies like China or India would have been selected as a 
comparative country to Sweden but the reason for selecting Pakistan is the World Bank‘s 
corporate governance survey of the South-East-Asian region that declares Pakistan as the 
winner of the region.
52
 Motivation of this study is to compare corporate governance practices 
in a developed country and its comparison with the corporate governance practices in a 
developing country. At the latest, Governance Metrics International (GMI) prepared a rating 
of countries, where Sweden scored 5.46 on a scale of ten whereas Pakistan, included into the 
                                               
50Jackson & Moerke, Continuity and Change in Corporate Governance, Volume 13:3, 2005 
50Jackson & Moerke (2005); La Porta et al. 2000; Mintz 2005; Weimer & Pape 1999 
51 Zhou and Panbunyuen, 2008, Kruk and Nilsson, 2006, Grahovar and Akesson, 2004 
52 World Bank Publication, 2009 
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emerging markets, scored 4.09 by their research model
53
. Comparing the corporate 
governance of a developed country which is ranked higher in global ratings (Sweden) with the 
top-ranked developing country of the emerging region will help understand the relative 
situation of corporate governance in the two regions. 
 
An interesting phenomenon behind the selection of these two countries is the legislative 
systems in both countries. As Pakistan is an Islamic Republic and there is a strong influence 
of religion on the laws of country while Sweden is considered as an open system. Also, the 
two countries have differences in culture and development level of corporate governance 
phenomenon. Additionally, Pakistan‘s corporate governance system has major influence of 
Anglo Saxon Model whereas Swedish corporate governance system is skewed more towards 
Germanic Model. It will be very interesting to observe the development of corporate 
governance practices and the possibility of convergence between countries that are very apart 
due to above mentioned reasons. Additionally, it will be very interesting to put side by side 
the very open Swedish corporate governance system, which is considered to be among the 
better in the region and the Pakistani corporate governance system which has been declared 
best in the whole south Asia by the World Bank.
54
  
 
In the presentation of the two countries, it is described that they differ both in origin and on 
other aspects; the differences of the countries make it harder to conduct research as no prior 
study is found to fit Pakistan and Sweden in character. How do you compare the corporate 
governance systems of Pakistan and Sweden? With prior knowledge of the different 
development stages, is it alright to believe that a general research could be adopted to conduct 
the research, probably not. Skewness could occur to the study if prior research model would 
be used without consideration to the mentioned problem. The problem would probably not 
only occur on country-level, the companies might also differ i.e. information disclosure etc. 
making a comparison hard to conduct. The kind of research model to be used needs to be 
colored by the characteristics of the two countries. A new model for this purpose is required 
that could accommodate both the country level and company level scenario in an unbiased 
manner.  
 
                                               
53 Governance Metrics International, country rankings as of September 23, 2008 
54 World Bank Publication, 2009 
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The second aspect of the study is the company-level compliance of corporate governance part 
just mentioned above. The annual reports and websites of the sample companies will act as 
the primary sources of data to the company-level as these sources might be considered as 
representative of the companies‘ governance practices and reveal how the company wants to 
portray its image for all the stakeholders like creditors, employees, customers etc. and 
especially the shareholders
55
. As annual report is a public document, so, all stakeholders have 
readily access to it. Therefore, due to the convenient availability of this detailed document, all 
stakeholders especially investors, both domestic and foreign, uses it as a fundamental starting 
place for investigating a company
56. The annual report‘s level of compatibility between the 
sample companies of the selected countries will be observed and the various forms of 
information available will be focused on to examine the research questions of the study. The 
stated corporate governance system of countries and discovered differences and similarities is 
one aspect to the study. Is what discovered at country-level a direct reflection of the corporate 
governance application of companies? A not so bold statement is to say; no. Thereby remains 
the issue of whether or not companies‘ annual reports and website content are reflections of 
the nation's corporate governance system? Do the differences and similarities vary between 
Pakistan and Sweden more or less on company-level than on country-level?   
Cultural and religious aspects will also be taken into account while discussing the differences 
present in the two systems. Like many previous comparative studies of corporate governance 
systems of different countries, the possibility for convergence between the basic corporate 
governance models (i.e. Anglo Saxon and Germanic Model) adopted and adapted by the two 
concerned countries will also be looked upon. The mutual convergence could be plausible 
within the represented countries, however, the country specific social and religious aspects 
and the convergence of two systems will not be the core points of argumentation for this 
study. 
 
1.3. Research Question 
 
How is corporate governance systems compared in two national systems with different 
development stages? What are the differences and similarities in Pakistan and Sweden on 
                                               
55 Zhou and Panbunyuen, The association between board composition and different types of voluntary disclosure 
p.7-9 2008 
56 Canadian Investor Relation Institute and Precision IR- Survey of Investor Research Trends, 2005 
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country-level and on company-level? What research model should be used to make such 
comparisons? 
 
1.4. Research purpose 
 
To compare the differences and similarities that apart the corporate governance systems of 
Pakistan and Sweden by using a research model developed for this purpose. The same model 
will compare how major companies of the countries are expressing this in information to 
shareholders.  
 
1.5. Delimitation 
 
The numbers of companies that have been studied are not viewed as representative for the 
stock exchanges in each country, instead a sample of carefully chosen major companies are 
examined for this pilot study. All further listed companies have been disregarded due to the 
time limit. 
 
1.6. Thesis Outline 
 
The thesis will direct the reader with an introduction, further on to the problem discussion, 
which results in the chosen research question and purpose. Next section presents how the 
thesis will be made, methodology of the qualitative approach, which is the base for the 
theoretical framework. Here the two corporate governance systems will be defined and earlier 
studies explaining important dimensions of corporate governance. To sum up the thesis 
chapter four and five will explain the findings of the study, here, the interpretation of the 
literature will take place and define the whole thesis. 
 
Chapter one, withholds the introduction and problem discussion where it‘s defined why 
research is important for fulfillment of research gap and to understand the situation. The main 
research question and purpose of the thesis will conclude the discussion, guide and prepare 
the reader to following chapters. 
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Chapter two is presentation of theoretical framework and empirical foundation, which are 
used as basis for this thesis and to provide understanding to readers. The two corporate 
governance systems‘ theoretical framework is presented, and the importance of prior research 
of the chosen method dimensions. 
 
Chapter three contains the research model introduction in detailed manner. All five key 
dimensions: ownership structure, board, disclosures and internal control, shareholder‘s right, 
and corporate social responsibility. The five dimensions will be sub-categorized with more 
specific variables. 
 
Chapter four, states the research methodology of this thesis, which is foundational of 
qualitative approach. To conduct this type of research main dimensions are chosen to best 
reflect the purpose of the thesis. 
 
Chapter five is presentation of the findings and results of collected data in order. Differences 
and similarities are presented among the two systems and the sample companies. 
 
Chapter six is continuation to chapter five where collected results and findings are analyzed in 
order of country-level and company-level.  
 
Chapter seven is the concluding chapter of the thesis. All conclusions found through analysis 
will be stated with considerations for further research. 
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2. Theoretical Framework and Empirical Foundation 
 
To better understand the concept of this research study, the chapter of theoretical framework 
and empirical foundation will present a picture of corporate governance models that national 
corporate governance systems are related to. Pakistan and Sweden are presented in the sense 
of their systems to understand the current situation and view of regulations that form the 
system. To sum up the chapter, the issue of convergence is presented, which might hold the 
future of corporate governance and at last the construction of research model is presented. 
 
2.1. Theoretical Framework 
 
Corporate governance systems of nations are categorized into main larger models of systems 
e.g. Anglo Saxon, Germanic, Network-oriented etc.
57
. Another classic distinction to make is 
the market-based UK/US corporate governance system and the bank-based Continental 
Europe and Japan.
58
 However behind the mentioned systems different theories lays, i.e. 
agency theory, institutional theory, and stakeholder theory. Below is the discussion of two 
models which influence the governance regimes of the selected countries. 
 
2.1.1. Anglo Saxon Corporate Governance Model 
 
The Anglo Saxon model has been established for quite some time and is considered to be the 
most influential one. Major economies like United States of America and United Kingdom 
have adopted this corporate governance model and due to the strong capital markets of these 
countries, it has proven to be very dominant and various other countries like Australia and 
New Zealand have adopted this system
59
. The Anglo-Saxon system, also called outsider or 
market-based system, has profoundly affected the purpose of corporations worldwide by 
emphasizing on the fulfillment of shareholder‘s interest60. This model is branded by the 
maximization of shareholder‘s value and protecting their interests61 whereas other 
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59 Clarke, International Corporate Governance, A comparative study p.129, 2007 
60 ibid 
61 International Chamber of Commerce 
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stakeholders like creditors, employees, suppliers, customers etc. gets protection for their 
rights through contractual and regulatory means instead of being a participant in the corporate 
governance
62
. As discussed before, that the shareholders are the key stakeholders, so, this 
model is heavily subject to agency theory
63
. 
 
One of a key attribute of this system is its widely dispersed equity ownership structure where 
institutional shareholding is a significant part of ownership structure
64
. Initially there used to 
be more individual investors who invested in a company and used to develop emotional ties 
with the company but over time, the institutional investors have become more considerable 
than before. Institutional investors might include mutual funds, hedge funds, investor‘s 
blocks, insurance companies, bankers etc. However, studies also talks about the importance of 
individual investors as these investors provide expansion and liquidity to the stock market
65
. 
 
For the purpose of meeting the expectations of company‘s shareholders, the firm generally 
seeks short-term profitability and efficiency instead of long-term profitability, survival and 
growth
66
. For the purpose of aligning the management‘s interest towards above-mentioned 
motive, often the executive remuneration is attached with the performance of firm
67
. The most 
famous being stock options. The result is often in the form of increased focus on keeping the 
share price high as per expectations of shareholders. High levels of continuous disclosure and 
transparency requirements are supposed to be met to keep the market informed
68
. Disclosures 
regarding strategic, financial and non-financial information are disclosed by companies for 
investor‘s awareness and as per demands of respective codes for countries. 
 
One tier board structure is followed in the Anglo Saxon model whereby the board contains 
both independent and executive directors. The role of independent or non-executives directors 
is very important as they are the ones who are primarily supposed to safeguard the interest of 
shareholders
69
. Chairman works closely with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and board 
has board committees for the purposes of audit, remuneration and nomination
70
. However, in 
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United State of America, the role of chairman and Chief Executive Officer can be seen 
together in contrast to Germanic and other models
71
. A strong stock market is also a feature of 
this model and plays an important role in respective countries and countries with such models 
may also have strong external takeover market, which serves as a protective mechanism for 
investor
72
. Much emphasis is also paid on the safety of interests of minority shareholder 
through codes, company laws and security laws
73
. 
 
2.1.2. Germanic Corporate Governance Model 
 
This system can be observed in countries like Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, 
Norway, Finland etc.
74
 whereby focus is not only the interest of share holder, rather, a wider 
array of stakeholders like creditors, employees, suppliers, customers, society etc. are 
considered (stakeholder theory). Due to this fact, the philosophy is not only to keep the share 
price sky high. Instead, working in the best interests of all stakeholders and firm is the 
ultimate goal
75
. Consequently, companies in Germanic system are conceived as a coalition of 
various stakeholders
76
, which is not the case in Anglo American system where management 
and shareholders are the main entities. 
 
This Bank based system, unlike Anglo Saxon model, is characterized by concentrated 
ownership
77
 where a majority or significant amount of stockholding is kept by few numbers 
of large investors
78
. These large dominating investors can be classified into wealthy 
individuals and families as the primary stockholders whereas large banks and non-financial 
firms play a secondary role in ownership structure. These large banks and block holders of a 
corporation play a substitutionary role in the disciplinary mechanism in regard to Anglo 
Saxon Model. Such large block holders take a more active part in governance of corporations 
and business matters due to the fact that they are more informed about the matters of 
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corporation
79
, which is not as often the case with the dispersed ownership of Anglo Saxon 
system. 
 
As shareholders are not the only stakeholders to be considered, therefore, sole focus on short-
term profitability and efficiency is not the case with this governance model. Here, in general 
management‘s focus is on long-term survival, growth and stability of corporate entity80. 
Consequent to this philosophy of long-termism towards business and block holding of shares 
by wealthy individuals, families and banks, the stock turnover is low which is in contrast with 
the Anglo Saxon model that is characterized by short term business philosophy and dispersed 
ownership
81
. 
 
In contrast to the presence of strong securities markets in Anglo-Saxon countries
82
, Germanic 
countries have relatively smaller and under-developed securities market
83
. Consequent to this 
fact, the Germanic corporations are more reliant on the debt financing which banks in the 
form of loans provide
84
. Because of embryonic securities market in Germanic countries, its 
role as active market for corporate control is minimized while the otherwise case is true for 
Anglo-Saxon countries
85
. Germanic countries have in general two tier board structures in 
contrast to Anglo Saxon one tier board
86
. The lower tier for Germanic corporations that is 
called management board consists of full time executive members or managing directors 
whereas the upper tier, called supervisory board, consists of non-executive directors only, 
which are representatives of various stakeholders
87
. These two boards are independent of each 
other
88
 and make certain the avoidance of nose-to-nose accountability of executive on 
management board
89
. When it comes to disclosure and transparency, Germanic model is 
believed to lag behind a bit compared to Anglo Saxon model where company presents more 
detailed information for investors
90
.  
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2.2. Convergence of Corporate Governance Systems 
 
In particular, there has been discussion on whether the outcome of the globalization process 
will lead to the global dominance of the Anglo-Saxon ―outsider‖ model, with its emphasis on 
shareholder rights and transparency over the Continental ―insider‖ model, with typically 
fewer listed companies and a remarkable concentration of ownership either in families or 
other companies
91,92. Steen Thomsen argues in his article ―The Convergence of Corporate 
Governance Systems to European and Anglo-American Standards‖ that convergence is 
happening to UK/US corporate governance systems that are getting closer to European 
corporate governance systems. This is in contrast to the common perception that European 
corporate governance systems are converging into UK/US corporate governance systems. It‘s 
important to state that US/UK systems are also converging; it‘s not a one-sided issue. UK/US 
systems through ownership concentration, increasing insider ownership, greater separation of 
ownership and management and insider control. Thomsen finds support for the mutual 
convergence hypothesis in his article
93
.  
 
2.3. National Corporate Governance Systems 
 
Pakistan and Sweden both have national codes of corporate governance shaping their systems, 
colored by Anglo Saxon and Germanic corporate governance systems mentioned above. The 
national directions of each code will be presented below with other aspects that are of 
relevance to this study.  
 
2.3.1. Pakistani Corporate Governance System 
 
Historically, Pakistani companies have been family-controlled and many still remain in the 
same manner, in general, through pyramid structures and cross-holdings. Financial support 
have in general relied on debt financing, hence is the equity market not developing rapidly.  
However, there are three stock exchanges in Pakistan, Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) as the 
largest with Islamabad and Lahore stock exchanges
94
 to follow. The issue of corporate 
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governance has recently been discussed with new light.  Major reforms in shaping the best 
practices (according to Pakistani legislation) for companies in relation to corporate 
governance have been taken by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) in 
2002. SECP is a regulatory authority on companies in Pakistan. It has exercised its power 
under clause 34(4) of the securities and exchange ordinance
95
. SECP has developed a code of 
corporate governance in cooperation with the Institute of Charted Accountants Pakistan 
(ICAP). SECP further issued directions to Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad stock exchanges to 
incorporate the provisions of the code in their listing regulations. As a result, the listing 
regulations were suitably modified by the stock exchanges
96
. While the legal frame works to 
run a company in Pakistan is addressed through Companies Ordinance 1984. SECP has made 
some key aspects of code of corporate governance, a legal binding on companies by 
incorporating them in the Companies Ordinance 1984. Thus, by the modification of listing 
regulations for companies on stock exchanges and Companies Ordinance 1984, bigger chunk 
of the practices defined in code of corporate governance has become mandatory for listed 
companies.  
 
According to the laws, the minimum number of board of directors for listed company is 
seven
97
. The representation of independent non-executive directors and minority shareholders 
is encouraged and maximum limit for executive directors on board is seventy five percent of 
total number of board of directors including the chief executive officer
98
. The board must 
have one independent director representing institutional equity interest
99
. The directors should 
be selected through election as it is prescribed in detail in Companies Ordinance 1984 under 
section 178
100
. If a person acquires 12.5% or more of voting shares of company then he may 
apply for new elections of board of directors in the coming annual general meeting under 
section 178A of Companies Ordinance
101
. If a person takes such action after acquiring 12.5% 
or more of voting shares then he must hold those shares at least for one year after the date of 
new elections
102
. A director should not be a director in more than ten listed companies
103
. 
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Director should be a registered taxpayer, he should not be a defaulter in payment of any loan 
and he or his spouse should not be involved in stock exchange brokerage business
104
. 
Directors, once elected, should not hold the office for more than three years and if any casual 
vacancy occurs during that period then the new director should be appointed within thirty 
days and he should hold the office for the remaining period
105
. 
 
Directors should file a declaration with SECP that they are directors of particular company 
and they are aware of their powers, duties and responsibilities. This declaration should be 
made within fourteen days after the appointment of directors
106
. While it is mandatory for 
board of directors to prepare and circulate ―statement of ethics and business practices‖ duly 
signed by them to establish a standard of conduct in companies
107
. Board of directors should 
also disclose in the annual reports, the vision and mission statements of company along with 
the formulation of corporate strategies and policies of material nature
108
. The chairman of 
board should preferably be non-executive
109
. It is mandatory for board of directors to meet 
once in each quarter of the financial year
110
. Appointment and removal of chief financial 
officer and company secretary should be done by the chief executive officer along with the 
approval of board of directors
111
. Chief financial officer and company secretary should be 
either a member of recognized body of professional accountants, or a bachelor from a 
recognized university along with a five year or more experience in a corporate sector 
specifically in the listed companies. Lawyers are also eligible to be a company secretary
112
. 
Director‘s report to shareholders should be a part of annual reports of companies, in which 
directors testify that the annual reports present fair view of company, books of accounts are 
properly maintained, appropriate accounting standards and policies are applied, appropriate 
internal control system is developed, belief about the company that it is a going concern or 
not and company is in line with the best practices of code of corporate governance as 
described in the code of corporate governance
113
. Directors should also make sure that key 
financial figures of last six year are disclosed in annual reports, strategic decisions regarding 
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any restructuring, divestiture or expansion, dividend announcements or in case of non 
payment of dividends the reasons for such action by the company, number of board meetings 
held during the year including attendance from each director, pattern of share holding and 
trade of shares held by directors, CEO, CFO and company secretary during the financial 
year
114
. The board of directors should approve all the statements circulated in the year
115
. The 
external auditors should not hold any share in the company, directly or indirectly
116
. Board of 
directors should establish audit committee. Committee should include at least three members 
including chairman and it is preferable if they are non-executive members of board
117
. 
Members of audit committee should meet at least once in a quarter of year. The audit 
committee should decide for external auditors, their appointment, removal and remuneration 
in particular and give their recommendations to the board of directors.
118
 Committee is also 
responsible for all the relevant issues and decision as for as internal and external audit of the 
company is concerned
119
. All listed companies should change their external auditors after five 
years
120
. It is required from all companies to include the statement of compliance with 
corporate governance report in their annual reports, and this statement should be examined 
and verified by the external auditors
121
.  
 
2.3.2. Swedish Corporate Governance System 
 
The content of the Swedish corporate governance model is defined with characteristics i.e. in 
general concentrated ownership, only few listed companies misses a controlling owner. Take-
over activity is skewed more to the Anglo-Saxon model than Germanic with high activity
122
. 
It's said that corporate governance has been put high on the agenda for a longer time in 
Sweden. In the 1980's, an evaluation was made by the owner investigation focusing on issues 
that today is discussed in corporate governance and in the 1990's, there was a revision of the 
Company act in 2003. A concluding statement was presented about best practices of the board 
                                               
114
 ibid. 
115 Code of Corporate Governance p: 6, 9 
116
 ibid. 
117
 ibid. 
118
 ibid. 
119
 ibid. 
120 Code of Corporate Governance p: 8, 12 
121 Code of Corporate Governance p: 12 
122 SOU, 2004:46  
 25 
work in Swedish limited companies
123
. The Swedish Corporate Governance Board 
implemented the Swedish code of corporate governance July 2005, covering listed companies 
with market capitalization exceeding 3 billion SEK. When implemented, approximately 100 
companies were covered. From the first of July 2008, the code was revised, all listed 
companies traded on the Swedish stock market, should comply with the code
124
. The code 
should be regarded as a complement to the Swedish law and act as an alternative to the law, 
so called self-regulation
125
. The code of corporate governance is one part of Swedish 
corporate governance rules including the Companies act, stock exchange listing requirements 
and statements by the Swedish Securities Council, as rules set minimum limitations and ―the 
code‖ a norm of good corporate governance. Companies may choose either to comply with 
the code or explain the occurred deviations
126
.   
 
Ownership of Swedish companies relative to Great Britain and US companies are represented 
by fewer and larger shareholders with higher active participation and even board 
representation. There‘s positive reaction to this, but also other voice that such strong power 
should not be misused and hurt other shareholders
127. That‘s why the law is enforcing 
minority rights during circumstances creating an undue advantage to a shareholder
128
. The 
general meeting is the highest deciding organ of the company where every single shareholder 
has voting rights and if they can‘t participate they can pass on their rights to a council. The 
general meeting decides remuneration level to the board of directors and the auditors. The 
board should set up an extra general meeting if a minority shareholder with at least ten 
percent of outstanding shares demands it. The auditors and the board itself can also demand 
extra general meetings. The voting rights of shareholders can have different power, but no 
share can have more than ten times higher voting rights than an ordinary share. At the general 
meeting the nomination committee should propose the chairman of the board
129
. The board of 
directors should consist of at least three representatives where one of them should be 
announced as chair of the board, which will be responsible that the board fulfill their 
obligated demands and lead the work of the board. According to the stock exchange‘s listing 
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requirements
130
, only one of the elected board directors is allowed to be a part of the 
company‘s management or the management of a subsidiary. Usually this is the CEO, however 
it‘s usual that no company representative is board director within the own company. The 
board of directors should consist with a good majority of non-executive directors. In further 
extent should the majority of the board directors be independent in relation to the company 
and the management of the company, and at least two of these should be independent in 
relation to the major shareholders of the company
131
. The board may not alter its own size, 
which is up to the general meeting to decide. The board should consist of two employee 
representatives with equal number of alternates and three if the company exceeds 1000 
employees. However, the number of employee representatives may not exceed the number of 
directors on board. The CEO is subordinated to the board of directors, and should prepare 
questions for the board that are outside the jurisdiction of the CEO. The CEO can never be the 
same person as the chair of the board
132
. The board shall give the CEO directions on how to 
run the operations of the company. The CEO can be board director but not the chair of the 
board. Whether or not the CEO is a board member, the CEO can always participate and 
interact at a board meeting as long as the board doesn‘t oppose133.     
 
The nomination committee should propose election of the chair of the board and board 
members and remuneration and other compensation to the board and each of the members of 
the board, as it is autonomous of the board
134
. The same process is followed with the election 
of auditors. The general meeting should elect the nomination committee or direct how the 
board members should be elected. The nomination committee should consist of at least three 
members, where one shall be elected as chair. The CEO or the company management may not 
be a member of the nomination committee. The board members may not be of majority of the 
nomination committee and neither chairman of the committee. At least one of the members of 
the nomination committee should be independent in relation to majority shareholders. At the 
election or reelection of the board members, the nomination committee should disclose 
information about the nominated. The information should consist of age, main education, 
work experience, position in the company or other company, his/her or close person‘s 
shareholdings or other financial instruments of the company, independence status of the 
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person in regard to the company or any major shareholder of the company
135
. The board size 
and composition should be structured in regards of business, development stage to fit with 
representation of female, diversity, competence and background. Equal gender representation 
shall be emphasized. No suppliants should be elected and a board member should not be 
elected for longer than to the next annual general meeting
136
. The chairman of the board 
should be elected at the general meeting
137
. 
 
For remuneration of leading positions, the board shall initiate a remuneration committee that 
will prepare and provide the remuneration and other employment conditions to the company 
management. The chairman is allowed to lead the remuneration committee as well. The 
general meeting shall decide and approve share related compensation to the company 
management where board members should not participate in such remuneration. It is left to 
general meeting to decide such remuneration
138
. The board shall institute an audit committee 
that should include at least three members of the board where the majority of the members 
should be independent in relation to the management of the company and major shareholder. 
The board shall at least once a year meet with the company‘s auditor. The audit committee 
should evaluate companies that do not have a separate internal function, whether or not there 
is a need for it. 
139
. The company shall create a corporate governance report, posted in the 
annual report. Any deviation to the code should there be noted and explained if deviated. 
Following aspects should be included: the composition of the nomination committee, if a 
board member has been appointed by an owner, where also the name of the owner should be 
disclosed. The work distribution, how the work is done, number of board meetings and the 
representation by specific board members should be included in the report. Composition, 
work tasks, decision rights in eventual board committees, the participation of specific board 
member, CEO‘s age, main education, and work experience, relevant tasks outside the 
company, own or close related person shareholding or company‘s with close business 
relations are other required statements. Certain section, where the boards description of 
internal control and risk assessment regarding the financial report. On the company‘s website, 
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there should be a devoted section to corporate governance issues where the corporate 
governance report and current code could be found
140
.    
 
2.4. Corporate Governance Ranking Institutes 
 
Currently, various corporate governance-rating agencies are operating in this field with own 
rating criteria to rank companies globally. In this regard, Governance Metric International‘s141 
(GMI) corporate governance index, Institutional Shareholder Services‘142 (ISS) Corporate 
Governance Quotient (CGQ) and Standard and Poor‘s143 (S&P) Gamma criteria are notable 
ones. The comparative dimensions are the most crucial part of this study. The rating schemes 
of above-mentioned rating agencies have been taken into consideration for construction of 
analytical tool. A brief overview for these ratings seems reasonable. 
 
2.4.1. ISS Rating Institute 
 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) is an independent corporate governance rating 
agency
144
. ISS is facilitating investors in making their decisions regarding their investments. 
To facilitate investors in this regard ISS has developed a standard governance matrix to 
monitor and compare corporate governance practices of American companies initially and 
later for non-American firms too
145
. This matrix is named as Corporate Governance Quotient 
(CGQ)
146
. The key dimensions of ISS used in their standard model of ranking are board, 
audit, charter/by laws, state of incorporation, executive and director compensation, qualitative 
factors, director ownership and director education
147
. ISS has further subcategorized these key 
dimensions into sixty-four variables
148
. ISS has developed an electronic platform 
(proxymaster.com), which is used by investors, companies and researchers to view Corporate 
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Governance Quotient ratings of companies
149
. ISS has two separate Corporate Governance 
Quotient rating criterions for US and non-US firms
150
. ISS utilizes first Corporate Governance 
Quotient for US companies that include sixty-five sub dimensions
151
. The second Corporate 
Governance Quotient is for non-US companies that contain fifty-five sub dimensions
152
. 
 
2.4.2. GMI Rating Institute 
 
Governance Metrics International (GMI) is a corporate governance research and rating 
institute
153. Key expertise of GMI is to rate the companies‘ world wide on the basis of their 
corporate practices. Like this study is focusing on corporate governance issue from an 
investor‘s perspective, GMI also rates companies all over the world from an investor‘s 
perspective
154
. For this purpose, GMI has designed a standard corporate governance index for 
rating companies worldwide. Six dimensions are the most critical to define corporate 
governance practices in a company from GMI viewpoint which are board accountability, 
financial disclosure and internal controls, shareholder rights, executive compensation, market 
for control and ownership base and corporate behavior and CSR Issues
155
. GMI has further 
subcategorized these dimensions to make a detailed assessment structure
156
. GMI assigns 
score to each company after the analysis of its corporate governance practices in which score 
of one represents the lowest corporate governance rating while the score of ten represents the 
highest corporate governance rating
157
. GMI assign ratings to the companies relative to other 
rated companies in the same region or relative to company‘s home market rating158. For the 
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global rating of companies, GMI rate companies relative to 4200 companies rated by GMI 
worldwide
159
.  
 
2.4.3. Standard and Poor (S&P) 
 
Standards and Poor‘s has designed a research tool namely ―Gamma‖, which reflects the 
approach towards the company‘s corporate governance practices with focus on investor‘s 
protection against inadequate governance related losses
160
. S&P conducts its analysis both at 
country level and company level
161
. For specifically country level approach, this study is 
consistent, with few modifications, with the method adopted by Standard and Poor‘s. For 
country level analysis, it focuses on four key dimensions, which are market infrastructure, 
legal infrastructure, regulatory infrastructure and informational infrastructure
162
. While, for 
company level analysis, Gamma concentrates on ownership influences, shareholder rights, 
transparency, audit and enterprise risk management, board effectiveness, strategic process, 
and compensation practices
163
. 
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3. Research Model 
 
The actual research model will be presented here, which has been used for the data collection 
of the research. The five key dimensions of the research are described with sub variables to 
all dimensions. At the end of chapter, the newly constructed model for country and company 
level research along with all dimensions and variables is presented. 
 
3.1. Structure of the Research Model 
 
The above-discussed rating agencies have designed criterion for comparing companies 
globally. Using similar comparative mechanism for this study does not fit fully. ISS is only 
rating at company‘s level by categorizing them as US and non-US companies and uses 
separate Corporate Governance Quotients (CGQ)
164
 for this purpose. These CGQs measure 
company‘s governance rankings compared to its industry or it is compared with the 
companies in the index in which company is registered. This study not only conducts 
company level analysis but country level analysis too. So, utilizing the ISS designed matrices 
cannot fulfill the need of this study as ISS, in its rating, only focuses on the micro level 
attributes of the corporate governance systems. Likewise, GMI has designed its rating index 
for companies but it does not consider macro level dimensions in their study. Although, 
countries are assigned scores but the basis for such rating is not country level factors but 
company level conformance with governance requirements. As mentioned, the aim of this 
study is two fold, so this approach also doesn‘t fully serve the purpose of this study. A 
comparison is required at the country level to focus on the macro factors to assess corporate 
governance practices in the country. Effective/ineffective legal and regulatory environment is 
an important factor to investors‘ decision making. A country providing better legal protection 
to shareholders‘ rights and having effective enforcing mechanism for avoiding abuse of 
investors‘ rights might bias an investors‘ investment decision towards that country. This 
becomes even more important in the case of emerging markets where many variations exist in 
this regard
165
. These mechanisms are important to assess, as legal and regulatory frameworks 
go hand in hand as an effective regulatory mechanism may do no good if there are no 
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effective laws. Similarly, if regulatory mechanism doesn‘t provide practical sense to laws, 
then good laws can serve no purpose to investors. Additionally, if country level governance 
environment is weak, this can come down to company level governance settings. The research 
model utilized for this comparative study conducts country level analysis and looks only to 
the protection provided to investors by legal and regulatory framework designed for the 
corporate governance practices in both countries. Market functionality might be a useful 
dimension as it may help understand the overall environment of a country‘s equity market166. 
It may also provide insights about factors like liquidity/ breadth of stock market, role of 
various players like institutional investors and the extent to which it serves as mechanism for 
corporate control. Similarly, informational infrastructure might become handy as it contains 
information about varying accounting standards, the usefulness and effectiveness of 
disclosures etc.
167
 Such dimensions would have been useful for this kind of studies but this 
study follows an archival research approach while real time information through surveys or 
interview approach better suits such analysis, which is not probable for this particular study 
due to time and resource limitations. In regard to country level corporate governance, 
company law and stock exchange listing regulations are the main legal documents as they 
cover all basic issues ranging from company formation to setting rights and responsibilities of 
directors and management. Additionally, for regulatory framework, the study examines it by 
looking only at the level of compliance by companies with respective legal requirements. 
 
For the company level analysis, the study utilizes underlying variables of ISS, GMI and S&P. 
Each rating considers certain variables to be more important while others follow different 
approach. This study tries to reconcile the above ratings to narrow down the gap between 
them by keeping investor‘s perspective in view. While constructing the research model for 
this study, those variables like company responses given for providing additional information 
on investor‘s demand, anti-takeover measures (poison pill arrangements) etc. have been 
disregarded that required first hand information from interviews, surveys etc. Variables 
regarding ownership structure have been modified and extended a bit that fits to this study for 
examining the highly ownership concentrated firms from both countries. This study focuses 
on five key dimensions, which are ownership structure, board and board committees, 
disclosures and internal control, shareholders‘ rights and corporate social responsibility.  
                                               
166
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The research model is designed to study the sample countries and companies in qualitative 
manner that, in the author‘s view will provide a deeper understanding of the given issue. For 
comparative studies like this, especially, in regard to countries where governance system is 
evolving, a qualitative model like this will not limit the research findings in the sense of a pre-
approved framework thereby enabling superior inferences to be drawn. Since this is a pilot 
study aimed at determining differences and similarities among diverse governance systems, 
utilizing a pre-determined quantitative scale for assessing undetermined nature of qualitative 
results might affect the quality of research findings. Unlike traditional comparison models 
like discussed above, this model will not give a predefined rating to any variable in each 
country. Rather, its focal point is to benchmark the sample countries and companies‘ 
governance practice with the OECD defined global best practices. Based on that, a qualitative 
comparative judgment will be drawn. 
 
The significance of the key dimensions of model is discussed below: 
 
3.1.1. Ownership Structure 
 
If everything is owned by an individual entity, the matter of direct and indirect ownership 
becomes meaningless
168
. Understanding the ownership structure is an important element 
while assessing a company‘s governance footing. It is essential to look at the existence of 
majority shareholders; institutional shareholding, cross-shareholding by associated companies 
etc. as concentration of power in hands of few expose minority shareholders to expropriation 
risk like transfer pricing etc. Such observation becomes more important for economies where 
family or business group dominance on business exists. Similarly, dispersed ownership 
exposes shareholders to management risk. However, for this study, variables aiming at 
existence of ownership concentration are more relevant as both the sample countries have 
dominating family and business group entities, cross shareholdings and pyramid structures
169
. 
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When shares of a corporation are issued to the general public, the control of the founders to 
their corporation is diluted that many founders do not want to happen
170
. Offering different 
classes of shares with differing voting rights is one such way of maintaining control over 
organization
171
. Such different classes of shares are known as dual-class share structures or 
also restricted- or subordinate-voting share structures
172
. These dual-class share structures add 
new dimensions to the normally ―one share, one vote‖ rule as superior shares can have 
disproportionate multiple voting rights while inferior with no voting rights
173
. These superior 
shares enjoy special voting rights like power to elect a specific number of board members, 
right to decide and approve executive compensation plans etc
174
.  
 
A study suggests that such share structures are common in family dominated businesses 
where these shares are used to maintain family control over business
175
. Controlling 
shareholders argue that dual-class shares serve as a protection against takeover threats and 
short-termism thereby paving way for long term sustainable position
176
. Also, founders who 
are not fond of debt use this mechanism that enables them to acquire capital needed without 
sharing their controlling power
177
. In contrast, many investors, especially institutional 
investors, oppose these share structures and argue that dual-class share structures are against 
public shareholders and contribute to overall poor corporate governance
178
. A Scandinavian 
study concludes that firms with dual class shares systematically perform inferior and over 
invest whereas firms with single-class shares performs better and invests efficiently
179
. This 
mechanism is also accused for many other reasons like expropriation of shareholder‘s right 
with restricted shares by controlling shareholders with superior shares by, for example, 
flowing company cash towards their personal projects not related to core business, sky-high 
executive pays, bonuses and stock options
180
. 
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This study considers single class/ dual class shares issue for the company analysis. S&P uses 
a similar variable for company ratings but in a more general sense. It is addressed explicitly in 
this study due to its role in Swedish corporations. This study also takes an additional variable 
for assessing ownership concentration by looking at the percentage shares held by top ten 
shareholders of company. This will be useful in relating to minority shareholder protection 
and representation given to them on board. By looking at top ten shareholders of company, it 
will provide a comparative view about which country has more ownership concentration. For 
detailed list of variables selected for this dimension, see tables 3.1 at the end of the chapter. 
 
3.1.2. Board and Board Committees 
 
Board is one of the crucial factors in the governance of company as it is supposed to provide 
strategic direction to the company and keep an independent check on management‘s practices, 
thus, acting as a safeguard layer for investors.
181
 Board is responsible for creating trust 
between management and shareholders while assisting in the day-to-day activities of the 
company
182
. Key roles of the board are monitoring the management, checking the 
accountability, approval and monitoring of strategic decisions, advising the management and 
executives on the crucial matters and relationship building with stakeholders
183
. Such 
responsibilities can be served best if the board composition is effective. That is the reason 
why investors focus on issue of board structure and composition; specifically they consider 
non-executive representation and independence as a proxy for board effectiveness
184
. Non-
executives directors play a vital role in the effectiveness of board and their representation act 
as a source of confidence to investors
185
. Companies with major shareholder(s) can have 
boards, which are highly populated with management or majority shareholders, thereby 
making such boards less accountable to minority shareholders. Research of boards tells that 
markets reward firms for appointing outside directors
186
. The study focuses on the board 
composition and disclosures regarding them. It will be interesting to see the dimension about 
non-executive directors in concentrated ownership set up as both relates to the control 
mechanism over firm. 
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Separation of chairman and CEO seat is an important governance factor as unification of such 
powers can be an element affecting investors‘ confidence. Where the chairman is also a chief 
executive, a strong and sovereign board is very essential
187
. When the CEO also is the 
chairman, it can increase the agency costs of the firm, which exposes shareholders to 
considerable risk
188
. 
 
Executive remuneration has been a sensitive issue in regard to board‘s practices. In family 
dominated businesses or majority shareholders existence, where management can be 
controlled through keeping direct control from dominating shareholder. It is interesting to 
follow how effectively the management is compensated, and whether such compensation 
aligns management‘s interest with shareholder‘s interest in a short term or long term 
perspective? Also, in situations where boards are heavily represented by management, 
executive compensation schemes become issues if greater concern. Board‘s remuneration and 
audit committees‘ and the nomination committee independence is an issue of concern for 
shareholders as they deal in matters like executive compensation schemes, key appointments 
to company etc. 
 
Factors like board size, directors‘ expertise and education, board committees‘ autonomy, 
AGM/ EGM attendance, and relevant disclosures etc. are also other areas of focus for this 
study. For more detailed factors building this broader dimension, see tables 3.1 at the end of 
this chapter. 
 
3.1.3. Disclosures and Internal Control 
 
Transparency of managements‘ practices is an important issue for investors because this 
explains exactly what is going on in company. The timely availability of firm‘s financial and 
non-financial information is important for existing and potential investors as this can allow 
them to keep a check on management‘s performance as they present it. It is an important 
responsibility to the board of directors to provide high quality disclosures on the financial and 
operating performance of the company, so that shareholders can make informed and accurate 
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decisions regarding their investments
189
. Board of directors may discuss material issues in 
management and analysis sections of the annual report to enhance the quality of reporting 
standards. It increases investor‘s understanding regarding risks inherent to the company190. 
This study looks at this variable in regard to majority shareholding influence on company 
practices and the relevant disclosures. Also, in concentrated ownership structures, the 
availability or non-availability of disclosures regarding associated party holdings, cross 
shareholdings, institutional share holdings are important concerns for investors. Disclosures 
regarding ownership structure, board composition, executive remuneration, internal control 
and audit, accounting policies adoption, auditor‘s independence and appointment etc. are key 
issues of interest for current and potential investors
191
. Regulators and markets now demand 
continuous disclosures on all the significant matters such as mergers and takeovers from the 
board of directors
192
. 
 
As aftermath of the Enron collapse, Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) has taken vital steps to 
enhance internal control by imposing that CFOs and CEOs are to implement internal control 
practices
193. A sound system ensures a safeguard to investor‘s investment and company‘s 
assets. Investors benefit from a sound internal control as it enhances efficiency and 
effectiveness of operations and helps in complying with laws and regulations. An effective 
internal control system helps identifying the changing environment around company and thus 
helps in management and control of the risks in an appropriate manner
194
. Irrespective of 
validity of the pre-conception that Swedish code of corporate governance has explained 
internal control in a limited manner
195
, it is interesting to find that how companies within 
Sweden disclose explanation of internal control in their annual reports, and importantly to 
compare it with Pakistani code of corporate governance. The study specifically focuses on 
internal audit function disclosures in annual reports, disclosure regarding internal control 
policies and practices formulated by companies in their annual reports. 
 
3.1.4. Shareholder’s Rights  
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It is very crucial for investors the level of protection a country provides to them. It is even 
more crucial how company treats the shareholders rights. Different countries have different 
level of legal protection for investors. The way company governance practices relating to 
shareholders rights lag behind, match or exceed the legal requirements will be a useful aspect 
of this study for determining how companies in comparison with each other and then with 
countries differ in this regard. 
 
Issues regarding rules, requirements and related processes for general meetings and voting 
procedures are key factors for his study. For detailed list of variables selected for this 
dimension, see table 3.1. 
 
3.1.5. Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Corporations are becoming more and more socially responsible and there are apparent signs 
that they are taking their social responsibilities more seriously
196
. A KPMG survey in 2005 
shows the similar trend, and shows that increasing number of companies are now issuing 
separate Annual Reports for CSR
197
. OECD and European Union are also promoting socially 
responsible practices and investments, especially in regard to the operations of multinational 
companies, which is quite obvious from their guidelines
198
. Although, the way different 
corporations view CSR varies a lot as some view it as an unwanted cost whereas other 
perceive it as an effective way of presenting the corporate entity as a socially responsible due 
to their social contributions which help firms gain competitive advantage
199
. 
 
Research has also shown that there is a relationship between environmental management and 
firm performance. Study by Klassen and McLaughlin demonstrates that positive returns were 
observed for environmental management whereas negative returns were produced for weak 
environmental management. However, mix results have been found by researchers as work by 
Teoh et. al.
200
 claims no relationship, Wright and Ferris
201
 found negative relationship and 
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Posnikoff observed a positive relationship
202
 between CSR and financial performance. This 
study incorporates this factor as a benchmark dimension due to the growing awareness of 
CSR in business community and globally in general. In regard to this study, disclosures 
regarding the health, safety and environment policy will be observed to compare corporate 
behavior. 
 
3.2. Country-level matrix 
 
Country level analysis is conducted by answering the questions mentioned below. The 
questions relate to five key dimensions, as mentioned above, and data is gathered in matrix 
form. To clarify, first step will investigate country level situation for which national laws and 
regulation will be examined across various dimensions relating to investor protection. 
National set up will be bench marked against global best practices (OECD) so analysis will be 
built on benchmark findings. Answers to these questions have been gathered in matrix form 
presented in the Appendix 1 Table 4.1.  
 
The dimensions addressed are as follows: 
 
What are the relevant laws prevailing in the country regarding corporate governance 
practices? 
Laws and guidelines related to break down of Shareholdings? 
Laws and guidelines related to Directors and executives shareholdings? 
Laws and guidelines related shareholding concentration? 
Laws and guidelines related to Composition of board? 
Laws and guidelines related to Directors Duties and Responsibilities? 
Laws and guidelines related to Meetings and attendance of board? 
Laws and guidelines related to director‘s biography? 
Laws and guidelines related to Minority Shareholders? 
Laws and guidelines related to chairman/ CEO? 
Laws and guidelines related to Committees? 
Laws and guidelines related to Election, voting procedures and proxies? 
Laws and guidelines related to Executive non executive directors? 
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Laws and guidelines related to board committees? 
Laws and guidelines related to External Audit? 
Laws and guidelines related to Auditor‘s rotation? 
Laws and guidelines related to Auditor‘s independence and job description? 
Laws and guidelines related to Internal Audit and Internal Control Policy? 
Laws and guidelines related to Disclosures of information? 
Laws and guidelines related to environmental and social Policy disclosures? 
Laws and guidelines related to Governance Related disclosures? 
Laws and guidelines related to Accounting Standards? 
Laws and guidelines related to single/dual class shareholding? 
Laws and guidelines related to disclosures on company website? 
Laws and guidelines related to dividend policy? 
 
3.3. Company-level Matrix 
 
Annual reports and company websites of sample companies will be observed and companies‘ 
governance practices will be benchmarked against the rules set up by respective national 
institutions. Later, companies from both countries will be compared to each other and with 
OECD to conduct analysis and assign qualitative judgments. The analysis will be constructed 
based on the benchmark findings. The matrix utilized for data gathering is as follows. 
 
Variables Pakistani 
Company 
Swedish 
Company 
OECD Best 
Practice 
Ownership Structure    
Director/ Executive Shareholding    
Top Ten Shareholders    
Breakdown of Shareholding    
Board and Board Committees    
Chairman/ CEO Separation    
Board Size    
Non-Executive Directors    
Director Effectiveness    
Meetings/ Attendance of Directors    
 41 
Board committees    
Disclosures and Internal Control    
Director/ Executive Remuneration 
(Remuneration Break up) 
   
Director‘s Responsibility    
Directors Auto-biography    
Audit Remuneration    
Internal Audit and control policy    
Rights of Shares‘ classes    
Shareholding pattern    
Financial and Operational Information    
Strategic Information    
Auditor Appointment/ Report to 
Shareholder 
   
Shares Traded by Directors/ Executives    
Related Party Transaction    
Governance related disclosures    
Website Reporting    
Accounting standards    
Firm-Industry Analysis    
Shareholder rights    
Classes of Shares    
Minority Shareholders representation    
Dividend policy and History    
Corporate Social Responsibility    
Environment, Health and Safety Policy    
Table 3.1. Company Level Matrix 
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4. Methodology 
 
During this chapter, the method to conduct the research will be stated. The chapter follows: 
selection of methodology, preconceptions, research and scientific approach, choices and 
criticism. Then, approach of data collection and gathering, selection os sample companies. In 
the end, discussion regarding validity and reliability is presented.     
 
4.1. Research Methodology and Approach 
 
As mentioned earlier, the aim of the study is to compare the corporate governance systems of 
the selected countries. It was possible to use either qualitative or quantitative research 
approach for the thesis. After carefully looking at the purpose of our research, the decision 
ended with qualitative research approach. If a quantitative approach was chosen, it would 
have limited the study in depth ness and rather emphasized a larger number of research 
objects. 
 
Since this is a pilot study and no prior research has been conducted in the manner mentioned, 
so, an explorative approach has been conducted. Extensive literature review has been done in 
order to obtain necessary relevant information which has been utilized for the construction of 
research model. As the country and company level analysis is built upon the inferences drawn 
from benchmarking with OECD best practices, which is more of a deductive exercise 
according to literature
203
. 
 
The aim of the study is to conduct a comparison of corporate governance systems between 
two countries at country and company level, the research will proceed as a two-step process 
as seen in previous chapter. The study is conducted for investors‘ perspective to facilitate 
them to make more informed investment decisions by assessing the country level and 
company level non-financial aspects. 
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4.2. Preconceptions 
 
In comparison of the two chosen countries, the authors were under the conception that 
Sweden as country and its companies have a more developed corporate governance system 
and implementation of it than Pakistan as country and its companies.  
 
4.3. Approach of Data Collection 
 
As mentioned above, the primary sources of data are Company laws and codes of corporate 
governance of respective countries and annual reports of sample companies; hence, the 
decision of the archival research for data gathering has been adopted. An exhaustive 
investigative work is done to skim out the necessary information on which inferences and 
conclusion can be drawn
204
. Apart from the above mentioned data sources, related articles and 
surveys conducted by World Bank, IMF, Corporate Governance related bodies, organizations 
and individuals is used to support the findings from data analysis phase. 
 
This study is based on government directed committees‘ documents, national laws and annual 
reports from listed limited companies, by theory called official documents of private and 
governmental kind. These types of documents are regarded as non-affected of personal values 
and preconceptions of the researcher. This type of non-reactive documents let the researcher 
to disregard the reactive effects that validity constraint might cause
205
.  
 
4.4. Research Companies 
  
Selecting four companies from numerous companies and sectors listed on stock exchanges 
and generalizing unbiased inferences from the corresponding data for the whole system is 
delicate. As the decided size of the sample is four for each country, company should be from 
different industry sectors. The sample selection is based on investor‘s preferred sectors and 
companies i.e. sectors and companies with highest market capitalization at the beginning of 
2009 on each stock exchange. Therefore, firstly, four sectors having highest turnover over the 
stock exchanges have been selected which in the case of Pakistan are cement, textile 
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composite, and Fertilizer
206
. In the case of Sweden the sectors represented are industry, 
material, transportation and telecom
207
. The selection have no financial sector representation 
as the financial institutions are monitored by the State Banks of respective countries and are 
subject to separate law i.e. not subject to company law.  
 
Additionally, government owned companies and subsidiary or associated companies of 
foreign entities have also been left out as they might not be best representatives of national 
system. The representative companies of each sector chosen are the companies with highest 
market capitalization. In certain cases, company next to the leader has been selected due to 
unavailability of data. In case of Pakistan, two companies are selected from cement sector due 
to the reason that biggest sectors after cement sector are Oil and Gas exploration sector and 
Oil and Gas Marketing sector.
208
 Here, companies in these sectors are owned by Government 
so they have been disregarded. The following next sectors have very low turnovers and 
market capitalization as compared to the other selected sectors
209
. So, alternatively, a second 
company has been selected from Cement sector that has highest turnover among all these 
selected sectors.
210
 Two companies of this sector have a highest market capitalization as 
well.
211
  
 
The sample set for Pakistan and other sources of information are as follows: 
  
PAKISTAN 
Sr. Sector Company 
1 Cement Lucky Cement Ltd. 
2 Cement DGKC Ltd. 
3 Textile Composite Azgard Nine Ltd. 
4 Fertilizer  Engro Chemicals Ltd. 
Table 2.1. Pakistani Sample Companies 
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The sample set for Sweden and other sources of information are as follows: 
 
 
SWEDEN 
Sr. Sector Company 
1 Industry Atlas Copco AB 
2 Material SSAB 
3 Vehicle Construction Volvo AB 
4 Telecom Tele2 
Table 2.2. Swedish Sample Companies 
 
4.5. Validity and Reliability  
 
The first step of research employs country‘s laws and regulation to build inferences regarding 
the country level situation of corporate governance. Such documents are authentic as the 
national institutions of countries issue them. The best practices they will be benchmarked with 
are OECD guidelines, which are also considered authentic as World Bank, IMF, Asian 
Development Bank, or many other international bodies support them. A survey or interview 
approach would also have been adopted in parallel but given time and resources available, 
this option seems unfeasible. 
 
Second aspect of the study, the company-level compliance of corporate governance, annual 
reports and websites of the sample companies will act as the primary source of data as this 
document is considered as the representative of a company and it reveals how the company 
wants to portray its image for all the stakeholders like creditors, employees, customers etc. 
and especially the investors or shareholders. As annual report is a public document, so, all 
stakeholders have readily access to it. Therefore, due to the convenient availability of this 
detailed document, all stakeholders especially investors, both domestic and foreign, can use it 
as a fundamental starting place for investigating a company. Also, it is very hard to get hold 
of first hand information from key personals of the company and not all, especially individual 
investors from general masses, have access to company professionals like Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), company auditors or other important players 
within a company to provide them with the specific information they are looking far. As the 
 46 
observations from annual reports will be benchmarked against national rules and regulations, 
so authenticity of the national documents provide authenticity to the analytical mechanism. A 
survey/ interview would have been useful for this step too but time and resource constraint 
restricts his study to accommodate it. 
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5. Results and Consideration 
 
In this chapter, the results and findings of importance from the empirical data collection in 
appendixes are stated. The presentation will be formed in the same manner as the research 
model. At first, the country-level research results will be presented in regard to the five key 
dimensions. The research from company-level will be presented in the same way with the 
exception that they are presented separately by respective country. This chapter should be 
seen in conjunction with relevant mentioned Appendix. 
 
5.1. Results of Country-level research 
 
Results and findings are found in country-level matrix in Appendix 1 table 4.1. Here, the 
country-level results will be illustrated in five dimensions. At first, it will show the 
differences of the chosen variables and the similarities. Each key dimension stating the 
dissimilarities and similarities between Pakistan and Sweden will be compared to best 
practices.   
 
5.1.1. Ownership structure 
 
Regarding legislation and best practices covering ownership structure, there is limited 
availability. The concerned variables in the research were director and executive 
shareholdings and shareholding pattern. In both Pakistan and Sweden, there should be 
disclosed shareholdings by both directors and executives and related person to them. Both the 
countries are stating to disclose holdings in subsidiaries and associated companies. No 
differences are found but only in the phrasing. No best practice for ownership structure was 
found in OECD guidelines for this variable. 
  
According to best practices, it is a basic right of investors to know the ownership structure of 
the company directly and in-directly. In Sweden, the possessions of company‘s shares larger 
than ten percent, both directly and indirectly, should be disclosed. In case of Pakistan, 
shareholding pattern shall be disclosed with comparatively more extensive information as 
break-up based on nature of entity i.e. institutional holding, mutual fund etc. is mandated to 
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be given. The situation in both countries is in line with best practices, but Pakistan seems to 
be bit more comprehensive in this regard. 
  
5.1.2. Board and Board Committees 
 
The first variable is separation between the Chief Executive Office and the Chair of the board, 
whether or not the same person can hold these two positions. In Pakistan the position can be 
held by the same person but not preferred and in Sweden it can not be. By best practices, 
Sweden is most in line; however Sweden is tougher on this variable than best practices. 
 
No stated best practices about the size of the board of directors are found in OECD best 
practices. Pakistan is requiring at least seven directors and Sweden three. Sweden is leaving 
the size of the board more voluntary than Pakistan. 
 
Regarding non-executive board directors, the definition by OECD states that it is preferable 
that a director is of independent non-executive character. Pakistani laws limit executive 
director representation on board not to exceed 75% including Chief Executive Officer (CEO). 
Swedish law requires more than half elected board members to be non-executive directors. 
Among these non-executive directors, at least two should be independent of major 
shareholders and also in regard to subsidiaries. Both countries‘ law focuses on independent 
directors where Swedish legislation is more concrete while Pakistani legislation is of 
voluntary nature and main emphasis on non-executive nature of directors. Also, Pakistani law 
mandates at least one independent director representing institutional equity interest. Over all, 
both countries are in conformity with the best practice towards the independence of board 
members as best practices are mostly emphasizing on words as considering and encouraging. 
Sweden is once again tougher and strict in its statement in this regard while Pakistan uses 
more soft words. So, Sweden is comparatively nearer to best practice. 
 
Pakistani law limits director to represent maximum ten boards to ensure appropriate time 
devoted to concerned companies while Swedish law does not confine board representation to 
a specific number. Rather, it takes a more subjective approach towards necessary time needed 
for the company. Both countries seek directors‘ affectivity as suggested by OECD best 
practice but Pakistan has a more explicit stance on it. Pakistani legislation takes it further, if a 
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director misses three consecutive meetings or all meetings held in three consecutive months, 
which ever is longer; he or she ceases to be a director unless leave of absence is granted by 
company. 
 
Pakistani law mandates directors to meet at least once every quarter having quorum of 
meeting to be at least four or one third of total board size, which ever is higher. If any of the 
two conditions is not met, the chairman and board members are subject to fines. Number of 
meetings and board members‘ attendance is to be disclosed in annual report but it is 
mandatory to do so by Pakistani companies. Both countries are in line with best practices, 
Sweden in the same subjective motivation and Pakistan with a more enforcing legislation.  
 
Board committees are by best practices focusing on audit, remuneration, and nomination 
committees. Pakistani and Swedish law mandates audit committee existence consisting of at 
least three members where the majority representation shall be non-executives. Swedish 
legislation requires at least one member to be independent of the majority shareholders. 
Pakistani legislation demands the chairman of committee to be non-executive. Swedish law 
talks about independence of committee members too but Pakistani law‘s emphasis is only on 
non-executive nature of committee members. Swedish law is closer to OECD best practices 
when it comes to describing the roles and responsibilities of the audit committee such as 
internal audit function (for financial as well as non-financial information), interfacing 
between internal and external audit. Swedish audit committee shall assist nomination 
committee in proposing auditor for next term. Pakistan mandates meeting of this audit 
committee to be at least once every quarter and to be held before and after external audit. 
Swedish law extends the practices established by OECD in regard to board committee by 
requiring the board to establish remuneration and nomination committee consisting mainly of 
independent directors. Chairman can also be chairman of remuneration committee but not for 
audit committee.  Nomination is suppose to propose the chair and board members for 
elections. Remuneration committee proposes directors‘ and auditors‘ fees and remunerations 
for approval in general meeting. OECD emphasize in this regard on a transparent nomination 
and election of board. Selection of board members also needs nomination of such candidates 
who are well equipped with appropriate knowledge, competencies and expertise required for 
the board. 
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The election of board directors is interesting in regard to how, why and when. In Pakistan, 
effective representation of independent non-executive directors is encouraged along with the 
representation of minority shareholders. Nomination committee is not required in corporate 
governance system of Pakistan however minority shareholders can take part in elections 
through proxy solicitation. Listed companies are required to annex additional copy of proxy 
form filled by the minority shareholder candidate for election with the notice of annual 
general meeting. In addition, creditors also may nominate directors on the basis of their 
contractual agreement. All these notices received by the company should be communicated to 
members at least seven days before the annual general meeting in which the election is going 
to take place. All notices shall be published in the daily newspapers both in Urdu (Pakistani 
national language) and English in the province in which related stock exchange exists. In 
Sweden, directors are also elected at the annual general meeting. The nomination committee, 
an autonomous body separate from board control, is required to nominate the suitable 
candidates for the board. Recommendations of nomination committee are then presented in 
the annual general meetings for the voting. These recommendations are published on the 
company website as well. Further more, each candidate‘s age, education, work experience, 
prior work in the company, shareholding in the company and other professional commitments 
should be the part of this recommendation proposal. Election system is stricter in Sweden as it 
includes the nomination committee for the recommendation of the board of directors while in 
Pakistan it is done by directors thereby making Swedish law more protective. In Pakistan, 
there is no legislation or best practice recommended for the director‘s education, age, work 
experience, prior work in the company and shareholding of directors which might be 
considered a short coming in the selection process of effective board with all the required 
competencies. Sweden is following the best practices that is stating a transparent nomination 
and election, Pakistan is not clearly stating the same but do emphasize an open nomination. It 
is stated in Sweden that the board should be filled by appropriate knowledge as in best 
practices; this is however not directly found in Pakistani legislation. 
 
5.1.3. Disclosures and Internal Control 
 
Remuneration of directors and executives are recommended to be disclosed by OECD best 
practices. Both countries follow this practice and disclose the remuneration of the board and 
schemes of share-incentive related remuneration. However Pakistan does not disclose the 
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remuneration individually, which is the case of Sweden and best practices. The remuneration 
in Sweden is proposed by the remuneration committee and approved at the general meeting 
while in Pakistan, the remuneration is approved in general meeting but no law regarding 
remuneration committee exists. Pakistan is missing best practices recommendations on 
individual disclosure. 
 
Disclosure about responsibilities of board directors are not found in OECD best practices, 
however Pakistan and Sweden are stating a subjective mind of how the board directors are to 
act. They have very similar descriptions that can be concluded to work in the best manner of 
the company.  
 
The disclosure of board directors‘ background could be of various levels of details. Best 
practices suggest stating qualifications, selection process, other company directorships, and if 
they are regarded independent. Pakistan is emphasizing more on limitations of directorships 
on other companies with some sense of their independence status. Sweden is more focusing 
what is stated by best practices with disclosing all necessary information regarding the board 
directors. 
  
Audit remuneration should be disclosed and decided by the general meeting. In Pakistan, it 
should be proposed by board directors. While in Sweden, the nomination committee proposes 
the remuneration. 
 
Internal audit and control is to be done by the audit committee or an equivalent function, to 
cover all activities of this kind according to best practices. In Sweden, the board is to make 
sure that the company has good internal control and routines. The corporate governance report 
should include explicit disclosure about internal control and risks. Pakistani boards are to 
disclose that directors‘ control is sound and effectively implemented and monitored. In 
accordance to best practices, both countries demonstrate no significant differences. 
  
Financial and operational information should not be limited to material information according 
to best practices. Pakistani legislation is focusing more on financial information and its details 
whereas Swedish legislation is focusing on extra significant occurrences on top of the 
financial reporting. It is in line with best practices; however, Pakistan is lacking some 
operational focus on information. 
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Best practice requires strategic information to be disclosed i.e. future plans and expected 
performance of the company. Swedish companies shall disclose future expectations, risks, 
factors, and development etc. Pakistani companies have the same expectations on them as 
Swedish companies where the only minor difference is in presentation of strategic 
information disclosure. 
 
Best practice requires reporting of any information of material importance like any significant 
equity-related transactions. Information should be of high quality standard about accounting, 
financial, and non-financial issues. Also, an audit opinion has to be stated on the presented 
material. In Pakistan, as mandated by law, it is the director‘s report to shareholders that 
discloses such information where main emphasis is on financial information which is in 
compliance with best practices. Swedish listing requirements states such information to be 
disclosed to shareholders at earliest which is in compliance with best practices. Also, 
disclosure about share affecting information should be made public before ordinary reports. 
 
In best practice, auditor report to shareholders should be presented by an independent, 
competent and qualified auditor. This is to ensure shareholders that an external view has been 
conducted on financial statements and the financial information is in accordance to what is 
stated. It is usual that an independent auditor committee appoints the external auditor.  It is 
also an increasing issue to ensure the competence and profession of the auditor according to 
best practices. The audit report is obliged to be presented to shareholders without any 
interference from company executives or board. The auditor recommends whether or not the 
general meeting should accept the information in the director‘s report, and if any violation to 
company act has been done. 
 
In Pakistan there is a strong legislation for external auditor. Auditors and their spouse and 
children should be independent of company and its management. They should not have any 
shareholding in the company in a direct or indirect manner. They are recommended by audit 
committee and decision regarding their appointment is taken in the annual general meeting. 
Duties of auditors are somehow same in both countries. However in Sweden auditors are 
required to state that shareholder‘s should accept the balance sheet and income statement and 
members of board and president be discharged from liability of financial year while in 
Pakistan auditors only give their opinion on the information provided to them in the form of 
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―qualified‖ and ―unqualified‖ to the shareholders. In Sweden auditors need to give their 
consent on CEO and directors practices as well which is not the case in Pakistan. In Pakistan 
auditors are also bound to give their opinion whether Zakat is deducted and deposited in 
central Zakat fund in a proper manner or not. Auditors in Pakistan are also required to give 
their opinion on the corporate governance practices of company. 
 
The appointment of auditor, in Sweden, is conducted through a proposal by an independent 
nomination committee and elected at the general meeting. In Pakistan, legislation concerning 
who can or can not become auditor is extensive. Auditors are prohibited to own shares in the 
company and also any person in relation to executive management or board is ineligible for 
being auditor of that company. There are many similarities in regard to auditor appointment, 
but Pakistani legislation is very detailed in describing the eligibility of right auditor. 
 
Best practices calls for mandatory audit rotation. The case in Sweden is that auditors are 
elected for four year with a possibility of re-election of three years. Pakistan does have a 
shorter horizon of one year and limit of three years. Both countries have mandatory rotation, 
with the time horizon difference for which they are elected for. This puts both countries in 
line with best practice. 
 
Best practices states that the board and executive management should disclose their direct or 
indirect interest in any material transaction or matter affecting the company. In Sweden and 
also according to best practices a person with a related interest is not allowed to participate in 
that issue. In Pakistan the issue is more regarding shareholding where any change in 
shareholding of directors and executive management should immediately be notified in 
writing. Disclosure of material interests is required to be disclosed in both countries, Sweden 
is more aligned to best practices as it also covers that no participation is allowed for an 
executive or board director with a material interest in any matter. 
 
It‘s essential for companies to fully disclose related party transactions either individually or in 
groups, according to best practices. This is to locate conflict of interests of the company and 
its owners. In Sweden, larger companies should disclose significant transactions of this kind 
while all Pakistani companies should disclose this information. Special details should be 
included both at arms-length and in normal market conditions and the company should keep a 
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record of the transactions in both countries. However, Pakistani legislation is more detailed 
and in line with best practices in this regard.   
 
In best practices, governance related disclosures should be disclosed by the companies, 
particularly the division of authority between shareholders, management, and board members. 
In Sweden, the companies shall produce a corporate governance report where it shall be 
clearly stated which rules it has complied with, explain, and motivate each case of it. In 
Pakistan, all listed companies shall publish and circulate a statement about the status of 
compliance with best corporate governance practices. In Pakistan, auditors are also required 
to give their consent on the corporate governance practices of the company.   
 
In best practices, it is stated that information of relevant issues should easily be accessed 
through Internet. The Swedish legislation requires that a specific section should be devoted to 
a corporate governance and relevant information. No such information in Pakistani legislation 
is found. 
 
In accounting standards best practices states that information should be prepared and 
disclosed in accordance with high quality. Both Pakistan and Sweden are stating which 
accounting standards that are being adopted. 
 
Share trading by executive management and board directors is not stated by OECD best 
practices. However, Pakistani legislation states that trading by key personals company, as 
named in laws, should be disclosed along with trading of related persons. Swedish legislation 
states that in the corporate governance section, there should be a detailed, up-to-date account 
of shares and share-incentive related remuneration scheme. Pakistani legislation is far more 
extended than the Swedish legislation in this regard. 
 
5.1.4. Shareholder rights 
 
According to best practices, the differences of share classes and its properties shall be 
disclosed with details and there shall be a cap on voting power of shares. In Pakistan, 
companies may have shares of different classes. The situation in Sweden is similar. However, 
in Sweden, there is a cap on voting power of superior class shares where no share can have 
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more than ten times the voting power than another share. By putting such restrictions on 
voting rights, Sweden is more in line with best practices. 
 
The issue of minority board representation is not stated in the case of best practices. In 
Pakistan, a minority shareholder may contest the election of board of directors and proxy 
voting is also possible. In Sweden, a minority shareholder can call an extra general meeting, 
use proxy right, and demand an extra auditor appointment. It is not allowed that the board 
could make any decision that could favor specific shareholders on the expense of other 
shareholders. Minority shareholder of ten percent may stop certain resolutions of significance 
in Sweden. Swedish minority shareholder protection is larger compared to Pakistan.  
 
Both in Pakistan and Sweden, it is stated that the company should disclose information of 
dividend. There is no legislation that concerns dividend-history or dividend policy, neither are 
there any best practices. 
 
Shareholders should be able to obtain relevant material information on time and regular basis, 
as stated by best practices. In Pakistan, important information like share affecting information 
should immediately be made notified to Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
(SECP) and disclosed publicly. Sweden also requires prompt dissemination of such 
information to shareholders. However, in Pakistan, law provides explicit information in 
categorizing information as material. 
 
In Sweden, financial reporting is required to be done according to laws and relevant 
accounting standards. Annual and quarterly reports should be made public where the auditor 
reviews the annual report and disclosure regarding whether auditor review has been done for 
quarterly statements needs to be mentioned. The audit committee ensures that the board‘s 
work of financial statements holds certain quality. Pakistani companies should publish 
quarterly reports (can be un-audited) where the second quarter is subject to auditor‘s limited 
review according to legally defined standards. The annual report is however subjected to the 
auditor‘s consent in both countries. There is no best practice defined in this regard. 
 
Regarding the participation at the general meeting, in Sweden, all shareholders at the current 
date are allowed to participate where a shareholder is allowed to vote with all shares that the 
shareholder owns or represent. Pakistani legislation states that all members may participate at 
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the meeting either personally or by proxy. No member holding share is to be ceased from 
casting his/her vote. 
  
Proxy voting rights should be available to use according to best practices, no difference 
should be considered in the voting power, either the vote is by person or proxy. Both 
Pakistani and Swedish legislation is in line with best practices definition of proxy voting 
rights. 
 
Changes of voting rights should be under approval by those classes which are negatively 
affected by the change according to best practices. In Sweden the board should not make 
decisions that could favor an advantage for specific shareholders on the expense of other 
shareholders. Minorities can stop certain resolutions where a larger majority is required. This 
resolution may be share capital structure decisions. In Pakistan, such a change may only be 
approved if a majority of at least three quarters of the affected members approve it. If ten 
percent of the affected shareholder classes apply to the court within 30 days, such resolution 
will be cancelled.  
 
Regarding right to call an extra general meeting, best practices state that shareholder meetings 
should provide for equitable treatment of all shareholders. In Sweden, the board can call an 
extra meeting if they find it necessary; the board should also call an extra meeting if an 
auditor or a minority shareholder with minimum ten percent in writing demands it. Pakistani 
board directors may, as in Sweden, at any time call an extra meeting and the same amount of 
minority shareholder may also demand an extra general meeting. 
 
5.1.5. Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Best practices designed by the OECD in this regards recommends that companies are 
encouraged to incorporate reports on code of ethics, environmental policy and other public 
policy commitments. 
 
In Pakistan code of corporate governance emphasize on board of directors of listed companies 
to include statement of ethics and business practices in the annual reports. Statement of ethics 
and business practices should define a standard of conduct for directors and employees. Code 
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further says that this statement should be signed by each director and employee in the 
company to ensure his acknowledgment of understanding and acceptance of this standard 
conduct. Board should also make a disclosure of significant policies of company in which it 
discloses the company‘s health, safety and environmental policy along with the disclosures of 
donations, charities, contributions and other payments. 
 
No information in this regard is given in Swedish code of corporate governance and company 
act. In Sweden, it is all the volunteer effort of the companies to make disclosures in this 
regard but in Pakistan companies need to comply in this regard with the suggested criteria 
defined by the code of corporate governance otherwise relevant explanation is required. 
 
5.2. Results of Company-level Research Pakistan 
 
The results stated are collected from appendix 2 (see 2.1.-2.4). Differences and similarities are 
stated in relation to national legislation and best practices. The results are presented in order 
of the research model, however not in specific order to sub variables. All sub variables are not 
presented in the result. The reasons to disregarded sub variables are variables with not 
sufficient information to perform a comparison or that the content is too vast to explain in the 
detailed presentation that would be needed to give a justified view on the issue.  
 
5.2.1. Ownership Structure 
 
Pakistani companies are using a standard format for disclosing the pattern of shared holding 
and similar classifications have been used to represent various types of shareholders along 
with their equity interests. Shareholding by executives, directors, their spouses and children, 
associated and related parties and shareholding exceeding 10% of total shares have been 
disclosed in detail. Director, executive and their spouse and children shareholding have mix 
trend varying from almost 3% to 30%. But the interesting thing is that where director and 
executive shareholding is low, their associated companies or top ten shareholdings were very 
high. The table below shows the details. 
 
Variables DGKC Lucky Azgard Engro 
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Cement Nine Chemicals 
Directors/ Executive Shareholding 
(including Spouse and children) 
3.58% 30% 15.22% 9% 
Top ten Shareholders 58.83% 48% 68.44% 56.53% 
Associated companies 31.86% 4.87% Nil 41.75% 
Table 5.1. Source: Annual Reports of Respective Companies. 
 
It is clear from the above table that the family or major shareholding dominance has been 
ensured by either concentrated director/ executive shareholding, associated companies or by 
other major shareholders. It cannot be said concretely that top ten shareholders, other than 
associated companies, are related parties too but based on the trend from sample companies 
and the non-disclosure of specifics about these shareholders, this assumption will not be 
illogical. All Pakistani companies, although under explicit law, are consistent with OECD 
best practice. 
 
5.2.2. Board  
 
Although Pakistani law prefers the CEO and chairman of board to be different persons but 
does not prohibit this which is the case with Swedish law. But, in case of Pakistani sample, 
every company voluntarily has separate persons holding these offices, which is compatible 
with OECD best practice. Sample companies are just meeting the minimum number i.e. seven 
(average board size for three sample companies) for board size which is minimum board size 
explicitly mandated by Pakistani company law. However, an exception is for one company 
with 13 board members. Boards are relatively smaller as no employee representation is found. 
OECD does not disclose any specific number for board size but talks about having required 
expertise. Having 75% representation as maximum threshold for executive director‘s 
representation mandated by Pakistani law, sample‘s average executive members‘ proportion 
on board is found to be almost 41%. Any company, which might be due to voluntary nature of 
this requirement, separately did not disclose explicit disclosure of independence of any 
director by Pakistani law. Although two companies among the sample talks about 
independent representations where only one company i.e. Engro Chemicals disclosed the 
number of total independent directors i.e. five members and other company i.e. Azgard Nine 
discloses the chairman to be independent. It is hard to determine which director is 
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independent and which is not that clearly does not equal best practice. Also, minority 
shareholder representation is given on board. No director of Pakistani companies is working 
on more than ten boards as restricted by Pakistani law for ensuring affectivity. Average 
attendance by sample companies‘ directors was found to be almost 74%. This is mainly due to 
one company‘s i.e. Azgard Nine board where attendance was only 35% merely meeting the 
minimum quorum requirement of 33%. One reason was leave of absence given to foreign 
directors. Else, average for remaining three sample companies is almost 88%, which can be 
considered as ‗effective participation‘ as per best practice. Meetings held were within five to 
nine. Audit committee is part of each company‘s board but remuneration and nomination 
committee is not popular among the sample. Only one company i.e. Engro Chemicals plc ltd. 
has a compensation committee, which consists of five members, out of which four are non-
executive. Audit committee of all companies mainly consists of non-executive directors 
(being over 82% on average) while one company Engro Chemicals has only disclosed their 
independence. No or very brief overview of audit committee roles and responsibilities is 
mentioned in annual reports. 
 
5.2.3. Disclosures and Internal Control 
 
All four Pakistani companies, as mandated by law, disclose the remuneration being paid to 
CEO and full time directors along with the break-up details. CEO‘s compensation is disclosed 
explicitly while an aggregate amount for remuneration has been assigned to joint categories of 
directors and for executives. Total number of persons in a category has also been mentioned. 
Best practice is to disclose the remuneration individually but it has not being followed by 
Pakistani companies and only minimum legal requirements are being satisfied. An interesting 
thing observed is that no stock options form part of remuneration package to CEO or others. 
Sample Pakistani companies‘ directors have given an explicit legal declaration about their 
awareness of their duties and responsibilities, understanding of articles and memorandum of 
firm, general understanding about affairs of firm‘s business before taking position on board. 
This is in accordance with legal requirement of country. In regard to profile information of 
directors, no provision is available in law or code for Pakistani companies. Due to voluntary 
nature of this issue in Pakistan‘s case, mix results were found as two out of four companies 
i.e. Azgard Nine and Engro Chemicals, were found to be following best practice and were 
disclosing the relevant information like academic background, past experience and the roles 
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they are performing on other companies, if any. Two companies only disclosed the names of 
directors. Based on sample mixed findings, general practice by Pakistani companies cannot be 
concluded but it can be said that two companies conformed to best practice while two did not. 
Pakistani companies in regard to internal audit and control disclose very limited information. 
Disclosure about assurance by directors has been given in annual report stating only the 
existence of such system and conformance to it. No internal control policy has been disclosed. 
Only one company i.e. Azgard Nine is has given a very brief disclosure about the key areas 
within their internal control policy. However, audit committee is overseeing the internal 
control mechanism in all four companies, which confirms to OECD best practice. But overall, 
sample companies are not satisfactorily in conformance with best practice. Share classes 
along with their voting rights and dividend entitlements have been disclosed in cases of both 
countries. In Pakistani companies, the shares are mainly either ordinary or preferred. Ordinary 
shares entitle holder with one vote per share while preferred shares are non-voting and 
redeemable at a specific date upon company‘s exercising such option. Although few 
variations also exist as one company i.e. Azgard Nine also has non-voting ordinary shares and 
another company has Global Depository Receipts (GDRs) due to their listing on London 
Stock Exchange but they are not very common in general. Though not very explicitly, but 
sufficient information is disclosed by all companies as mandated by the listing requirements 
which match the OECD best practice. OECD states the disclosure of ownership structure as 
basic right of an investor. Both countries are in conformity in this regard but sample Pakistani 
companies are found to be more explanatory as they all use similar various categories, under 
laws requirement, to elaborate it. Disclosures like institutional, public company, associated 
company, insurance company, mutual funds etc. holdings and percentage shares held by CEO, 
directors, executives, their spouses and children gives more detailed information about 
ownership structure. No explicit disclosure about voting rights is given because one share one 
vote prevails in Pakistan. Pakistani sample companies are found to be well in line with best 
practice. As required by Pakistani code, companies present financial, operational and strategic 
information in their annual reports. Only one company i.e. DGKC did not present any 
strategic information. Remaining all companies disclosed any material event of strategic 
importance like opening of new division etc. Financial and operational data is summarized for 
last six years whereas significant changes compared to last year‘s performance are also 
disclosed. Most Pakistani companies are found to go with OECD best practice at least to an 
acceptable standard. In regard to timely availability of material information, Pakistani 
companies are found to be inline with the OECD best practices that requires immediate 
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reporting of any matter having significant effect on company. Such matters may be mergers 
and acquisitions, new production sites, manpower reduction or any other information that can 
affect share price. The immediacy and completeness of such information cannot be judged 
based on annual report‘s disclosure. Inference has been made based solely on availability of 
such information in annual report of sample companies. Due to acceptance of internationally 
accepted accounting standards, all sample companies are using IFRS, IAS for financial 
reporting. Disclosures regarding significant accounting principles form part of all four 
Pakistani companies which makes them aligned with OECD best practice. CEO, directors, 
executive, their spouses and children, if made, notified any trade of company shares, in all 
four Pakistani companies. Three Pakistani companies made no commercial trade and 
disclosure about his fact, as required by listing requirements, was also disclosed in annual 
reports. One company i.e. Engro Chemical‘s above mentioned personals were involved in 
such transactions and the disclosure including names and position of persons transacting 
shares, aggregate sales and purchases of shares, the quantity, price, transaction and the 
exchange from which the shares were purchased were explicitly mentioned. Although no 
specific best practice is available in this regard, but such information can be of material 
interest for investors, which need to be made public as per OECD guidelines. In this regard, 
Pakistani sample companies, although due to legal requirements, are found to be closer to best 
practice. External auditor is appointed through AGM where proposal for eligibility and 
availability of auditor is presented for approval. Board is advised by audit committee in this 
regard, which makes Pakistani companies in conformance with best practice. Disclosure of 
material interest was given in reports of all four Pakistani companies. Since, no interest was 
there in case of all companies so a disclosure stating non-interest by directors/ executives was 
given conformance with best practice was observed in this regard. As per listing requirement, 
information about related party transactions is disclosed by all Pakistani sample companies. 
The pricing method, related party name and relationship, nature of transaction and concerned 
amount is explicitly disclosed for last two consecutive years. Additionally, all sample 
companies also give a separate mandatory statement under Pakistani Companies Ordinance 
about compliance with best practices for transfer pricing. In case of audit remuneration for 
Pakistani sample, audit committee of all four companies proposed the package and was 
approved in AGM as per law. Remuneration along with break-up was also disclosed which 
conforms to OECD best practice which requires disclosing audit and non-audit fee. Although, 
laws and codes of both companies encourages minority shareholder representation but no 
such representation was observed in sample from both companies. OECD also does not speak 
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in this regard. However, Swedish companies have independent directors in boards, which can 
be regarded as minority shareholding representation. This is not the case with Pakistani 
sample companies as only one company discloses independent directors whose attendance 
was found to be very low. As required by company law of Pakistan, all Pakistani companies 
are complying with best practices, as proxy arrangements are being available to investors. A 
proxy form required to be submitted to company to participate in voting, is attached to the 
annual reports as per legal requirements. 
 
5.2.4. Shareholder’s rights 
 
Pakistani sample companies only declared the dividend per share or the reason for no 
dividend. No company discloses any dividend policy. This trend totally coincides with the 
legal requirements but no extra disclosure is being presented. Since, OECD has no explicit 
practice described in this regard, but still this information can be considered material 
information for investors, which is to be declared. Pakistani sample companies seem to lag 
behind best practice in this regard. 
 
Share classes along with their voting rights and dividend entitlements have been disclosed in 
cases of both countries. In Pakistani companies, the shares are mainly either ordinary or 
preferred. Ordinary shares entitle holder with one vote per share while preferred shares are 
non-voting and redeemable at a specific date upon company‘s exercising such option. 
Although few variations also exist as one company i.e. Azgard Nine also has non-voting 
ordinary shares and another company has Global Depository Receipts (GDRs) due to its 
listing on London Stock Exchange but they are not very common in general. Though not very 
explicitly, but sufficient information is disclosed by all companies as mandated by the listing 
requirements which match the OECD best practice. 
 
Although, laws and codes of both companies encourages minority shareholder representation 
but no such representation was observed in sample from both companies. OECD also does not 
speak in this regard. However, Swedish companies have independent directors in boards 
which can be regarded as minority shareholding representation. This is not the case with 
Pakistani sample companies as only one company discloses independent directors whose 
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attendance was found to be very low. No minority shareholder representation is given on 
board by any of the sample companies. 
 
5.2.5. Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Two Pakistani companies are following OECD best practice in this regard that requires 
companies to disclose their socially responsible behavior. Deviations are observed like one 
Pakistani company i.e. Lucky Cement did not mention environmental policy and one other i.e. 
DGKC did not disclose anything in this regard. 
 
5.3. Results of Company-level Research Sweden 
 
The results stated are collected from Appendixes 3 table 4.3 (see 3.1-3.4). Differences and 
similarities are stated in relation to national legislation and best practices. The results are 
presented in order of the research model, however not in specific order to sub variables. All 
sub variables are not presented in the result. 
 
5.3.1. Ownership Structure 
 
Neither board directors nor executive are holding large amounts of shares, not even in voting 
rights. The accounts disclosing the shareholdings and incentive schemes are sufficient ly 
detailed with respective share classes and disclosure of related natural and legal persons. It 
would however be interesting if the companies would disclose associated shareholdings in 
relation to the board directors and their indirect shareholdings. The largest ten shareholders 
here presented in voting rights are ranging from 36% up to 70%, which demonstrate fairly 
high ownership concentration. All companies have shares with different voting rights but they 
are using the possibility cap of ten times voting power per share than any ordinary share. 
 
Variables Volvo SSAB Atlas Copco Tele2  
Directors/Executive 
Shareholding 
0.034% 0.035% Disclosed 
>1% 
Disclosed 
and minimal 
Top ten Shareholders 45.1% 38% 36%  69.7% 
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Table 3.2 Source: Annual reports 2008 and companies‘ websites. 
 
The shareholding pattern was disclosed in all of the Swedish companies. However, only in 
half of the companies, the shareholding pattern was broken up into categories where names, 
amount of voting rights and capital holdings were disclosed. Disclosure is in line with 
legislation; however it is less common that directors and executives shareholdings in 
associated companies and subsidiaries are disclosed. 
 
5.3.2. Board 
 
Due to Swedish legislation, all companies have a separation between the CEO and chair of the 
board. This in combination with small amount of shares held by board directors and executive 
management implies distanced separation between ownership and control. The board size is 
varying from eight to fourteen board directors where explanation to high board size is the 
inclusion of two to three union representatives along with their individual suppliants. Cleared 
from union representatives the board directors vary from eight to ten directors. The 
independence of board directors is stated in two cases, independence in relation to the 
company and associated companies and in relation major shareholders to the company and 
subsidiaries. If the union representatives are disregarded, the number of independent non-
executive directors becomes five-to-seven out of eight-to-ten range which is in line with 
Swedish legislation presented in Appendix 3 table 4.3. All companies disclose director 
effectiveness and where half companies have a board meeting attendance of approximately 
82-83% and the other half approximately 95%. The number of meetings is ranging from eight 
to twenty-one annually that the board is holding. The large range is explained as two 
companies also conducted percapsulam and phone meetings which have also been counted. If 
only physical meetings are counted, the number ranges from eight to ten on average. 
 
All companies have three different committees, audit, nomination, and remuneration. The 
nomination committee is autonomous from the board and is elected at the general meeting. 
The auditor and remuneration committees are under the board of directors. The members of 
all committees with high number of independence are disclosed in all of the companies 
represented in this pilot study. The companies comply with the Swedish legislation on all 
variables in the country-level results. The board size hurdle is low. However, the hurdle of 
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independence is more demanding. Best practices might be are not that demanding in this 
matter as all companies have a good compliance with the variables without strict legislation. 
An exception is Tele2 that did not disclose any union representatives.  
 
5.3.3. Disclosures and Internal Control 
 
Director remuneration is disclosed individually in all companies. The remuneration for 
executive management is defined in remuneration policies, where the proposals are the 
remuneration committees‘ work which is published in detailed scheme. There is detailed 
description of the CEO remuneration disclosed but also individual remuneration of the other 
executive management. There is no deviation found from legislation in this regard. 
 
Director responsibilities are disclosed in all companies and are in line with the results from 
country-level. The background of the board directors is, in all four companies, disclosed in a 
detailed manner, mostly more extensive than required. 
 
Audit remuneration is disclosed as a separate fee along with other fees paid to the auditor, 
both remuneration and nomination is in accordance to legislation. Internal audit and control is 
conducted in compliance to legislation and best practices. Financial, operational, and strategic 
information is disclosed in all companies, the contents of disclosed information are harder to 
examine. All necessary information according to Swedish legislation and best practices is 
reported to shareholders, especially the necessary information regarding share-affecting 
disclosure. All companies disclose how the auditor is appointed.  
 
The nomination committee nominates the external auditor as demanded by Swedish 
legislation and is in compliance with best practices. In the three variables about disclosure of 
material information, related party transaction, and governance related disclosures, all four 
companies disclose them in, more or less, similar manner with small difference in details. 
Governance related disclosures are found in the corporate governance section of the 
companies‘ websites and annual report with exception of Tele2, the devoted section of 
corporate governance is required by the corporate governance code. The disclosed material is 
in order with both requirements in Sweden and best practices. Accounting standards are the 
same in all companies with half of the companies with additional standards disclosed. 
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Disclosure regarding adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) is adequate and in line with the OECD best 
practice. All firms do not disclose information of firm-industry performance analysis 
explicitly as there is no legislation in Sweden or best practices demanding such actions. 
However, three firms are disclosing such information voluntarily. In regard to related party 
transaction, Swedish code of corporate governance states that such shares traded should be 
disclosed that is not found in majority of the companies. However, such information could be 
found on the website of the company. More usual is that all possession held by executive and 
board directors are disclosed. Swedish companies have room to increase the disclosure of 
transactions by key persons in the company both in availability on their websites and in their 
annual reports. 
 
5.3.4. Shareholder’s Rights        
   
All companies in this small pilot study are using the right to have multiple classes of shares. 
Three companies use two classes and one company is using three. One type of the shares have 
ten times the voting power than the other shares, which is also the highest accepted voting 
power in Swedish legislation. All companies are disclosing the required information about the 
different shares types and are also in line with best practices recommendations. None of the 
board is having an explicit minority board director represented but there is representation of 
minority shareholder in the nomination committee as a way to enhance minority shareholder 
rights.  Dividend policy and dividend history is disclosed by all companies in detail (ordinary 
and extra ordinary dividends) along with material information disclosed in all companies 
except for one i.e. Tele2.  
 
A brief summary is that the same three companies are disclosing more than one (Tele2) at all 
occasions when they are differing, however at one occasion Tele2 disclosed information that 
the three other had disregarded. It is not disclosed in the annual reports or at companies‘ 
websites if minority protection rights have been used as proxy rights and refusals of decision 
that would harm the minorities of the company‘s shareholder. These variables are more 
interesting in case of legislation on country-level analysis.  
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5.3.5. Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
All companies are disclosing information on environmental policy they are applying. The 
most common information is the sustainability report/policy of the company, while they differ 
in contents and labeling of procedures, policies, and reports. The companies are following 
best practices in their work.  
6. Analysis 
 
This chapter presents the analysis that has been conducted on the result in chapter five only 
presenting relevant issues. In regard to this, the analysis is presented in four sections where 
all current dimensions and variables are analyzed for country and company level, analysis of 
discussion model and religious considerations. 
 
6.1. Country-level Analysis 
 
Regarding the matter of ownership structure, there was not much stated in legislation of 
Sweden and OECD best practices when compared to Pakistan. The shareholding of executive 
management and board of directors should be stated with detailed account according to best 
practices. Pakistan is requiring more detailed information which might be due to the family 
dominant ownership structure and cross shareholding set ups. This disclosure may be aimed at 
providing investors with the information about the actual influence of managers and directors 
have on the company. The same system would favor the Swedish system as well with a 
country of high ownership concentration. When investors know the true picture of 
shareholders and power structure within the companies, they might be able to make to more 
informed investment decisions. 
 
Sweden does leave a more voluntary choice of board size along with more relaxed floor limit 
of at least three persons compared to Pakistan‘s seven. No country does mention a board size 
cap of how many board directors there may be. A reflection to why the floor is more than 
twice as high in Pakistan and why Swedish legislation is focusing more on the issue to have a 
range of competence and experience is corporate governance development stage. Different 
development stages in countries call for different legislation. This issue goes back to the 
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separation of chair of the board and the CEO where it is not required but preferable that these 
positions are separated. The different stages of development and a mind of self-regulation 
might answer why there are lesser worries about the issue that board will not have a proper 
size. In Sweden, concern is regarding competence while, in Pakistan, the laws are more 
demanding to ensure competence by means of filling the board of directors. 
 
Regarding separation of CEO and chairman, Pakistani law is bit flexible providing room for 
single person, though not preferred, to take control of both positions. This might be due to the 
influence of Anglo-Saxon model on Pakistani governance system. In case of Sweden, it is 
required to have separated chairman and CEO which might be under influence of Germanic 
model, self-regulation and the better developed stage of corporate governance. 
 
Best practices regarding non-executive directors are softer than Swedish legislation and are in 
line with Pakistani legislation. The background to the difference is in relation to what is 
mentioned earlier. The family and network controlled companies in Pakistan are perhaps not 
that separated in matter of ownership and control. By restricting the executive directors‘ 
representation on board, may provide some protection to minority shareholders. Due to 
relaxed requirement for independent directors, and after looking at the Swedish strict 
requirements, it can be said that relatively lower development stage of corporate governance 
has put this issue as a voluntary item for Pakistan, while, due to better developed system level 
in Sweden has resulted in stricter legal requirements restricting the non-independent directors 
board representation to be below 50% of total board size. An increase in separation would 
favor new investors and minority shareholders. As stated by Swedish legislation that no 
decisions are allowed to be made by a party that will favor one shareholder on the expense of 
another shareholder, this will increase minority shareholder protection in Sweden. Best 
practices could increase their recommendations to increase minority shareholder protection 
with an increased independence of board directors. An important issue to the independence is 
that associated companies and cross-holdings should be included to minimize the gaps and 
that directors are truly independent directly and indirectly. 
 
The attendance regulation is different in the two countries where both countries do comply 
with best practices but in different ways. Pakistani legislation is more concrete and 
constructed with fine impositions while Sweden has a subjective motivation as best practices. 
To understand why Pakistani board directors are having a stricter attendance requirement 
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could be understood with prior analysis of the Pakistani board. A possibility might be that in 
companies with family ownership, there is no need of the board as the owners might also be 
the executive management. So, Pakistani law, by putting restrictions, attempts to make the 
existence of board more legitimate for investors. In Sweden, the board exists in its true spirit, 
so directors attend the board meetings as shareholders have elected them to control 
management. Best practices seem to believe that board is elected because the shareholders 
and investors demand a control over the executive management. 
 
As found in the results, Pakistan law mandates an audit committee only while remuneration 
and nomination committees are also required in Sweden. As mentioned, the nomination 
committee is autonomous in Sweden and does provide an entrance of minority shareholder to 
nominate appropriate candidates for their needs. Without any nomination committee minority 
shareholders are to suffer even further when no requirement of minorities is given on the 
actual board. This is however not the full picture as in Pakistan they use free nomination of 
board directors at the general meeting with notice in advance. This is one way to increase the 
minority shareholder protection if it will have any actual effect on the elected result, neither is 
it safe to say that nomination committee enhances minority protection in Sweden due to the 
fact that there is a possibility of participation at the nomination committee. Both countries 
have the same legislation in regard to the remuneration disclosure of directors and it is in 
conformity with the defined best practices of OECD. However, in Pakistan, there are no 
separate disclosures for each board member‘s remuneration. Weak legislation in Pakistan in 
this regard compared to the best practices perhaps facilitates family dominant businesses in 
Pakistan and impede minority shareholders in assessing the right picture. 
 
Responsibilities and duties of directors are thoroughly given in both countries and both are 
consistent with best practices in this case. Focus is given on the necessary time required for 
the fulfillment of director‘s duties in Sweden while Pakistan speaks more on the independent 
judgment to make better decisions in the company. Director‘s biography should be disclosed 
by the companies in Sweden, which is in conformity with the best practices, but Pakistan is 
lagging behind in this regard as no disclosure is required regarding experience, education and 
related matters in the law. It is perhaps due the developing and developed stages of two 
governance systems in the both countries as the level of importance given by investors may 
differ among two countries. 
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Best practices require the disclosure of non-audit fees along with audit remuneration but no 
requirements are found in this regard at the country level in both countries. However the 
nomination committee in Sweden proposes remuneration and directors in case of Pakistan but 
in both countries, the ultimate decision in taken in the annual general meeting by 
shareholders. So, process may differ initially but the end product is similar for both countries. 
Internal control and internal control policy are strictly taken by Swedish system as compared 
to Pakistan and best practices as it requires detailed section of internal controls and policy in 
the annual reports. This is perhaps to ensure more transparency and reduction of risks related 
to unexpected collapses. The philosophy of self-regulation is again visible here in this regard 
which obviously is resultant of corporate governance development stage. Financial as well as 
strategic disclosure is strictly applied in Pakistan on companies whereas in Sweden strict rules 
for disclosures are not found. It is left more open for companies to adopt best practices in this 
regard by Sweden. It is perhaps due to the norms and cultural differences as in Sweden more 
disclosures in regard of strategic information is appreciated but in Pakistan financial 
information is considered as a key concern. 
 
Both countries are strict in the appointment of external auditors as laws in both countries 
stress the independence of auditors, which is consistent with the OECD as well. However, 
legislation for the selection of external audit firm is defined in detail in Pakistan and thus 
ensures reliability of audit firms by setting high qualification criteria for these firms. Audit 
committees are required to look upon audit related matters in both countries. Appointment of 
audit is done through annual general meeting in both countries but in Sweden nomination 
committee proposes for the auditors whereas audit committee proposes for auditors in front of 
board of directors, which then present it in the annual general meeting. Nomination 
committee is fifth governance pillar in Swedish governance system as it is autonomous in 
regard of the board of directors. Nomination committee‘s proposal for auditors in annual 
general meeting thus provide greater protection to shareholders and investors as it reduces the 
risk of directors‘ biasness towards a particular audit firm. 
 
Related party transactions are required to disclose at an arms length method by both countries 
however Pakistan has a detailed legislation in reference to this matter. It is perhaps to ensure 
more transparency and investor‘s confidence as many companies are interwoven with other 
associated companies with same families as their owner. It is again more open for Swedish 
companies to disclose it in a best possible manner. Information availability on internet is 
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required in Sweden however in Pakistan there is no requirement from the authorities in this 
regard. This is perhaps Sweden is a developed country with a highly developed IT 
infrastructure as compared to Pakistan. IT is itself in an evolving stage in Pakistan and 
majority of people are not familiar with it and want to rely more on the paper information that 
is not the case in Sweden where Internet could be regarded as an extra source to disclose 
information with high frequency and parts that the annual report is missing. 
 
Both countries are following the internationally acceptable accounting standards (IFRS, IAS), 
which are in conformance with best practices. By providing standard accounting in both 
countries, global investor might has a high incentive to invest in, as one can easily compare 
companies of these countries with any other company in the world which is following the 
same standards.  Trading of shares by executives and directors by the company in the year 
needs to be disclosed in an extensive manner in Pakistan where as Sweden requires the 
disclosure of shares by directors and executives. Governance system of Pakistan is stronger to 
deal with the insider trading which ensures greater transparency to investor as compared to 
Sweden. 
 
Sweden has a strong requirement to deal with different shareholding classes as compared to 
Pakistan as Sweden imposes some caps on voting rights with shares while requirements in 
Pakistan in this reference are less evident. Caps and floors on voting rights thus provide more 
protection to the minority shareholders where there is concentrated ownership and family 
dominant businesses. Both countries are facilitating investors on their voting rights through 
proxy arrangements and are in conformance with the best practices as shareholders are not 
restricted from voting. In both countries, requirements are similar for calling extra ordinary 
general meetings of the companies. 
 
Extra ordinary general meetings could be called at anytime by the directors or by shareholders 
representing 10% or more holding in the company. Both countries are empowering minority 
shareholders in this regard who may contradict with majority shareholders and raise the 
matter again for decisions. Code of ethics, environmental and health policy and corporate 
social responsibility matters are required by Pakistan whereas it is not required in Sweden. 
Perhaps voluntary effort in this regard is encouraged in Sweden whereas Pakistani system 
wants to implement it so that it can ensure the stake holders perspective in the country as well.  
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6.2. Company Level Analysis 
 
Disclosure regarding ownership structure differs between Pakistani and Swedish sample 
companies. This might be due to the differing legal requirements set by both countries. 
Pakistani firms are more elaborative and closer to best practices due to the fact that Pakistani 
law explicitly demands information in a pre-defined format. This concrete requirement is an 
attempt to expose to maximum extent the real ownership structure after considering cross 
shareholdings, pyramid structures and other similar arrangements by dominant families and 
major shareholders. 
  
For board size, it is interesting to note here that even though Pakistani firms are mandated by 
a larger minimum requirement for board size i.e. seven and Swedish companies with lesser 
i.e. three, but in practice, opposite scenario has been observed. Average board size of 
Pakistani firms tends to be smaller i.e. below nine compared to Swedish boards i.e. above 
eleven thereby different competence levels if relation between size and competence is 
assumed true. Swedish companies have gone way beyond legal floor requirements for board 
in this regard while Pakistani companies are found to be very near to the legal requirement. 
The reason for Pakistani companies being so close to legal requirement might be due to 
family dominance over firm as there is not much separation of ownership and control. So, 
interests of management and majority shareholders (families) are already aligned. Both the 
Pakistani and Swedish companies are found to conform to the best practice by having separate 
persons holding CEO and chairman positions. Although in legal terms, this holds true for 
Pakistani companies too but reality is bit different. Although, non-executive directors can be 
found on Pakistani boards but their independence remains to be an issue of concern. Many 
board members, declared non-executive, belong to same family group and are serving on 
associated companies management team or board. As the independence of director is 
voluntary requirement by law, so most Pakistani companies has conveniently preferred to 
maintain influence to the board. This clearly is not a best practice. Approach towards board 
meetings, attendance and hence board effectiveness varies among the sample countries. This 
is due to the differing laws. Swedish boards conduct meetings when it is required whereas 
Pakistani boards are mandated to meet every quarter. No explicit attendance is subjected to 
Swedish companies whereas Pakistani companies can get fined if appropriate quorum or 
attendance requirement is not met. Average number of meetings for Pakistani companies was 
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almost six while it was near twelve for Swedish companies. The low number for country i.e. 
Pakistan which is explicitly mandated to meet a specific number of meetings underperformed 
by just being close to minimum requirement level. Swedish companies, on other hand, were 
more efficient in this regard even without having to meet a specific number of meetings. This 
trend again indicates toward non-separation of ownership and control and philosophy of just 
meeting minimum legal requirement. In regard to board committees, both countries differ, as 
apart from audit committee, no other committees are popular in Pakistan. The reason 
seemingly is lack of legal requirement for remuneration and nomination committees in 
Pakistan. So, Pakistani sample companies only satisfy minimum legal requirement by having 
audit committee whereas Swedish companies have all the committees in compliance to the 
listing requirements. So, clearly Sweden is found closer to the best practice. Also, only 
disclosures regarding audit committee were given by Pakistani companies, which were 
mandatory as per listing requirement such as number of meetings. No description of roles and 
responsibilities of audit committee are disclosed as it is left up to companies‘ discretion. So, it 
might be inferred that the sample companies differ due to requirements and nature of law. 
 
In regard to CEO, director and executives, remuneration, specific requirements, especially in 
Pakistani law, in regard to presentation of break-up information is not given, but still 
companies from both countries are given more details than legally required on voluntary 
basis. Although Swedish companies provide more detailed view on this issue but the 
voluntary effort by Pakistani companies make the gap to narrow between them and bring 
them in compliance with best practice. The way director discloses their awareness about their 
duties differs between two countries. It is again due to the nature of relevant laws as Pakistani 
Directors give a legal declaration about them being aware of articles of association, 
memorandum, by-laws and other related documents of a company and to have exercised all 
such powers where required of all eight companies are required by law to be aware of their 
responsibilities while this is not the case with Sweden. This legal declaration may be to make 
directors legally liable for their decisions, which in case of any lawsuit can be presented in the 
court of law. For more appropriate inferences, annual reports and websites are not reasonable 
estimators. All sample Swedish companies and mixed results from Pakistani companies, 
although insufficient to generalize, might be considered an indication for increasing trend to 
move towards a global best practice. Although differences exist, but the reason for such 
difference might be the development stage of corporate governance system in a country as 
more developed system may treat such information for legitimacy of director while other can 
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disregard it. Clearly, Swedish sample in this regard is found to be well in line while Pakistani 
sample lags way behind. 
 
The proposal for auditor remuneration for all Swedish companies is done by nomination 
committee where as board of director take this role in Pakistani sample case. Although the 
proposing authorities differ but the supreme authority in this regard is AGM where 
shareholders vote in this regard. Also, break-up of such remuneration is also given which 
discloses audit and non-audit fees. Both countries, with Sweden superior, are found to be 
following best practice and in conformance with each other. In addition, Pakistani sample 
companies, on advice from audit committee and Swedish sample companies, on proposal by 
nomination committee disclosed the election for appointment of external auditors in AGM. 
Here again the final authority are shareholders so similar implications as discussed for audit 
committee applies. Both countries sample companies are found in accordance with best 
practice. Although the internal control mechanism exists in both countries, but the 
transparency about the control processes and scope differs. By simply disclosing that such 
mechanism exists is of lesser importance until the effectiveness of it is not disclosed. It can be 
assumed that Pakistani companies are just fulfilling a legal requirement, as it is required to 
give such disclosure. Swedish companies, apart from disclosure, present the whole 
mechanism thereby providing more legitimacy to their system. 
 
In regard to disclosure of financial, operational and strategic information, both countries 
samples are found to be in conformance with best practices and with each other. Although, a 
minor difference observed is more emphasis on details of financial and operational 
information compared to strategic information. This might be considered as an Anglo-Saxon 
characteristic by Pakistani investors focusing more on near term performance and Germanic 
characteristic by Swedish investors interested more in long term future prospects of firm. 
Also, conformance with best practice in regard to disclosure of availability of material 
information was observed for both sample companies. In regard to sensitive issue of related 
party transactions, Pakistani sample companies disclose more detailed view of pricing method 
and require certain declarations to be presented in annual report under companies‘ ordinance. 
More explicit disclosures and declaration requirements by Pakistani companies are direct 
result of legal requirements. Swedish companies, although not subject to such declarations, 
contain adequate disclosure of such transactions due to their voluntary efforts and more aware 
market due to more developed corporate governance system. All companies from both 
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countries disclosed the dividend or the reason if no dividend was declared. But, dividend 
policy was declared by only two Swedish companies. Although results are not unanimous 
from Sweden too, but still they are closer to best practice compared to Pakistani companies, 
where no proper such disclosure was made in this regard. The reason for the two companies 
disclosing dividend policy may be their voluntary effort to inform their current investor and to 
attract new investor.  
 
All Swedish sample companies have strong web presence as per their listing requirements. 
Although, no relevant law exists in this regard for Pakistani companies, but still, sample 
companies present useful information on their websites voluntarily. As the internet being the 
most convenient way of information dissemination especially for global aims, might have 
been a reason for the Pakistani companies voluntary effort. Such voluntary effort puts 
Pakistani companies in conformity with best practices along with Swedish companies. All 
companies are in total conformance with best practices in regard to adoption and disclosure of 
significant accounting policies. This is mainly due to the acceptance of International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) by both countries. For trade of shares by company executives 
and directors, Pakistani companies provide such transactions, if any, in more detailed manner 
than Swedish sample companies. This is mainly due to the legal requirement as the law 
provides a pre-determined format and amount of information to be disclosed in companies‘ 
annual reports. Although due to legal requirements, Pakistani companies are found to be more 
conformed to OECD best practice. Companies from both countries disclosed share types and 
voting rights making them conformed to each other and best practice. Although Swedish 
companies were more explicit in regard to voting rights disclosure. 
 
Swedish companies presented fairly detailed information about their corporate social behavior 
while mixed results were observed in Pakistani companies. Sweden is in conformance with 
best practice while Pakistan lags behind which might be due to the absence of relevant laws. 
Also mixed results can be viewed as shift towards a global standard due to increased 
awareness about this issue. Since both countries provide proxy-voting rights to their investors 
so both are following best practices. Although, all Pakistani sample companies annex a proxy 
form with their annual reports as they are mandate by law to do so. This might be to provide 
convenience to investors as acquiring such form on their own might refrain investors to 
pursue proxy voting. 
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6.3. Research Model 
 
The purpose of constructing above research model is to compare sample companies with their 
respective national laws and then make judgment based about them by benchmarking against 
OECD best practice. Comparing different countries with such differing legislation requires a 
flexible model that could take input against a variable, potentially similar in content but 
different in presentation, and enable a comparison to be conducted. The underlying model 
serves the purpose as its qualitative nature provides flexibility to the researcher so there is 
room to make translation adjustments to the information obtained. It enabled the data to be 
presented in comparable form consequently easing way for deriving conclusions. 
 
In regard to this study, the issue was same. The information is found in different sources and 
in different manner in two diverse countries. If a strict approach would have been conducted 
with a pre-determined quantitative scale, the data gathered would have missed out some 
context of real situation. 
 
6.4. Religious Considerations 
 
Pakistan and Sweden differs greatly in respect to religion as religion is more actively 
practiced in Pakistan. Since, Pakistani laws have impact of religion on them and it is in 
constitution of country that if any country law collides with Islamic law, then, Islamic law 
shall prevail. Due to this, all country laws are in conformance with religious laws. So, this 
study also looks for any impact of religion on governance practices. 
 
During the analysis, no influence of religion is observed in case of Sweden. Also, no major 
influence was observed in case of Pakistan. However, two religious aspects were witnessed in 
Pakistan. First one is in relation to the name of companies i.e. companies are not allowed to 
choose name for them which is deceptive or designed to exploit or offend the religious 
susceptibility of people.
212
 Second is in relation to Zakat. Zakat is one of the five pillars of 
Islam.
213
 It is compulsory in Islam that every person at the end of Islamic year pays 2.5% of 
                                               
212
 Companies Ordinance 1984 section 37 (page 26) 
213
 http://www.zpub.com/aaa/zakat-def.html assessed on May 5, 2009. 
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his/ her real assets which he/ she holds for the whole year to poor and needy people in Islamic 
states.
214
 The philosophy behind it is to establish social justice and prosperity among the 
society.
215
 Government in Pakistan has established a detailed law on Zakat collection with the 
name of Zakat and Ushr Ordinance 1980 to which all companies doing business in Pakistan 
are subject to. Companies are mandated to deduct Zakat at source and deposit it in the central 
Zakat fund established by the government of Pakistan. Through companies act, it has been 
made compulsory to obtain an opinion on the transparent Zakat payment and its submission in 
the Central Zakat Fund from external auditor and to disclose it in their report to shareholder. 
If auditor gives a negative remark in this regard, then, due to Zakat being an important 
component of Islam, might affect an investors investment decision towards that company. 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
214
 http://www.zpub.com/aaa/zakat-def.html assessed on 20.05.2008 
215
 ibid. 
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7. Conclusions and Further Consideration 
 
As the last chapter of the thesis, the conclusions will be presented with further considerations. 
Mainly three conclusions will be presented where most of the focus has been on adequacy of 
research mechanism, comparative findings, corporate governance development stages and 
convergence.  
 
After utilizing a modified research model and conducting detailed study on Pakistan and 
Sweden, three conclusions have been arrived at. 
 
Firstly, it will be inappropriate to rate a country‘s corporate governance mechanism solely 
based on its legislation only without following the state of its practice within the companies. 
Likewise, it may also be improper to judge a country based on companies practices while 
ignoring the national laws. Pakistani laws are found to be more comprehensive and concrete 
compared to Swedish laws in various aspects which seem to relate to the corporate 
development stage in the country. On the contrary, Pakistani companies, although fulfilling 
minimum legal requirements, lag behind overall when compared to companies of Sweden. 
This, probably, is a result of better developed corporate governance which has lead to self-
regulation and more voluntary efforts by companies. 
 
Secondly, different development stages of corporate governance in selected countries employ 
different mechanisms for enforcing corporate governance practices for that country. Pakistan 
seems to bring its corporate governance system closer to best practices in the world by setting 
down hard rules and explicit laws whereas it is found to be comparatively open and flexible in 
case of Sweden. Mainly, the differences are caused by different development stages in the 
corporate governance systems of both the countries. The corporate governance in Pakistan is 
in its evolutionary stages where setting down explicit laws is required for its development. On 
the other hand, the system in Sweden is through with its developing stage and has evolved to 
the point where setting up standards seems to come naturally. The legislation in Pakistan is, 
according to research findings, stated to create a difference between management and 
ownership, the board in this case. The family concentrated Pakistani companies do not desire 
a board as they already have direct or indirect control over the management. Also, Pakistani 
legislation is enforcing this separation to make it more attractive for other shareholders that 
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are not holding a controlling share, both domestic and international. As separation is not the 
same issue in Sweden, legislation does not need to enforce board attendance, number of 
directors etc. However, the issue in Sweden is rather in consideration of keeping the board 
independent, both to management and major shareholders. Again, the differing development 
stages are making the expression to differ among the two countries.  
 
Thirdly, although, the two countries diverge in various aspects but some traces of 
convergence are also observed. Convergence was observed in situations where either law 
became closer to each other at country level or voluntary efforts matched at company level.  
 
While conducting research, a very limited number of companies were examined from both 
countries to derive inferences due to time constraint. It is recommended to conduct research in 
this regard with a bigger sample which could be a better representative of corporate 
governance system for a country. 
 
Due to time and resource constraint, research focused solely on archival approach for data 
gathering. Other techniques like interviews, surveys etc. might lead to more realistic data. 
Such techniques shall be adopted for both country and company level. Especially in regard to 
country level analysis, regulatory infrastructure, market infrastructure and informational 
infrastructure, such techniques, if applied, could provide a more comprehensive picture of the 
governance situation. 
 
The research model constructed for this study to be tested in other environments and for other 
countries to determine its applicability and affectivity. 
Separate studies to be conducted to examine the effect of corporate governance development 
stages, religion and culture in the selected countries on the results obtained in this study. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1. Country-level Matrix 
 
Variables Pakistan Sweden Best Practice 
Ownership Structure    
Directors/ Executive 
Shareholding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
220. Register of directors ‘ 
shareholdings, etc. - (1) 
Every listed company shall 
keep a register showing as 
respects each director, 
chief executive, managing 
agent, chief accountant, 
secretary or auditor of the 
company, and every other 
person holding not less 
than ten per cent of the 
beneficial interest in the 
company, the number, 
description and amount of 
any shares in, or 
debentures of, the 
company or any other body 
corporate, being the 
company‘s subsidiary or 
holding company, or a 
subsidiary of the 
company's holding 
company, which are held 
by or in trust for him, or of 
which he has a right to 
become holder, whether on 
payment or not. 
The CEO‘s and board 
directors‘ holdings of 
shares and other financial 
instruments in the 
company or any similar 
holdings. Also related 
natural or legal person‘s 
possession should be 
disclosed. Shareholdings 
and ownership in other 
companies that the 
company has significant 
business with. 
 
Shareholding pattern XI37 (xix) also part (i) The 
pattern of shareholding 
shall be reported to 
disclose the aggregate 
number of shares (along 
with name wise details 
where stated below) held 
by: 
• associated companies, 
undertakings and related 
parties (name wise details); 
• NIT and ICP (name wise 
details); 
• directors, CEO and their 
spouse and minor children 
(name wise details); 
• executives; 
• public sector companies 
and corporations; 
• banks, Development 
Finance Institutions, Non-
The shareholdings either 
direct or indirect in the 
company representing at 
least a tenth of the total 
voting power shall be 
disclosed. (Swedish 
Annual Accounts Act 
2005:1554, ninth chapter 
§6) 
VA (3) One of the basic 
rights of investors is to 
be informed about the 
ownership structure of 
the enterprise and their 
rights vis-à-vis the rights 
of other owners. The 
right to such information 
should also extend to 
information about the 
structure of a group of 
companies and intra-
group relations. 
Such disclosure might 
include data on major 
shareholders and others 
that, directly or 
indirectly, control or may 
control the company 
through special voting 
rights, shareholder 
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Banking Finance 
Institutions, insurance 
companies, modarabas and 
mutual funds; and 
• Shareholders holding ten 
percent or more voting 
interest in the listed 
company (name wise 
details).  
agreements, the 
ownership of controlling 
or large blocks of shares, 
significant cross 
shareholding 
relationships and cross 
guarantees 
 
Board and Board 
committees 
   
Chairman/ CEO 
Separation 
Board should define that 
these offices are held by 
separate individuals or by a 
single individual. (Code of 
Pakistan) 
XI37 (ix) The Chairman of 
a listed company shall 
preferably be elected from 
among the non-executive 
directors of the listed 
company. The Board of 
Directors shall clearly 
define the respective roles 
and responsibilities of the 
Chairman and Chief 
Executive, whether or not 
these offices are held by 
separate individuals or the 
same individual. 
The CEO may be a 
member of the board but 
not the chair of the board 
VIE In countries with 
single tier board systems, 
objectivity and 
independence of board 
may be strengthened by 
the separation of the role 
of chief executive and 
chairman or if these roles 
are combined then 
representation of a lead 
non-executive director is 
considered as best 
practice. 
Board Size Every listed company shall 
have not less than seven 
directors to be elected in a 
general meeting in the 
manner provided in this 
Ordinance. (Co.‘s 
Ordinance, sec:174) 
The board must consist of 
no less than three 
members. The 
requirement is that the 
board has enough 
competence and 
experience to fulfill the 
expected requirements to 
listed companies. 
(OMXN) 
 
Independent and Non-
Executive Directors 
XI37 (i) All listed 
companies shall encourage 
effective representation of 
independent non-executive 
directors, including those 
representing minority 
interests, on their Boards 
of Directors so that the 
Board as a group includes 
core competencies 
considered relevant in the 
context of each listed 
company. (Voluntary) 
(Code of Pakistan) 
XI37 (i) 
(b) the Board of Directors 
of each listed company 
includes at least one 
independent director 
representing institutional 
Only one of the elected 
board directors at the 
shareholders‘ meeting 
may be on the executive 
management team of the 
company or any of its 
subsidiaries. 
More than half the elected 
board members need to be 
independent in relation to 
the company and the 
company management.  
At least should two of the 
elected board members be 
independent in relation to 
the company‘s larger 
shareholders. (OMXN 
listing requirements) 
VIE Independence from 
controlling shareholders 
or another controlling 
body will need to be 
emphasized, in particular 
if the exante rights of 
minority shareholders are 
weak and opportunities 
to obtain redress are 
limited. This has led to 
both codes and the law in 
some jurisdictions to call 
for some board members 
to be independent of 
dominant shareholders, 
independence extending 
to not being their 
representative or having 
close business ties with 
them. Independent non 
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equity interest of a banking 
company, Development 
Financial Institution, Non-
Banking Financial 
Institution (including a 
modaraba, leasing 
company or investment 
bank), mutual fund or 
insurance company; 
(c) executive directors, i.e. 
working or whole time 
directors, are not more 
than 75% of the elected 
directors including the 
Chief Executive: 
Provided that in special 
circumstances, this 
condition may be relaxed 
by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan. 
(ix) The Chairman of a 
listed company shall 
preferably be elected from 
among the non-executive 
directors of the listed 
company. The Board of 
Directors shall clearly 
define the respective roles 
and responsibilities of the 
Chairman and Chief 
Executive, whether or not 
these offices are held by 
separate individuals or the 
same individual. 
executive directors can 
contribute significantly 
to the decision-making 
of the board and their 
representation on board 
is encouraged to protect 
minority shareholder 
rights. Boards should 
consider assigning a 
sufficient number of 
non-executive board 
members capable of 
exercising independent 
judgment to tasks, where 
there is a potential for 
conflict of interest. 
Examples of such key 
responsibilities are 
ensuring the integrity of 
financial and non-
financial reporting, the 
review of related party 
transactions, nomination 
of board members and 
key executives, and 
board remuneration. 
Director effectiveness/ 
limit on representing no. 
of boards  
No listed company shall 
have as a director, a person 
who is serving as a director 
of ten other listed 
companies.(Mandatory) 
(code of Pakistan) 
XI37 (ii) The directors of 
listed companies shall, at 
the time of filing their 
consent to act as such, give 
a declaration in such 
consent that they are aware 
of their duties and powers 
under the relevant law(s) 
and the listed companies‘ 
memorandum and Articles 
of Association and the 
listing regulations of stock 
exchanges in Pakistan. 
CO 185 
185. Validity of acts of 
directors. - No act of a 
director, or of a meeting of 
directors attended by him, 
shall be invalid merely on 
Board directors are to 
devote the necessary time 
and care to effectively 
protect and promote the 
interests‘ the company 
and its owners. 
VIE (3) Board members 
should be able to commit 
themselves effectively to 
their responsibilities. 
Service on too many 
boards can interfere with 
the performance of board 
members. Companies 
may wish to consider 
whether multiple board 
memberships by the 
same person are 
compatible with effective 
board performance and 
disclose the information 
to shareholders. 
(Disclosures required for 
company regarding 
director‘s directorship in 
other companies). 
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the ground of any defect 
subsequently discovered in 
his appointment to such 
office: 
Provided that, as soon as 
any such defect has come 
to notice, the director shall 
not exercise the right of his 
office till the defect has 
been rectified. 
188. Vacation of office by 
the directors. - (1) A 
director shall ipso facto 
cease to hold office if— 
(b) he absents himself from 
three consecutive meetings 
of the directors or from all 
the meetings of the 
directors for a continuous 
period of three months, 
whichever is the longer, 
without leave of absence 
from the directors; 
192. Restriction on 
assignment of office by 
directors. - (1) If in the 
case of any company 
provision is made by the 
articles or by any 
agreement entered into 
between any person and 
the company for 
empowering a director of 
the company to assign his 
office as such to another 
person, any assignment of 
office made in pursuance 
of the said provision shall, 
notwithstanding anything 
contained in the said 
provision, be of no effect 
unless and until it is 
approved by a special 
resolution of the company. 
193. Proceedings of 
directors.- (1) The quorum 
for a meeting of directors 
of a listed company shall 
not be less than one-third 
of their number or four, 
whichever is greater. 
(2) The directors of a 
public company shall meet 
at least 1[once in each 
quarter of a year.] 
(3) If a meeting of 
directors is conducted in 
the absence of a quorum 
specified in sub-section 
(1), or a meeting of 
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directors is not held as 
required by sub section 
(2), the chairman of the 
directors and the directors 
shall be liable to a fine 
195. Loans to directors, 
etc.- (l) Save as otherwise 
provided in sub-section 
(2), no company, hereafter 
in this section referred to 
as "the lending company'', 
shall, directly or indirectly, 
make any loan to, or give 
any guarantee or provide 
any security in connection 
with a loan made by any 
other person to, or to any 
other person by.— 
(a) any director of the 
lending company or of a 
company which is its 
holding 
company or any partner or 
relative of any such 
director; 
(b) any firm in which any 
such director or relative is 
a partner; 
(c) any private company of 
which any such director is 
a director or member; 
(d) any body corporate at a 
general meeting of which 
not less than twenty 
five per cent of the total 
voting power may be 
exercised or controlled by 
any such director or his 
relative, or by two or more 
such directors 
together or by their 
relatives; or 
(e) any body corporate, the 
directors or chief executive 
whereof are or is 
accustomed to act in 
accordance with the 
directions or instructions 
of the chief executive, or 
of any director or directors, 
of the lending company: 
196. Powers of directors.- 
Meetings and 
Attendance of Directors 
The Board of Directors of 
a listed company shall 
meet at least once in every 
quarter of the financial 
year. Written notices 
(including agenda) of 
meetings shall be 
circulated not less than 
The board decides a work 
procedure where the 
number of meetings is 
decided. (Swedish 
Company Act, 2005:551, 
chapter 8, § 6) The Chair 
of the board shall hold a 
board meeting when it‘s 
VIE (3) Board members 
should be able to commit 
themselves effectively to 
their responsibilities. 
Service on too many 
boards can interfere with 
the performance of board 
members. Companies 
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seven days before the 
meetings. (Mandatory) 
(Code of Pakistan) 
See notes from companies 
ordinance. 
XI37 (xix) 
(h) The number of Board 
meetings held during the 
year and attendance by 
each director shall be 
disclosed. 
needed. may wish to consider 
whether multiple board 
memberships by the 
same person are 
compatible with effective 
board performance and 
disclose the information 
to shareholders. Some 
countries have limited 
the number of board 
positions that can be 
held. Specific limitations 
may be less important 
than ensuring that 
members of the board 
enjoy legitimacy and 
confidence in the eyes of 
shareholders. Achieving 
legitimacy would also be 
facilitated by the 
publication of attendance 
records for individual 
board members (e.g. 
whether they have 
missed a significant 
number of meetings) and 
any other work 
undertaken on behalf of 
the board and the 
associated remuneration. 
Board Committees The Board of Directors of 
every listed company shall 
establish an Audit 
Committee, which shall 
comprise not less than 
three members, including 
the chairman. Majority of 
the members of the 
Committee shall be from 
among the non executive 
directors of the listed 
company and the chairman 
of the Audit Committee 
shall preferably be a non-
executive director. The 
names of members of the 
Audit Committee shall be 
disclosed in each annual 
report of the listed 
company. The Audit 
Committee of a listed 
company shall meet at 
least once every quarter of 
the financial year. These 
meetings shall be held 
prior to the approval of 
interim results of the listed 
company by its Board of 
Directors and before and 
after completion of 
The board should 
establish an audit 
committee consisting of at 
least three board directors. 
The majority of the 
committee should be 
independent to the 
company and its 
management and at least 
on should be independent 
in relation to one of the 
company‘s major 
shareholders. There‘s no 
allowance that no member 
are a part of the executive 
management. The audit 
committee will ensure 
quality of the company‘s 
financial reports, meet the 
company‘s auditor and 
discuss the co-ordinance 
between internal and 
external control, evaluate 
auditing work, and assist 
the nomination committee 
with auditing reports and 
preparing nomination of 
next auditor. 
The board is to establish a 
remuneration committee 
AUDIT COMMITTEE 
VC The audit committee 
or an equivalent body is 
often specified as 
providing oversight of 
the internal audit 
activities and should also 
be charged with 
overseeing the overall 
relationship with the 
external auditor 
including the nature of 
non-audit services 
provided by the auditor 
to the company. 
Provision of non-audit 
services by the external 
auditor to a company can 
significantly impair their 
independence and might 
involve them auditing 
their own work. 
VD The practice that 
external auditors are 
recommended by an 
independent audit 
committee of the board 
or an equivalent body 
and that external auditors 
are appointed either by 
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external audit. A meeting 
of the Audit Committee 
shall also be held, if 
requested by the external 
auditors or the head of 
internal audit. 
with the mission to 
prepare remuneration of 
executive management. 
The chair of the board 
may be the chair of the 
remuneration committee, 
however the other 
members are to be 
independent. The 
shareholder‘s meeting 
decides all incentives of 
share and share-price 
character. 
The company is to have a 
remuneration committee 
who are supposed to 
propose the chair and the 
other members of the 
board. The nomination 
committee proposes as 
well fees and 
remuneration to each 
board member. The same 
procedures are followed 
when the committee 
proposes the auditor and 
its remuneration. The 
members of the 
nomination committee are 
elected or appointed how 
to be elected at the 
shareholders‘ meeting. 
There should be at least 
three members, and on to 
be elected chair. The 
majority needs to be 
independent to the 
company and at least one 
to the company‘s major 
shareholders. The CEO or 
other members of the 
executive management are 
to be elected. Board 
directors may be members 
of the nomination 
committee, however not 
the majority members of 
the committee and neither 
hold the chair in both the 
board and the committee. 
that committee/body or 
by the shareholders‘ 
meeting directly can be 
regarded as good 
practice since it clarifies 
that the external auditor 
should be accountable to 
the shareholders. 
VIE (2) When 
committees of the board 
are established, their 
mandate, composition 
and working procedures 
should be well defined 
and disclosed by the 
board. In order to 
evaluate the merits of 
board committees it is 
therefore important that 
the market receives a full 
and clear picture of their 
purpose, duties and 
composition. 
REMUNERATION 
COMMITTEE 
VIE (2) In order to 
evaluate the merits of 
board committees it is 
therefore important that 
the market receives a full 
and clear picture of their 
purpose, duties and 
composition. 
NOMINATION 
COMMITTEE 
VIE (2) In order to 
evaluate the merits of 
board committees it is 
therefore important that 
the market receives a full 
and clear picture of their 
purpose, duties and 
composition. 
Director election 
procedure (Vacancy 
filling) 
XI37 (a) (i) All listed 
companies shall encourage 
effective representation of 
independent non-executive 
directors, including those 
representing minority 
interests, on their Boards 
of 
Directors so that the Board 
as a group includes core 
The board of directors is 
elected at the 
shareholders‘ meeting. 
The nomination 
committee‘s proposals are 
presented at the 
shareholders‘ meeting. 
The proposals are also 
presented on the 
company‘s website 
VID (5) A formal and 
transparent board 
nomination and election 
process should be 
ensured. 
These Principles promote 
an active role for 
shareholders in the 
nomination and election 
of board members. The 
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competencies considered 
relevant in the context of 
each listed company. For 
the purpose, listed 
companies may take 
necessary steps such that 
(a) minority shareholders 
as a class are facilitated to 
contest election of 
directors by proxy 
solicitation, for which 
purpose the listed 
companies may: 
on a request by the 
candidate(s) representing 
minority shareholders 
and at the cost of the 
company, annex to the 
notice of general 
meeting at which directors 
are to be elected an 
additional copy of 
proxy form duly filled in 
by such candidate(s) and 
transmit the same 
to all shareholders in terms 
of section 178 (4) of the 
Companies Ordinance, 
1984; CO 179. 
Circumstances in which 
election of directors may 
be declared invalid. - The 
Court may, on the 
application of members 
holding not less than 
twenty percent of the 
voting power in the 
company, made within 
thirty days of the date of 
election, declare election 
of all directors or any one 
or more of them invalid if 
it is satisfied that there has 
been material irregularity 
in the holding of the 
elections and matters 
incidental or relating 
thereto. 180. Term of 
office of directors. - (1) A 
director elected under 
section 178 holding office 
for a period of three years 
unless he earlier resigns, 
becomes disqualified from 
being a director or 
otherwise ceases to hold 
office. 181. Removal of 
director.- A company may 
by resolution in general 
meeting 
explaining its proposals 
regarding the board 
directors regarding the 
requirements of the 
composition. The 
following information 
should be presented: 
candidate age, education, 
work experience, any 
work performed for the 
company and other 
professional 
commitments. Also 
financial holdings to 
themselves or related legal 
or natural person, whether 
or not the candidate are 
independent to the 
company, management, or 
company‘s major 
shareholder. 
board has an essential 
role to play in ensuring 
that this and other 
aspects of the 
nominations and election 
process are respected. 
First, while actual 
procedures for 
nomination may differ 
among countries, the 
board or a nomination 
committee has a special 
responsibility to make 
sure that established 
procedures are 
transparent and 
respected. Second, the 
board has a key role in 
identifying potential 
members for the board 
with the appropriate 
knowledge, 
competencies and 
expertise to complement 
the existing skills of the 
board and thereby 
improve its value-adding 
potential for the 
company. In several 
countries there are calls 
for an open search 
process extending to a 
broad range of people. 
 95 
remove a director 
appointed under section 
176 or section 180 or 
elected in the manner 
provided for in section 
178: 
Provided that a resolution 
for removing a director 
shall not be deemed to 
have been passed unless 
the number of votes cast 
1[against it is equal to, or 
exceeds].- 
(i) the minimum number of 
votes that were cast for the 
election of a director at the 
Immediately preceding 
election of directors, if the 
resolution relates to 
removal of a director 
elected in the manner 
provided in sub-section (5) 
of section 178; or 
(ii) the total number of 
votes for the time being 
computed in the manner 
laid 
down in sub-section (5) of 
section 178 divided by the 
number of directors for the 
time being, if the 
resolution relates to 
removal of a director 
appointed under section 
176 or section 180. 182. 
Creditors may nominate 
directors.- In addition to 
the directors elected or 
deemed to have been 
elected by shareholders, a 
company may have 
directors nominated by the 
company's creditors or 
other special interests by 
virtue of contractual 
arrangements. 183. 
Certain provisions not to 
apply to directors 
representing special 
interests. - Nothing in 
section 178, section 180 or 
section 181 shall apply 
to—(a) directors 
nominated 2[...] by a 
corporation or company 
formed under any 
law in force and owned or 
controlled, whether 
directly or indirectly, by 
the Federal Government or 
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a Provincial Government 
on the board of directors of 
a company in or to which 
3[…] such corporation or 
company has made 
investment or otherwise 
extended credit facilities; 
(b) directors nominated by 
the Federal Government or 
a Provincial Government 
on the board of directors of 
the company; or 
(c) directors nominated by 
foreign equity holders on 
the board of the Pakistan 
Industrial Credit and 
Investment Corporation 
Limited, or of any other 
company set up under a 
regional co-operation or 
other co-operation 
arrangement approved by 
the Federal Government: 
Disclosures and 
Internal Control 
   
Director/ Executive 
Remuneration 
(Executive 
remuneration break-up) 
XI37 (e) appointment, 
remuneration and terms 
and conditions of 
employment of the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) 
and other executive 
directors of the listed 
company are determined 
and approved by the Board 
of Directors; CO 191. 
Restriction on director's 
remuneration, etc.- (l) The 
remuneration of a director 
for performing extra 
services, including the 
holding of the office of 
Chairman, shall be 
determined by the directors 
or the company in general 
meeting in accordance 
with the provisions in the 
company's articles. 
(2) The remuneration to be 
paid to any director for 
attending the meetings of 
the directors or a 
committee of directors 
shall not exceed the scale 
approved by the company 
or the directors, as the case 
may be, in accordance with 
the provisions of the 
articles. 
The nomination 
committee proposes 
individual remuneration to 
each board member at the 
shareholder‘s meeting. 
The remuneration 
committee proposes the 
remuneration and other 
forms of employment of 
the executive 
management. All share 
and share-price related 
incentives to the executive 
management are to be 
decided by the 
shareholder‘s meeting  
VA (4) Remuneration 
policy for members of 
the board and key 
executives, and 
information about board 
members, including their 
qualifications, the 
selection process, other 
company directorships 
and whether they are 
regarded as independent 
by the board to be 
disclosed. 
Companies are generally 
expected to disclose 
information on the 
remuneration of board 
members and key 
executives so that 
investors can assess the 
costs and benefits of 
remuneration plans and 
the contribution of 
incentive schemes, such 
as stock option schemes, 
to company 
performance. Disclosure 
on an individual basis 
(including termination 
and retirement 
provisions) is 
increasingly regarded as 
good practice and is now 
mandated in several 
countries. 
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Directors‘ 
responsibilities 
The directors of listed 
companies shall exercise 
their powers and carry out 
their legislated duties with 
a sense of objective 
judgment and 
independence in the best 
interest of the listed 
company.  
The directors are to devote 
necessary time and care to 
ensure they have the 
competence to protect and 
promote the interests‘ of 
shareholders. 
‗Each director is to form a 
independent opinion on 
each matter considered by 
the board and request the 
information needed to 
make well-informed 
decisions‘. ‗Each director 
is obliged to acquire the 
knowledge of the 
company‘s operations, 
organizations, markets etc. 
required for the 
assignment‘. (Swedish 
Code of Corporate 
Governance §3.5.1-3.5.2.) 
 
 
Directors qualification 
and Biography 
(Education) 
XI37 Qualification and 
Eligibility to CO 157. (d) 
the names, addresses and 
occupations of the 
directors, chief executive, 
secretary, auditors and 
legal advisers of the 
company and the changes, 
if any, which have 
occurred since the date of 
the incorporation; Act as a 
Director (iii) No listed 
company shall have as a 
director, a person who is 
serving as a director of ten 
other listed companies. 
(v) A listed company shall 
endeavor that no person is 
elected or nominated as a 
director if he or his spouse 
is engaged in the business 
of stock brokerage (unless 
specifically exempted by 
the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan). Tenure of Office 
of Directors (vi) The 
tenure of office of 
Directors shall be three 
years. 
The following information 
should be presented: 
candidate age, education, 
work experience, any 
work performed for the 
company and other 
professional 
commitments. Also 
financial holdings to 
themselves or related legal 
or natural person, whether 
or not the candidate are 
independent to the 
company, management, or 
company‘s major 
shareholder. 
VA (4) Information 
about board members, 
including their 
qualifications, the 
selection process, other 
company directorships 
and whether they are 
regarded as independent 
by the board to be 
disclosed. 
Audit remuneration CO 252 (8) The 
remuneration of the 
auditors of a company 
shall be fixed — (a) in the 
case of an auditor 
appointed by the directors 
or by the Commission, as 
the case may be; and 
The nomination 
committee proposes the 
audit remuneration. The 
shareholder‘s meeting 
decides upon the proposal.  
VC mandatory rotation 
of auditors (either 
partners or in some cases 
the audit partnership). 
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(b) in all other cases, by 
the company in general 
meeting or in such manner 
as the general meeting may 
determine. 
Internal Audit and 
Internal control policy 
Internal Audit: Internal 
Control Policy: XI37 
(xix) Director’s report to 
shareholders disclose 
The system of internal 
control is sound in design 
and has been effectively 
implemented and 
monitored. (e) The system 
of internal control is sound 
in design and has been 
effectively implemented 
and monitored. (c) The 
Board of Directors 
establish a system of sound 
internal control, which is 
effectively implemented at 
all levels within the listed 
company; 
The board is responsible 
that the company has good 
internal control and 
formalized routines. The 
corporate governance 
report should disclose the 
most significant issues of 
internal control and risk 
management in 
connection to the financial 
report. (Swedish Annual 
Accounts Act, 2005:1554, 
ninth chapter §6) 
VC The audit committee 
or an equivalent body is 
often specified as 
providing oversight of 
the internal audit 
activities and should also 
be charged with 
overseeing the overall 
relationship with the 
external auditor 
including the nature of 
non-audit services 
provided by the auditor 
to the company. 
    
Financial and 
operational information 
XI37 (xix) a, b, c (a) The 
financial statements, 
prepared by the 
management of the listed 
company, present fairly its 
state of affairs, the result of 
its operations, cash flows 
and changes in equity. (b) 
Proper books of account of 
the listed company have 
been maintained. (c) 
Appropriate accounting 
policies have been 
consistently applied in 
preparation of financial 
statements and accounting 
estimates are based on 
reasonable and prudent 
judgment. 
Where applicable, also 
disclose, (b) Significant 
deviations from last year in 
operating results of the 
listed company shall be 
highlighted and reasons 
thereof shall be explained. 
(c) Key operating and 
financial data of last six 
years shall be summarized. 
Where applicable (e) 
Where any statutory 
payment on account of 
taxes, duties, levies and 
charges is outstanding, the 
amount together with a 
Disclosure of information 
of other issues than 
balance sheet, income 
statement, the notes but 
are crucial for the 
company‘s operations, 
position, profit, significant 
occurrences, future 
expected development, 
including specific risks, 
insecurity factors, the 
company‘s research and 
development, company 
international branches, 
number and ratios of own 
shares and all transactions 
during the fiscal year.   
If its significant the 
company shall disclose; 
the use of financial 
instruments with 
principles of financial risk 
guidance, and exposure of 
price-, credit-, liquidity-, 
and cash flow risks. 
(Swedish Annual 
Accounts Act, 2005:1554 
sixth chapter §1) 
VA (1) Disclosure 
should include, but not 
be limited to, material 
information on the 
financial and operating 
results of the company. It 
is therefore important 
that transactions relating 
to an entire group of 
companies be disclosed 
in line with high quality 
internationally 
recognized standards and 
includes information 
about contingent 
liabilities and off-balance 
sheet transactions, as 
well as special purpose 
entities. 
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brief description and 
reasons for the same shall 
be disclosed. (g) A 
statement as to the value of 
investments of provident, 
gratuity and pension funds, 
based on their respective 
audited accounts, shall be 
included. CO 224 (6) The 
books of account of every 
company relating to a 
period of not less than ten 
years immediately 
preceding the current year 
shall be preserved in good 
order: 
Strategic information XI37 (xix) Where 
applicable part. (f) 
Significant plans and 
decisions, such as 
corporate restructuring, 
business expansion and 
discontinuance of 
operations, shall be 
outlined along with future 
prospects, risks and 
uncertainties surrounding 
the listed company. 
Disclosure of significant 
occurrences, future 
expected development, 
including specific risks, 
insecurity factors, the 
company‘s research and 
development, company 
international branches. 
(Swedish Annual 
Accounts Act, 2005:1554, 
ninth chapter §1) 
VA (1) Investors are 
particularly interested in 
information that may 
shed light on the future 
performance of the 
enterprise 
Reports to shareholders 
(auditors, directors, 
management letter, code 
of ethics) 
CO 236. Director’s 
report. - (1) The directors 
shall make out and attach 
to every balance-sheet a 
report with respect to the 
state of the company‘s 
affairs, the amount, if any, 
which they recommend 
should be paid by way of 
dividend and the amount, 
if any, which they propose 
to carry to the Reserve 
Fund, General Reserve or 
Reserve Account shown 
specifically in the balance-
sheet or to a Reserve Fund, 
General Reserve or 
Reserve Account to be 
shown specifically in a 
subsequent balance-sheet. 
2 (a) disclose any material 
changes and commitments 
affecting the financial 
position of the company 
which have occurred 
between the end of the 
financial year of the 
company to which the 
balance-sheet relates and 
the date of the report; 
The company should as 
fast as possible publicly 
disclose decisions, and 
occasions of share-
affecting nature. (OMXN 
listing requirements 
3.1.1.) Financial reports 
shall be constituted and 
made public in accordance 
to current legislation and 
relevant accounting 
standards. Companies 
with primary listing on 
Nasdaq OMX shall make 
year-end report and 
periodical reports 
quarterly public. If share-
affecting information is 
included in the annual 
report, such information 
should be disclosed before 
disclosure of the annual 
report. Year-end report 
and quarterly reports 
should be made public at 
latest two months after 
ended report period. 
(OMXN listing 
requirements, § 3.2.1-
3.2.3) Other information 
that should be publicly 
disclosed; forecasts and 
V The Principles support 
timely disclosure of all 
material developments 
that arise between 
regular reports. They 
also support 
simultaneous reporting 
of information to all 
shareholders in order to 
ensure their equitable 
treatment. In maintaining 
close relations with 
investors and market 
participants, companies 
must be careful not to 
violate this fundamental 
principle of equitable 
treatment. 
VB Information should 
be prepared and 
disclosed in accordance 
with high quality 
standards of accounting 
and financial and non-
financial disclosure. The 
Principles support the 
development of high 
quality internationally 
recognized standards, 
which can serve to 
improve transparency 
and the comparability of 
 100 
announcements of the 
future, unexpected and 
significant change of 
result or financial 
position, shareholder‘s 
meeting and decision of 
importance at the 
shareholder‘s meeting, 
share and financial 
instruments issues and 
changes, changes of the 
board, executive 
management and auditor, 
share-related incentive 
programs, related party 
transactions, purchase or 
sales of companies, 
radical changes. (OMXN 
listing requirements 
§3.3.1-3.3.9) The 
company‘s website 
section of corporate 
governance issues where 
recent corporate 
governance reports and 
current articles of 
association along with 
other information required 
by the ―Swedish code‖. 
The website must include 
an up-to-date (seven days) 
information regarding 
board, executive 
management and auditor, 
and outstanding share and 
share and share-price 
related scheme. (Swedish 
code of Corporate 
Governance, §3.11.3) 
financial statements and 
other financial reporting 
between countries. 
VC In addition to 
certifying that the 
financial statements 
represent fairly the 
financial position of a 
company, the audit 
statement should also 
include and opinion on 
the way in which 
financial statements have 
been prepared and 
presented. This should 
contribute to an 
improved control 
environment in the 
company. 
Auditor‘s appointment 
and report to 
shareholders 
CO 252. Appointment and 
remuneration of auditors. - 
(1) Every company shall at 
each annual general 
meeting appoint an auditor 
or auditors to hold office 
from the conclusion of that 
meeting until the 
conclusion of the next 
annual general meeting: 
shall also publish it at least 
in one issue each of a daily 
newspaper in English 
language and a daily 
newspaper in Urdu 
language having 
circulation in the Province 
in which the stock 
exchange on which the 
company is listed is 
situate. CO 254 (3) None 
The auditor is obliged to 
report to owners without 
allowing their work to be 
governed or influenced by 
the executive management 
or board. The annual audit 
report is presented at the 
annual shareholder‘s 
meeting. The report must 
contain a statement 
whether the annual report 
has been conducted in line 
with legislation, specify 
the whether the annual 
report illustrate the 
company‘s position and 
result and if the director‘s 
report is consistent with 
the rest of the annual 
report, state if parts are 
missing from the annual 
An independent, 
competent and qualified, 
auditor should conduct 
an annual audit in order 
to provide an external 
and objective assurance 
to the board and 
shareholders that the 
financial statements 
fairly represent the 
financial position and 
performance of the 
company in all material 
respects. In addition to 
certifying that the 
financial statements 
represent fairly the 
financial position of a 
company, the audit 
statement should also 
include an opinion on the 
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of the following persons 
shall be appointed as 
auditor of a company, 
namely: — (a) a person 
who is, or at any time 
during the preceding three 
years was, a director, other 
officer or employee of the 
company; 
(b) a person who is a 
partner of , or in the 
employment of, a director, 
officer or employee of the 
company; (c) the spouse of 
a director of the company; 
(d) a person who is 
indebted to the company; 
1[…] (e) a body corporate; 
2[(f) a person or his spouse 
or minor children, or in 
case of a firm, all partners 
of such firm who holds any 
shares of an audit client or 
any of its associated 
companies: 
report that are required by 
legislation. The auditor 
will recommend whether 
the shareholder‘s meeting 
should accept balance 
sheet and income 
statement if the proposed 
suggestion in the 
director‘s report. The 
auditor is obliged to state 
if the board or CEO have 
carried out any action that 
may result in liability 
damage. Or if the same 
persons have conducted 
any fault according to the 
Company Act, legislation 
etc. (The Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance, 
§2.5) 
way in which financial 
statements have been 
prepared and presented. 
This should contribute to 
an improved control 
environment in the 
company. 
It is increasingly 
common for external 
auditors to be 
recommended by an 
independent audit 
committee of the board 
or an equivalent body 
and to be appointed 
either by that 
committee/body or by 
shareholders directly. 
Disclosure of material 
interest in transaction by 
Directors/ Executive 
XI37 Disclosure of 
Interest by a Director 
Holding Company’s 
Shares (xxvi) Where any 
director, CEO or executive 
of a listed company or 
their spouses sell, buy or 
take any position, whether 
directly or indirectly, in 
shares of the listed 
company of which he is a 
director, CEO or 
executive, as the case may 
be, he shall immediately 
notify in writing the 
Company Secretary of his 
intentions. Such director, 
CEO or executive, as the 
case may be, shall also 
deliver a written record of 
the price, number of 
shares, form of share 
certificates (i.e. whether 
physical or electronic 
within the Central 
Depository System) and 
nature of transaction to the 
Company Secretary within 
four days of effecting the 
transaction. The notice of 
the director, CEO or 
executive, as the case may 
be, shall be presented by 
the Company Secretary at 
the meeting of the Board 
A director of the board 
and the CEO is not 
allowed to participate in a 
issue where the director 
could be biased, i.e. 
agreement between the 
director and the company, 
agreement between the 
company and third part if 
the director has a different 
interest, or agreement 
where the director act as 
legal person for someone 
else in relation to the 
company.  (Swedish 
Company Act, 2005:551, 
eighth chapter, §23&§34) 
A person holding an 
insider position must 
report shareholdings and 
other financial instruments 
in the company held by 
the person or related legal 
or natural person to 
Finansinspektionen. (FI) 
IIIC Members of the 
board and key executives 
should be required to 
disclose to the board 
whether they, directly, 
indirectly or on behalf of 
third parties, have a 
material interest in any 
transaction or matter 
directly affecting the 
corporation 
Where a material interest 
has been declared, it is 
good practice for that 
person not to be involved 
in any decision involving 
the transaction or matter. 
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of Directors immediately 
subsequent to such 
transaction. In the event of 
default by a director, CEO 
or executive to give a 
written notice or deliver a 
written record, the 
Company Secretary shall 
place the matter before the 
Board of Directors in its 
immediate next meeting: 
Provided that each listed 
company shall determine a 
closed period prior to the 
announcement of interim/ 
final results and any 
business decision, which 
may materially affect the 
market price of its shares. 
No director, CEO or 
executive shall, directly or 
indirectly, deal in the 
shares of the listed 
company in any manner 
during the closed period. 
Related party 
transaction 
XI37 Related Party 
Transactions (xiii a) (1) 
All companies registered 
under the Companies 
Ordinance, 1984 shall 
place before the Board of 
Directors all the 
transactions with the 
related parties for review 
and approval. (2) The 
detail of all related party 
transactions shall be placed 
before the Audit 
Committee of the 
company. (3) The related 
party transactions which 
are not executed at arm‘s 
length price will also be 
placed separately at each 
Board meeting along with 
necessary justification for 
consideration and approval 
of the Board and before the 
Audit Committee of the 
company. (4) The Board of 
Directors of a company 
shall approve the pricing 
methods for related party 
transactions that were 
made on the terms 
equivalent to those that 
prevail in arm‘s length 
transaction only if such 
terms can be substantiated. 
(5) Every company shall 
Larger corporations shall 
disclose significant 
transactions which on 
other than market-like 
conditions have been 
conducted like: a 
company in the same 
corporate group, legal 
person either controlling 
or controlled by the 
company, an interest 
company, physical person 
controlling the company, 
board director, CEO, or 
other executive 
management member, 
related person, 
economical depended on 
related person, legal 
person administering 
capital to the company. 
(Swedish Annual 
Accounts Act 2005:1554, 
§12a). 
VA (3) Particularly for 
enforcement purposes, 
and to identify potential 
conflicts of interest, 
related party transactions 
and insider trading, 
information about record 
ownership may have to 
be complemented with 
information about 
beneficial ownership. 
VA (5) It is essential for 
the company to fully 
disclose material related 
party transactions to the 
market, either 
individually, or on a 
grouped basis, including 
whether they have been 
executed at arms-length 
and on normal market 
terms. 
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maintain a party wise 
record of transactions, in 
each financial year, entered 
into with related parties in 
that year along with all 
such documents and 
explanations. The record of 
related party transaction 
shall include the following 
particulars in respect of 
each transaction: (i) Name 
of related party; 24 (ii) 
Nature of relationship with 
related party; (iii) Nature 
of transaction; (iv) Amount 
of transaction; (v) Terms 
and conditions of 
transaction, including the 
amount of consideration 
received or given. 
Governance related 
disclosures 
XI37 (xix) (e) The system 
of internal control is sound 
in design and has been 
effectively implemented 
and monitored. (f) There 
are no significant doubts 
upon the listed company‘s 
ability to continue as a 
going concern. (g) There 
has been no material 
departure from the best 
practices of corporate 
governance, as detailed in 
the listing regulations. 
Where applicable: The 
Directors‘ Reports of listed 
companies shall also 
include the following, 
where necessary: (a) If the 
listed company is not 
considered to be a going 
concern, the fact along 
with reasons shall be 
disclosed. Compliance 
with the Code of 
Corporate Governance 
(xlv) All listed companies 
shall publish and circulate 
a statement along with 
their annual reports to set 
out the status of their 
compliance with the best 
practices of corporate 
governance set out above. 
(xlvi) All listed companies 
shall ensure that the 
statement of compliance 
with the best practices of 
corporate governance is 
reviewed and certified by 
The company is to 
produce a corporate 
governance report, it 
should be stated clearly 
which code rules it has 
complied with, explain the 
solution and motivation 
for each case. The report 
should disclose which 
parts that have been 
reviewed by the auditor. 
(The Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance, 
§3.11.1)   
VA (8) Companies 
should report their 
corporate governance 
practices. Disclosure of 
the governance structures 
and policies of the 
company, in particular 
the division of authority 
between shareholders, 
management and board 
members is important for 
the assessment of a 
company‘s governance. 
As a matter of 
transparency, procedures 
for shareholders 
meetings should ensure 
that votes are properly 
counted and recorded, 
and that a timely 
announcement of the 
outcome is made. 
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statutory auditors, where 
such compliance can be 
objectively verified, before 
publication by listed 
companies. 
Auditor authenticity and 
qualification 
XI37 Auditors Not to Hold 
Shares (xxvii) All listed 
companies shall ensure 
that the firm of external 
auditors or any partner in 
the firm of external 
auditors and his spouse and 
minor children do not at 
any time hold, purchase, 
sell or take any position in 
shares of the listed 
company or any of its 
associated companies or 
undertakings: Provided 
that where a firm or a 
partner or his spouse or 
minor child owns shares in 
a listed company, being the 
audit client, prior to the 
appointment as auditors, 
such listed company shall 
take measures to ensure 
that the auditors disclose 
the interest to the listed 
company within 14 days of 
appointment and divest 
themselves of such interest 
not later than 90 days 
thereof. (xxxvii) No listed 
company shall appoint as 
external auditors a firm of 
auditors which has not 
been given a satisfactory 
rating under the Quality 
Control Review 
programme of the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants 
of Pakistan. (xxxviii) No 
listed company shall 
appoint as external 
auditors a firm of auditors 
which firm or a partner of 
which firm is non-
compliant with the 
International Federation of 
Accountants‘ (IFAC) 
Guidelines on Code of 
Ethics, as adopted by the 
Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Pakistan. 
(xl) No listed company 
shall appoint its auditors to 
provide services in 
addition to audit except in 
accordance with the 
To incapacitate a person 
to not be elected auditor 
the person is in 
bankruptcy, banned on 
business, or have a legal 
person. An auditor should 
have the experience of 
auditing and economic 
situations in proportion to 
the assignment to fulfill 
the assignment. Only an 
authorized or approved 
auditor may be elected 
auditor. An auditor isn‘t 
allowed to be auditor if: 
the auditor owns shares in 
the company, is a board 
director or CEO in the 
company or its subsidiary, 
is an employee or 
subordinated of the 
company, is an accountant 
of the company, is related 
in a way to the board or 
CEO, or is in debt to the 
company or any company 
of its security. Swedish 
Company Act, ninth 
chapter, §10-17) 
VC An issue that has 
arisen in some 
jurisdictions concerns the 
pressing need to ensure 
the competence of the 
audit profession. 
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regulations and shall 
require the auditors to 
observe applicable IFAC 
guidelines in this regard 
and shall ensure that the 
auditors do not perform 
management functions or 
make management 
decisions, responsibility 
for which remains with the 
Board of Directors and 
management of the listed 
company. 
(xlii) No listed company 
shall appoint a person as 
the CEO, the CFO, an 
internal auditor or a 
director of the listed 
company who was a 
partner of the firm of its 
external auditors (or an 
employee involved in the 
audit of the listed 
company) at any time 
during the two years 
preceding such 
appointment or is a close 
relative, i.e. spouse, 
parents, dependents and 
non-dependent children, of 
such partner (or 
employee). 
Website Reporting  The company website 
should a devoted section 
to corporate governance, 
where the company‘s 
recent corporate 
governance report are 
presented and current 
articles of association. The 
section should also 
include up to date 
information of the board 
members, CEO, auditor, 
and a detailed table of 
every share and share-
price related incentive 
scheme. (Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance 
Board §3.11)   
VE Channels for 
disseminating 
information should 
provide for equal, timely 
and cost-efficient access 
to relevant information 
by users. The Internet 
and other information 
technologies also provide 
the opportunity for 
improving information 
dissemination. 
Significant Accounting 
standards/ Policies 
XI37 (xix) (d) 
International Accounting 
Standards, as applicable in 
Pakistan, have been 
followed in preparation of 
financial statements and 
any departure there from 
has been adequately 
disclosed. 
Companies are to follow 
the standards of Swedish 
Annual Accounts Act, 
IFRS and IAS 34. 
(Swedish Annual 
Accounts Act, 2005:1554 
& OMXN listing 
requirements) 
VB Information should 
be prepared and 
disclosed in accordance 
with high quality 
standards of accounting 
and financial and non-
financial disclosure 
Share traded by XI37 (xix) (j) All trades in The corporate governance  
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Directors/ Executives the shares of the listed 
company, carried out by its 
directors, CEO, CFO, 
Company Secretary and 
their spouses and minor 
children shall also be 
disclosed. 
(xxvi) Where any director, 
CEO or executive of a 
listed company or their 
spouses sell, buy or take 
any position, whether 
directly or indirectly, in 
shares of the listed 
company of which he is a 
director, CEO or 
executive, as the case may 
be, he shall immediately 
notify in writing the 
Company Secretary of his 
intentions. Such director, 
CEO or executive, as the 
case may be, shall also 
deliver a written record of 
the price, number of 
shares, form of share 
certificates (i.e. whether 
physical or electronic 
within the Central 
Depository System) and 
nature of transaction to the 
Company Secretary within 
four days of effecting the 
transaction. The notice of 
the director, CEO or 
executive, as the case may 
be, shall be presented by 
the Company Secretary at 
the meeting of the Board 
of Directors immediately 
subsequent to such 
transaction. In the event of 
default by a director, CEO 
or executive to give a 
written notice or deliver a 
written record, the 
Company Secretary shall 
place the matter before the 
Board of Directors in its 
immediate next meeting: 
Provided that each listed 
company shall determine a 
closed period prior to the 
announcement of interim/ 
final results and any 
business decision, which 
may materially affect the 
market price of its shares. 
No director, CEO or 
executive shall, directly or 
section at the company‘s 
website is to have a 
detailed account of share 
and share-price related 
incentive scheme. This 
has to be up-to-date, 
specifically seven days. 
(Swedish code of 
corporate governance, 
§3.11.3) 
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indirectly, deal in the 
shares of the listed 
company in any manner 
during the closed period. 
CO 224. Trading by 
director, officers and 
principal shareholders. - 
(1) Where any director, 
chief executive, managing 
agent, chief accountant, 
secretary or auditor of a 
listed company or any 
person who is directly or 
indirectly the beneficial 
owner of more than ten per 
cent of its listed equity 
securities makes any gain 
by the purchase and sale, 
or the sale and purchase, of 
any such security, within a 
period of less than six 
months, such director, 
chief executive, managing 
agent, chief accountant, 
secretary or auditor or 
person who is beneficial 
owner shall make a report 
and tender the amount of 
such gain to the company 
and simultaneously send 
an intimation to this effect 
to the registrar and the 
Commission: 
Shareholder’s Rights    
Single/Dual Class 
Shares 
Part VI (Companies 
Ordinance) 1[90. Classes 
and kinds of share 
capital. - A company 
limited by shares may have 
different kinds of share 
capital and classes there in 
as provided by its 
memorandum and articles: 
Provided that different 
rights and privileges in 
relation to the different 
classes of shares may only 
be conferred in such 
manner as may be 
prescribed.] 91. Only fully 
paid shares to be issued.- 
No company shall issue 
partly paid shares. 
It‘s approved that 
different types of shares 
are to be or issued. Such 
regulation is divided in 
differences between the 
share types and the 
number or part of shares 
of each kind. No share 
may have more then ten 
times the voting power 
than another share. 
(Swedish Company Act 
2005:551, fourth chapter 
§2-5) All shares have 
equal right in the company 
if no difference is stated. 
A regulation can be stated 
where information about 
differences between 
different types of shares 
and the number or part of 
shares of each kind. 
Regulation can be formed 
to state different rights of 
company‘s assets, profit, 
or that the shares will 
IID Capital structures 
(Pyramid structures, 
cross shareholdings) and 
arrangements 
(Single/Dual Class 
Shares) that enable 
certain shareholders to 
obtain a degree of 
control disproportionate 
to their equity ownership 
should be disclosed. 
Voting caps limit the 
number of votes that a 
shareholder may cast. 
IIIA (1) All investors 
should be able to obtain 
information about the 
rights attached to all 
series and classes of 
shares before they 
purchase. Any changes 
in voting rights should be 
subject to approval by 
those classes of shares 
which are negatively 
affected 
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have different voting 
power. No share can have 
more than ten times higher 
voting power than an 
ordinary share. (Swedish 
Company Act 2005:551 
fourth chapter, §1-5)      
Minority shareholders‘ 
interests 
XI37 (i) All listed 
companies shall encourage 
effective representation of 
independent non-executive 
directors, including those 
representing minority 
interests, on their Boards 
of Directors so that the 
Board as a group includes 
core competencies 
considered relevant in the 
context of each listed 
company. For the purpose, 
listed companies may take 
necessary steps such that: 
(a) minority shareholders 
as a class are facilitated to 
contest election of 
directors by proxy 
solicitation, for which 
purpose the listed 
companies may: 
• annex to the notice of 
general meeting at which 
directors are to be elected, 
a statement by a 
candidate(s) from among 
the minority shareholders 
who seeks to contest 
election to the Board of 
Directors, which statement 
may include a profile of 
the candidate(s); 
� provide information 
regarding shareholding 
structure and copies of 
register of members to the 
candidate(s) representing 
minority shareholders; and 
� on a request by the 
candidate(s) representing 
minority shareholders 
and at the cost of the 
company, annex to the 
notice of general 
meeting at which directors 
are to be elected an 
additional copy of 
proxy form duly filled in 
by such candidate(s) and 
transmit the same to all 
shareholders in terms of 
section 178 (4) of the 
The board may call an 
extra ordinary general 
meeting if a shareholder 
minority representing at 
least ten percent of the 
company‘s shares. 
(Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance 
§2.2) A shareholder can 
propose that an auditor 
that is chosen by 
―länsstyrelsen‖ will 
participate in the auditing 
among the other auditors. 
On the request of a 
shareholder minority 
reaching at least ten 
percent the company may 
decide on the 
shareholder‘s meeting to 
pay out a dividend of half 
of what‘s left on the 
balance sheet in the 
annual report. The board 
may not make decisions 
that could favor an 
advantage for specific 
shareholders on the 
expense of other 
shareholders. The ability 
to use proxy rights when 
voting. Minorities can 
stop certain resolutions 
where a larger majority is 
required. This resolution 
may be: merger decisions, 
share capital structure 
decisions, etc. At all time 
minority shareholder have 
the right to fully use 
his/her shares at the 
shareholder‘s meeting, ask 
questions at the same 
event, include proposals in 
the agenda, and make 
counter resolutions. 
(Swedish Company Act, 
2005:551) 
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Companies Ordinance, 
1984; 
Dividend policy and 
history 
XI37 (xix) Where 
applicable, disclose: (d) If 
the listed company has not 
declared dividend or issued 
bonus shares for any year, 
the reasons thereof shall be 
given. 
The year-end report 
should withhold 
information of the 
proposed dividend per 
share. If the board 
proposes that no dividend 
should be paid it should 
be stated clearly. (OMXN 
listing requirements 
§3.2.3)  
 
Timely availability of 
material information 
XI37 (xxiii) Every listed 
company shall 
immediately disseminate to 
the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan and the stock 
exchange on which its 
shares are listed all 
material information 
relating to the business and 
other affairs of the listed 
company that will affect 
the market price of its 
shares. Mode of 
dissemination of 
information shall be 
prescribed by the stock 
exchange on which shares 
of the company are listed. 
This information may 
include but shall not be 
restricted to information 
regarding a joint venture, 
merger or acquisition or 
loss of any material 
contract; purchase or sale 
of significant assets; any 
unforeseen or undisclosed 
impairment of assets due to 
technological 
obsolescence, etc.; delay/ 
loss of production due to 
strike, fire, natural 
calamities, major 
breakdown, etc.; issue or 
redemption of any 
securities; a major change 
in borrowings including 
any default in repayment 
or rescheduling of loans; 
and change in directors, 
Chairman or CEO of the 
listed company. XI37 (d) 
the following powers are 
exercised by the Board of 
Directors on behalf of the 
listed company and 
decisions on material 
The company should as 
fast as possible publicly 
disclose decisions, and 
occasions of share-
affecting nature.(OMXN 
listing requirements 
3.1.1.) Financial reports 
shall be constituted and 
made public in accordance 
to current legislation and 
relevant accounting 
standards. Companies 
with primary listing on 
Nasdaq OMX shall make 
year-end report and 
periodical reports 
quarterly public. If share-
affecting information is 
included in the annual 
report, such information 
should be disclosed before 
disclosure of the annual 
report. Year-end report 
and quarterly reports 
should be made public at 
latest two months after 
ended report period. 
(OMXN listing 
requirements, § 3.2.1-
3.2.3) Other information 
that should be publicly 
disclosed; forecasts and 
announcements of the 
future, unexpected and 
significant change of 
result or financial 
position, shareholder‘s 
meeting and decision of 
importance at the 
shareholder‘s meeting, 
share and financial 
instruments issues and 
changes, changes of the 
board, executive 
management and auditor, 
share-related incentive 
programs, related party 
transactions, purchase or 
IIA(3) Shareholders able 
to Obtain relevant and 
material 
information on the 
corporation on a timely 
and regular basis 
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transactions or significant 
matters are documented by 
a resolution passed at a 
meeting of the Board: 
sales of companies, 
radical changes. (OMXN 
listing requirements 
§3.3.1-3.3.9)  
Financial reporting 
Adequacy 
XI37 (xx) The quarterly 
unaudited financial 
statements of listed 
companies shall be 
published and circulated 
along with directors‘ 
review on the affairs of the 
listed company for the 
quarter. (xxi) All listed 
companies shall ensure 
that second quarterly 
financial statements are 
subjected to a limited 
scope review by the 
statutory auditors in such 
manner and according to 
such terms and conditions 
as may be determined by 
the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Pakistan 
and approved by the 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan. 
(xxii) All listed companies 
shall in the form and 
manner specified by the 
Commission ensure that 
the annual audited 
financial statements are 
sent to every member of 
the company at least 
twenty-one (21) days 
before the Annual General 
Meeting is held to consider 
the same. 
Financial reports shall be 
constituted and made 
public in accordance to 
current legislation and 
relevant accounting 
standards. Companies 
with primary listing on 
Nasdaq OMX shall make 
year-end report and 
periodical reports 
quarterly public. All 
quarterly reports should 
contain information 
whether the company 
auditor has conducted a 
general review or not. 
(OMXN listing 
requirements §3.2.1-3.2.3) 
The audit committee is 
responsible for the 
preparation of the board‘s 
work to ensure quality of 
financial statements 
(Swedish code of 
corporate governance, 
§3.10.2) 
 
Participation and voting 
in General Meetings 
(3) The notice of an annual 
general meeting shall be 
sent to the shareholders at 
least twenty-one days 
before the date fixed for 
the meeting and, in the 
case of a listed company, 
such notice, in addition to 
its being dispatched in the 
normal course, shall also 
be published at least in one 
issue each of a daily 
newspaper in English 
language and a daily 
newspaper in Urdu 
language having 
circulation in the Province 
in which the stock 
exchange on which the 
company is listed is 
situate. CO 160 (b) Where 
The right to participate at 
the shareholder‘s meeting 
is the shareholder that on 
the current day of the 
shareholder‘s meeting is 
filed in the stock register 
of the company. It may be 
filed in the corporation 
charter that participation 
has to be notified the 
company at a before a 
specific date set in the 
invitation to the 
shareholder‘s meeting. A 
shareholder is allowed to 
bring at most tow 
assistants to the 
shareholder‘s meeting. 
Shares owned by the 
company itself or a 
subsidiary may not 
IIA(4) Participate and 
vote in general 
shareholder meetings 
IIC (1,2,3,4)  
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any special business, that 
is to say business other 
than consideration of the 
accounts, balance-sheets 
and the reports of the 
directors and auditors, the 
declaration of a dividend, 
the appointment and 
fixation of remuneration of 
auditors, and the election 
or appointment of 
directors, is to be 
transacted at a general 
meeting, there shall be 
annexed to the notice of 
the meeting a statement 
setting out all material 
facts concerning such 
business, including, in 
particular, the nature and 
extent of the interest, if 
any, therein of every 
director, whether directly 
or indirectly, and, where 
any item of business 
consists of the according of 
an approval to any 
document by the meeting, 
the time when and the 
place where the document 
may be inspected shall be 
specified in the statement; 
(d) All the members may 
participate in the meeting 
either personally or 
through proxy. (2) The 
quorum of a general 
meeting shall be-- 
(a) In the case of a public 
1[listed] company, unless 
the articles provide for a 
larger number, not less 
than 2[ten] members 
present personally, who 
represent not less than 
twenty-five per cent. of the 
total voting power, either 
of their own account or as 
proxies; (4) In the case of a 
company having a share 
capital, every member 
shall have votes 
proportionate to the paid-
up value of the shares or 
other securities carrying 
voting rights held by him 
according to the 
entitlement of the class of 
such shares or securities 
(5) No member holding 
represented at the 
meeting. A shareholder is 
allowed to vote with all 
shares owned or 
represented by the 
shareholder. (Swedish 
Company Act 2005:551, 
seventh chapter §2,5,7,8) 
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shares or other securities 
carrying voting rights shall 
be debarred from casting 
his vote, nor shall anything 
contained in the articles 
have the effect of so 
debarring him. 165. 
Voting to be by show of 
hands in first instance. - 
At any general meeting, a 
resolution put to the vote 
of the meeting shall, unless 
a poll is demanded, be 
decided on a show of 
hands. 167. Demand for 
poll. - (1) Before or on the 
declaration of the result of 
the voting on any 
resolution on a show of 
hands, a poll may be 
ordered to be taken by the 
chairman of the meeting of 
his own motion, and shall 
be ordered to be taken by 
him on a demand made in 
that behalf by the person or 
persons specified below, 
that is to say,- (a) in case 
of a public company, by at 
least five members having 
the right to vote on the 
resolution and present in 
person or by proxy; by any 
member or members 
present in persons or by 
proxy and having not less 
than one-tenth of the total 
voting power in respect of 
the resolution. CO 173 (6) 
The books containing the 
minutes of proceedings of 
the general meetings shall 
be open to inspection by 
members without charge 
during business hours, 
subject to such reasonable 
restrictions as the company 
may by its articles or in 
general meeting impose so 
that not less than two hours 
in each day be allowed for 
inspection. 
Right to participate in 
material issues 
CO 160 (5) No member 
holding shares or other 
securities carrying voting 
rights shall be debarred 
from casting his vote, nor 
shall anything contained in 
the articles have the effect 
of so debarring him. 
The right to participate at 
the shareholder‘s meeting 
is the shareholder that on 
the current day of the 
shareholder‘s meeting is 
filed in the stock register 
of the company. Shares 
owned by the company 
IIB Shareholders should 
have right to participate 
in issues like (1) 
amendments to the 
statutes, or articles of 
incorporation or similar 
governing documents of 
the company; (2) the 
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CO 161 (7) On a poll, 
votes may be given either 
personally or by proxy. 
(6) The members or their 
proxies shall be entitled to 
do any or all the 
following things in a 
general meeting, namely.- 
(a) subject to the 
provisions of section 167, 
demand a poll on any 
question; 
and 
(b) on a question before 
the meeting in which poll 
is demanded, to abstain 
from voting or not to 
exercise their full voting 
rights; 
itself or a subsidiary may 
not represented at the 
meeting. A shareholder is 
allowed to vote with all 
shares owned or 
represented by the 
shareholder. (Swedish 
Company Act 2005:551, 
seventh chapter §2,8) 
Shareholders vote on 
proposals from 
nomination, remuneration 
and audit committees, 
(Swedish code of 
corporate governance, 
§3.1-3.9)  
authorization of 
additional shares; and (3) 
extraordinary 
transactions, including 
the transfer of all or 
substantially all assets, 
that in effect result in the 
sale of the company. 
IIC (3) Effective 
shareholder participation 
in key corporate 
governance decisions, 
such as the nomination 
and election of board 
members, should be 
facilitated. Shareholders 
should be able to make 
their views known on 
the remuneration policy 
for board members and 
key executives. The 
equity component of 
compensation schemes 
for board members and 
employees should be 
subject to shareholder 
approval. 
Auditor accountability Discussed in Auditor 
authenticity and 
qualification and auditor‘s 
report to shareholders 
above. 
The majority of the audit 
committee is to be 
independent of the 
company and it‘s 
executive management, at 
least one of the members 
is to be independent to the 
major shareholders of the 
company. No member of 
the executive management 
is allowed. If appropriate 
the entire board may 
handle this function. The 
audit committee is 
responsible for: 
preparation of the board‘s 
work to ensure quality of 
financial statements, meet 
company‘s auditor to keep 
updated and discuss 
internal and external 
audits, establish 
guidelines on services 
other than auditing, 
evaluate the auditor work 
and report to the 
nomination committee. At 
least once a year is the 
board to meet the auditor 
without any of the 
executive management. 
The board should make 
sure that the auditor 
VD The practice that 
external auditors are 
recommended by an 
independent audit 
committee of the board 
or an equivalent body 
and that external auditors 
are appointed either by 
that committee/body or 
by the shareholders‘ 
meeting directly can be 
regarded as good 
practice since it clarifies 
that the external auditor 
should be accountable to 
the shareholders. 
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reviews the sixth or ninth 
month report. (Swedish 
code of corporate 
governance §3.10.1-
3.10.4)      
Proxy voting 
arrangement 
CO 160 (7) On a poll, 
votes may be given either 
personally or by proxy. 
161. Proxies. - (1) Any 
member of a company 
entitled to attend and vote 
at a meeting of the 
company shall be entitled 
to appoint another person, 
as his proxy to attend and 
vote instead of him, and a 
proxy so appointed shall 
have such rights as 
respects speaking and 
voting at the meeting as 
are available to a member 
(d) A proxy must be a 
member unless the articles 
of the company permit 
appointment of a non-
member as proxy. 
(2) Every notice of a 
meeting of a company 
shall prominently set out 
the member's right to 
appoint a proxy and the 
right of such proxy to 
attend, speak and vote in 
the place of the member at 
the meeting and every such 
notice shall be 
accompanied by a proxy 
form. 
(10) Failure to issue 
notices in time or issuing 
notices with material 
defect or omission or any 
other contravention of this 
section which has the 
effect of preventing 
participation or use of full 
rights by a member or his 
proxy shall make the 
company and every officer 
of the company who 
knowingly and willfully is 
a party to the default or 
contravention liable to a 
fine which may extend to 
five thousand rupees 
To protect minority 
shareholders the Swedish 
company act give 
shareholders the 
possibilities to use proxy 
rights and thereby pass on 
voting rights to a council. 
(Swedish Company Act, 
2005:551, seventh chapter 
§3)  
IIC (4) Shareholders 
should be able to vote in 
person or in absentia, 
and equal effect should 
be given to votes 
whether cast in person or 
in absentia. (IT voting) 
also consider cross 
border voters IIIA (4) 
Changes in voting rights CO (see 108) 28. 
Alteration of articles.- 
Subject to the provisions of 
this Ordinance and to the 
conditions contained in its 
The board may not make 
decisions that could favor 
an advantage for specific 
shareholders on the 
expense of other 
IIIA (1) Any changes in 
voting rights should be 
subject to approval by 
those classes of shares 
which are negatively 
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memorandum, a company 
may by special resolution 
alter or add to its articles, 
and any alteration or 
addition so made shall be 
as valid as if originally 
contained in the articles, 
and be subject in like 
manner to alteration by 
special resolution: 
Provided that, where such 
alteration affects the 
substantive rights or 
liabilities of members or of 
a class of members, it shall 
be carried out only if a 
majority of at least three-
fourths of the members or 
of the class of members 
affected by such alteration, 
as the case may be, 
personally or through 
proxy vote for such 
alteration. 
CO 108 (2) Not less than 
ten per cent of the class of 
shareholders who are 
aggrieved by the variation 
of their rights under sub-
section (1) may, within 
thirty days of the date of 
the resolution varying their 
rights, apply to the Court 
for an order canceling the 
resolution. (3) An 
application under sub-
section (2) may be made 
on behalf of the 
shareholders entitled to 
make it by such one or 
more of their number as 
they may authorize in 
writing in this behalf. 
shareholders. The ability 
to use proxy rights when 
voting. Minorities can 
stop certain resolutions 
where a larger majority is 
required. This resolution 
may be: merger decisions, 
share capital structure 
decisions, etc. (Swedish 
Company Act, 2005:551) 
affected 
Right to call Extra 
General Meeting and 
Ownership threshold 
required to call EGM/ 
pass resolution 
CO 159 2) The directors 
may at any time call an 
extraordinary general 
meeting of the company to 
consider any matter which 
requires the approval of the 
company in a general 
meeting, and shall, on the 
requisition of members 
representing not less than 
one-tenth (10%) of the 
voting power on the date 
of the deposit of the 
requisition, forthwith 
proceed to call an 
extraordinary general 
meeting. 
If the board finds it 
necessary it should call an 
extra general meeting 
before the ordinary one. 
The board should also call 
to an extra general 
meeting if the auditor or a 
minority (at least ten 
percent) in writing 
demands that a given issue 
need to be discussed. 
(Swedish Company Act, 
seventh chapter, §13) 
IIIA (5) Processes and 
procedures for general 
shareholder meetings 
should allow for 
equitable treatment of all 
shareholders. Company 
procedures should not 
make it unduly difficult 
or expensive to cast 
votes. 
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(4) If the directors do not 
proceed within twenty-one 
days from the date of the 
requisition being so 
deposited to cause a 
meeting to be called, the 
requisitionists, or a 
majority of them in value, 
may themselves call the 
meeting, but in either case 
any meeting so called shall 
be held within three 
months from the date of 
the deposit of the 
requisition. 
(5) Any meeting called 
under sub-section (4) by 
the requisitionists shall be 
called in the same manner, 
as nearly as possible, as 
that in which meetings are 
to be called by directors. 
(6) Any reasonable 
expense incurred by the 
requisitionists by reason of 
the failure of the directors 
duly to convene a meeting 
shall be repaid to the 
requisitionists by the 
company, and any sum so 
repaid shall be retained by 
the company out of any 
sum due or to become due 
from the company by way 
of fees or other 
remuneration for their 
services to such of the 
directors as were in 
default. 
(8) Every officer of the 
company who knowingly 
or willfully fails to comply 
with any of the provisions 
of this section shall be 
liable to pay penalty. 
CO 164 
(2) The members having 
not less than ten per cent. 
voting power in the 
company may give notice 
of a resolution and such 
resolution together with 
the supporting statement, if 
any, which they propose to 
be considered at the 
meeting, shall be 
forwarded so as to reach 
the company,- 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
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Environmental Policy of 
Company 
Board of directors should 
formulate significant 
policies for the company 
which may include health, 
safety and environmental 
policy of company. (Code 
of Corp. Gov. 2002, Page 
45) 
 VA (2) In addition to 
their commercial 
objectives, companies 
are encouraged to 
disclose policies relating 
to business ethics, the 
environment and other 
public policy 
commitments 
Audit rotation policy XI37 (xxxix) The Board of 
Directors of a listed 
company shall recommend 
appointment of external 
auditors for a year, as 
suggested by the Audit 
Committee. The 
recommendations of the 
Audit Committee for 
appointment of retiring 
auditors or otherwise shall 
be included in the 
Directors‘ Report. In case 
of a recommendation for 
change of external auditors 
before the elapse of three 
consecutive financial 
years, the reasons for the 
same shall be included in 
the Directors‘ Report. 
(xl) No listed company 
shall appoint its auditors to 
provide services in 
addition to audit except in 
accordance with the 
regulations and shall 
require the auditors to 
observe applicable IFAC 
guidelines in this regard 
and shall ensure that the 
auditors do not perform 
management functions or 
make management 
decisions, responsibility 
for which remains with the 
Board of Directors and 
management of the listed 
company. 
The auditor is appointed at 
the shareholder‘s meeting. 
The auditor is elected for 
four years, if it‘s wished 
that the same auditor is re-
elected the auditor may be 
elected for three more 
years. If an auditor‘s 
assignment ceases before 
decided time, the cease 
should be reported to the 
board. (Swedish Company 
Act, 2005: 551, ninth 
chapter, §21-24)  
VC mandatory rotation 
of auditors (either 
partners or in some cases 
the audit partnership). 
Table 4.1. Excerpts taken from Company laws, Listing Requirements and OECD best Practices. 
 
Appendix 2. Pakistan Company-Level Matrix 
 
Variables DGKC Lucky 
Cement 
Azgard 
Nine 
Engro 
Chemicals 
Best 
Practice 
Ownership      
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Structure 
Directors/ Executive 
Shareholding 
(including Spouse 
and children) 
3.58% 30% 15.22% 9%  
Top ten Shareholders 58.83% 48% 68.44% 56.53%  
Breakdown of 
shareholdings 
Disclosed Disclosed  Disclosed  Disclosed   
Board and Board 
Committees 
     
Chairman/ CEO 
Separation 
Separate Separate Separate Separate  
Board Size 7 8 7 10  
Non-Executive 
Directors  
4 5 5 
(Chairman 
too) 
5  
Director 
effectiveness/ limit 
on representing no. of 
boards  
Max 10, No 
Explicit 
Disclosure 
Given 
Max 10, No 
Explicit 
Disclosure 
Given 
Max 10, 
Explicit 
Disclosure 
Given 
Max 10, 
Explicit 
Disclosure 
Given 
 
Meetings and 
Attendance of 
Directors 
5 meetings, 
94.29% 
attendance 
5 meetings, 
82.5% 
attendance 
9 meetings, 
34.92% 
attendance 
7 meetings, 
87.14% 
attendance 
 
Board Committees Audit 
Committee 
only (3/3) 
Audit 
Committee 
only (3/5) 
Audit (4/5), 
finance, HR 
committee 
Audit (4/4), 
compensation 
committee 
 
Disclosures and 
Internal Control 
     
Director/ Executive 
Remuneration 
(Executive 
remuneration break-
up) 
Disclosed, 
Break-up 
given 
Disclosed, 
No Break-
up given 
Disclosed , 
Break-up 
given 
Disclosed, 
Break-up 
given 
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Directors‘ 
responsibilities 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
Directors 
qualification and 
Biography 
(Education) 
Not 
Disclosed 
Not 
Disclosed  
Disclosed Disclosed  
Audit remuneration Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
Internal Audit and 
control policy 
Internal, 
details not 
given 
Outsourced Internal, 
details not 
given 
Internal 
control details 
given 
 
Classes and Rights of 
share 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed, 
But not 
explicitly 
Disclosed, 
But not 
explicitly 
 
Shareholding pattern Disclosed Disclosed  Disclosed  Disclosed   
Financial and 
operational 
information 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
Strategic information Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
Auditor‘s 
appointment and 
report to shareholders 
Disclosed Disclosed,  Disclosed Disclosed  
Shares traded by 
directors/Executives 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
Related party 
transaction 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
Governance related 
disclosures 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
Website Reporting Available Available Available Available  
Significant 
Accounting 
standards/ Policies 
Disclosed 
IAS, IFRS 
Disclosed 
IAS, IFRS 
Disclosed 
IAS, IFRS 
Disclosed, 
IFRS, IAS  
 
Firm-Industry 
Analysis 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
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Shareholder’s 
Rights 
     
Classes of Shares 
(Single/Dual class) 
Dual 
(preferred 
and 
ordinary 
only) 
Dual 
( Ordinary 
and GDRs 
with non 
voting right) 
Dual 
(ordinary 
(with and 
without 
voting), 
preferred) 
Single class 
share holding 
 
Minority 
shareholders‘ Board 
representation 
No No No No  
Dividend policy and 
history 
Not 
Disclosed  
Not 
Disclosed  
Not 
Disclosed  
Not Disclosed   
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
     
Environment, Health 
and Safety policy of 
the company 
Not 
Disclosed  
Not 
Disclosed  
Disclosed Disclosed  
Table 4.2. 
 
 
2.1. AZGARD Nine 
 
2.1.1. Ownership Structure 
 
Company‘s Annual report offers a comprehensive view of pattern of ordinary and preference 
shareholding. It classifies shareholders into various categories such as individuals, investment 
companies, insurance companies, foreign investments, joint stock companies, financial 
institutions, Modaraba companies (Islamic Financial Institutions) and others. It further 
discloses the shareholding in terms of related party positions and presents director, executive, 
their families‘ (spouse, children) shareholding and any shareholding by associated and related 
parties. Also, the name and shareholding position of investor holding 10% or more shares of 
company have also been disclosed. The shareholding situation of above mentioned have been 
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explicitly made along with their names, relationships, number and percentage of shares held. 
For detailed shareholding positions, see Matrix 1.X. Strong concentration of power is held by 
top ten shareholders of the company as more than 68% of ordinary shares are held by only top 
ten shareholders. CEO, directors, executives including their family members‘ shareholding is 
also high being above 15%. No other management executive holds any share of the company. 
In regard to directors/executives shareholding in company, the directors also certify that they 
don‘t hold additional interest in shareholding in any other form or through any other 
arrangement. 
 
2.1.2. Board 
 
The chairman of board and CEO positions are held separately in the company. Company‘s 
board consists of 7 members out of which 5 are non-executive directors. Chairman also 
happens to be non-executive director. No minority representation is given on board. Unlike 
the other sample companies for Pakistan, where board is populated by family representations, 
this, company seems to have relevant skill and experience as a selection criteria for director 
which can be assumed from the profile information of directors. Board seems to have 
comparatively independent directors on board as proclaimed by firm in annual report. It might 
be inferred from biographic information given about director and no family representation on 
board. But no explicit disclosure about individual director has been given. Apart from firm‘s 
viewpoint about having mainly independent directors, no disclosure regarding independence 
of the directors has been mentioned. The annual report shows the names of the directors along 
with detailed auto-biographic information of their high profile directors regarding their 
academic history or work experience. This makes investors to comprehend the skill and 
expertise of board. As per listing regulations, firm has disclosed their confirmation about no 
directors serving on more than 10 boards in statement of compliance with code of corporate 
governance. The annual report gives an adequate disclosure about board meetings and 
attendance by directors. The total number of meetings and attendance by each individual 
director has explicitly been disclosed. In total, 9 board meetings were held and average 
attendance of board was just 35%, which cannot be considered satisfactory. Statement of 
compliance with code of corporate governance gives the disclosure about the compliance of 
firm with the respective code and governance issues. The firm doesn‘t have remuneration and 
nomination committee but contains audit, finance and human resource (HR) committee. It has 
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been disclosed about audit committee that it consists of 4 non-executive and 1 executive 
directors. For other two committees, only member names have been disclosed. 
 
2.1.3. Disclosures and Internal Control 
 
The firm gives a detailed disclosure about the CEO, full time working directors and 
executives‘ remuneration break-up but for only last year in the notes to the financial 
statements (note 50.1 and 50.2). The aggregate amount paid, item wise break-up like salary, 
provident fund, housing etc., number of persons getting a particular compensation package, 
remuneration paid to other (non-full time) directors has been disclosed. Statement of 
compliance with code of corporate governance talks about major responsibilities performed 
by directors. In regard to internal audit and control systems, only the CEO affirmation of 
having a sound full-time internal audit and control mechanism is disclosed but no details have 
been provided for the investors in annual report. Although, the statutory external auditors are 
required by law to present their opinion on internal systems‘ adequacy and firm‘s compliance 
with statement of compliance with code of corporate governance which in case of this 
company is satisfactory. Financial, operational and strategic information has been, in detail, 
disclosed in the annual report. Industry performance, company performance, significant 
events and factors affecting industry and company like recession and price wars, government 
policies etc. have been discussed. Operational information like plant performance, operating 
results etc. and financial data like key financial highlights, statements etc. have been disclosed 
in detail in the annual report of the company. Strategic information like projects in progress, 
increased production targets and future projects has also been discussed. Dividend declaration 
as per share classes has also been disclosed in this part. Three classes of shares along with 
their rights have been disclosed namely ordinary shares with voting rights, ordinary shares 
with non-voting rights and preferred shares with non-voting, non-participatory, partly 
convertible, redeemable after a specific time but have prioritized dividend right (p.59, note 
5.4). The annual report also contains various reports to shareholders which include directors‘ 
and auditors‘ reports. CEO, on behalf of directors, presents directors‘ report to shareholders in 
which directors‘ views on corporate and financial key matters have been discussed. Likewise, 
auditor, in auditor‘s report to shareholder, gives opinion on the financials and corporate issues 
of the firm in regard to the firm‘s compliance with the standards. Management‘s report (CEO) 
to shareholders discloses the way management has complied with the code of corporate 
governance. A separate statement of management for compliance with the best practices in 
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regard to related party transactions is also included in annual report of the firm. The 
appointment or reappointment and fixing remuneration of auditor is done in Annual General 
Meeting (AGM). Audit remuneration is disclosed in the annual report in a break-up manner 
such as Annual Statutory Audit fee, half yearly review etc (p.84, note 32.2). The annual report 
contains notice for AGM where the shareholders are notified of this transaction. Annual 
reports contain notice and agenda of AGM which mainly include normal matters of concern 
to AGM along with any special business like amendments in articles of association etc. to be 
conducted. In case, it is not possible for shareholder to attend AGM, he can fill in proxy form 
which is annexed to annual report to authorize someone else to represent him/ her and to 
participate in voting. The company discloses the method used for dealing with related party 
transactions and claims to have followed the best practices set out by the listing regulation by 
the stock exchange. Further, as mandated by the code of corporate governance, annual report 
also includes statement of compliance with best practices for transfer pricing where the CEO 
has confirmed to follow such practices set out by listing requiring of KSE. Annual report also 
contains governance disclosures in Statement of compliance with codes of corporate 
governance, which is signed by CEO, and further the compliance is also endorsed by the 
auditor‘s opinion of the company showing the nature and amount of transaction (p.156-158, 
note 50). Company also discloses related party transaction under s separate head in annual 
report. The pricing of such transactions has been disclosed and is done by on market 
comparable prices method (p.113, note 3.34). Accounting policies are based on IAS and IFRS 
and financials have been constructed using them. In case where deviations occurred, 
disclosures have been made (p.101, note 2). Annual report contains a separate head for 
significant accounting policies. (p.103, note 3, note 4) The company has disclosed the trading 
of shares by CEO, directors and related parties. In this case, no trade was made in the 
concerned year (p.162). 
 
2.1.4. Shareholder’s Rights: 
 
Company has preferred and ordinary shares in its share capital. Preferred shares have no 
voting rights and they are redeemable at a specified date in the agreement with the holders of 
preferred shares. There is no minority shareholder representation on the board of the 
company. Company has announced the dividend for the year however no dividend policy is 
given in the annual report of the company. 
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2.1.5. Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
The company provides very detailed information in regard to CSR. It discloses the 
certifications it has with internationally accepted programs in this field like Socially 
Accountability International SA 8000 Standard and many other similar programs. It clearly 
explains its social and health, safety and environmental policy and the community welfare 
programs. Annual report has been prepared in accordance with the Company Ordinance 1984 
and listing requirements of KSE. Apart from company documents, information is readily 
available on the company website. 
 
2.2. DGKC 
 
2.2.1. Ownership Structure 
 
Company‘s Annual report clearly gives a very detailed view of pattern of ordinary 
shareholding. It classifies shareholders into various categories such as individuals, investment 
companies, insurance companies, foreign investments, joint stock companies, financial 
institutions, Modaraba companies (Islamic Financial Institutions) and others. It further 
discloses the shareholding in terms of related party positions and presents director, executive, 
their families‘ (spouse, children) shareholding and any shareholding by associated and related 
parties. Also, the name and shareholding position of investor holding 10% or more shares of 
company have also been disclosed. The shareholding positions by above mentioned have been 
explicitly made along with their names, relationships, number and percentage of shares held. 
For detailed shareholding positions, see table 4.2 Numbers clearly shows a strong 
concentration of power as only top ten shareholders, who are only 1.4% of total shareholders, 
hold almost 60% of ordinary shares. Also, 31% shareholding by associated company adds up 
to this aspect. However, directors, executives including their family members‘ shareholding 
were comparatively low being 3.58%. No other management executive holds any share of the 
company. In regard to directors‘/executives‘ shareholding in company, the directors also 
certify that they don‘t hold additional interest in shareholding in any other form or through 
any other arrangement. 
 
2.2.2. Board 
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The chairman of board and CEO positions are held separately in the company. However, it is 
interesting to observe that both positions are being held within the same family group which, 
indirectly, makes it synonymous with non-separation of seats. Company‘s board consists of 7 
members out of which 4 are non-executive directors. No minority representation is given on 
board. Apart for firm‘s viewpoint about encouraging the representation of independent 
directors on board in corporate governance statement, no disclosure regarding independence 
of the directors has been mentioned. The annual report shows only the names of the directors 
but no auto-biographic information regarding their academic history or work experience has 
been disclosed which makes it tough for investors to determine the skill and expertise of a 
certain director. As per listing regulations, firm has disclosed their confirmation about no 
directors serving on more than 10 boards in statement of compliance with code of corporate 
governance. The annual report of DGKC gives an adequate disclosure about bard meetings 
and attendance by directors. Both he total number of meetings and attendance by each 
director has explicitly been disclosed. In total, 5 board meetings were held and average 
attendance of board was over 94%, which appears to be satisfactory. Statement of compliance 
with code of corporate governance gives the disclosure about the compliance of firm with the 
respective code and governance issues. DGKC doesn‘t have remuneration, nomination or any 
other committee except for audit committee. It has been disclosed that the committee totally 
consists of and is chaired by non-executive directors. 
 
2.2.3. Disclosures and Internal Control 
 
The firm gives a detailed disclosure about the CEO, full time working directors and 
executives‘ remuneration break-up for past two years in the notes to the financial statements 
(note 38.1, 38.2). The aggregate amount paid, item wise break-up like salary, provident fund, 
housing etc., number of persons getting a particular compensation package, remuneration paid 
to other (non-full time) directors was disclosed. Statement of compliance with code of 
corporate governance talks about major responsibilities performed by directors. In regard to 
internal audit and control systems, only the CEO affirmation of having a sound full-time 
internal audit and control mechanism is disclosed but no details have been provided for the 
investors in annual report. Although, the statutory external auditors are required by law to 
present their opinion on internal systems‘ adequacy and firm‘s compliance with statement of 
compliance with code of corporate governance which in case of this company is satisfactory. 
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Company holds only two classed of share namely ordinary and preference shares. It has been 
mentioned by company that preference shares have no voting rights and they are mandatory 
redeemable on company‘s option at a specific date. Financial, operational and strategic 
information has been, in detail, disclosed in the annual report. Industry performance, company 
performance, significant events and factors affecting industry and company like recession and 
price wars, government policies etc. have been discussed. Operational information like plant 
performance, operating results etc. and financial data like key financial highlights, statements 
etc. have been disclosed in detail in the annual report of the company. Strategic information 
like projects in progress and future projects has also been discussed. Dividend declaration is 
also disclosed in this part and reasons if no dividend is declared for year are also disclosed 
here. The annual report also contains various reports to shareholders that include directors‘ 
and auditors‘ reports. CEO, on behalf of directors, presents directors‘ report to shareholders in 
which directors‘ views on corporate and financial matters all key have been discussed. 
Likewise, auditor, in auditor‘s report to shareholder, gives opinion on the financials and 
corporate issues of the firm in regard to the firm‘s compliance with the standards. 
Management‘s report (CEO) to shareholders discloses the way management has complied 
with the code of corporate governance. A separate statement of management for compliance 
with the best practices in regard to related party transactions is also included in annual report 
of the firm. The appointment or reappointment of auditor is done in Annual General Meeting 
(AGM). The annual report contains notice for AGM where the shareholders are notified of 
this transaction. Annual reports contain notice and agenda of AGM, which mainly include 
normal matters of concern to AGM along with any special business like amendments in 
articles of association etc. to be conducted. In case, it is not possible for shareholder to attend 
AGM, he can fill in proxy form which is annexed to annual report to authorize someone else 
to represent him/ her and to participate in voting. The company discloses the method used for 
dealing with related party transactions and claims to have followed the best practices set out 
by the listing regulation by the stock exchange. Further, as mandated by the code of corporate 
governance, annual report also includes statement of compliance with best practices for 
transfer pricing where the CEO has confirmed to follow such practices set out by listing 
requiring of KSE. Annual report also contains governance disclosures in Statement of 
compliance with codes of corporate governance that is signed by the CEO and further the 
compliance is also endorsed by the auditor‘s opinion of the company showing the nature and 
amount of transaction (p59, note 39). Company also discloses related party transaction under 
a separate head in annual report. Certain related party transactions are explicitly mentioned in 
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annual reports (p41 note 12.1) like property sold to a related party has been mentioned along 
with the nature of asset sold, book value of asset and selling price. Loans extended, trade 
debts, nature and quantity of shares held in associated companies have also been disclosed 
(p48, note 20.3.1). Accounting policies are based on IAS and IFRS and financials have been 
constructed using them. In case where deviations occurred, disclosures have been made (p.27, 
note 3). Annual report contains a separate head for significant accounting policies. (p.74, note 
4) The company has disclosed the trading of shares by CEO, directors and related parties. In 
this case, no trade was made in the concerned year. 
 
2.2.4. Shareholder’s Rights: 
 
Company has two types of shares. These are preferred and ordinary shares. Preferred shares 
have no voting rights and they are redeemable at a specified date in the agreement with the 
holders of preferred shares. There is no minority shareholder representation on the board of 
the company. Company has announced the dividend for the year however no dividend policy 
is given in the annual report of the company. 
 
2.2.5. Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Neither the annual report nor the website contains anything about corporate social 
responsibility. Although firm has given donation to some unknown cause but they have been 
treated as other operating expenses. Annual report has been prepared in accordance with the 
Company Ordinance 1984 and listing requirements of KSE. Apart from company documents, 
information is readily available on the company website. 
 
2.3. Lucky Cement 
 
2.3.1. Ownership Structure 
 
Pattern of shareholding is clearly defined in the annual report of company. Detailed 
classification of shareholders such as individuals, investment companies, insurance 
companies, joint stock companies, modaraba companies, leasing companies, charitable trusts, 
mutual funds and others is given in the pattern of shareholding. Shareholding of directors, 
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executives and their families are also disclosed along with the shareholding of associated 
companies. Company has disclosed that no one is holding more then 10% or more voting 
rights in the company. There is a strong shareholding concentration witnessed in the company 
as the top ten shareholders are holding 48% of the total shares of the company, which are only 
0.124% of total number of shareholders. Directors and there spouses are holding 30% of the 
shareholding in the company. Associated companies are holding 4.87% of total shares. 
Directors have given the statement that they hold no trade during the year except the shares 
are transferred to the legal heirs of Mr. Abdul Razzak Tabba. Mr. Abdur Razzak Tabba was 
CEO of company in 2004.   
 
2.3.2. Board 
 
There are eight directors at the board out of which five are non-executive directors. However 
names of non-executive directors are not specified separately. One of the directors is a 
representative of NIT in the board of directors. None of them is serving on more then 10 other 
listed companies (It is mandatory that director‘s state that they are not holding director‘s 
office more then 10 listed companies according to Pakistani law), however no disclosure is 
given regarding each director‘s membership on any other company. The chairman of board 
and CEO positions are held separately in the company. However, it is interesting to observe 
that all the board of directors belongs to the same family except one director who is from NIT. 
So, indirectly all the representation on the board is within one family including Chairman and 
CEO offices. There is no representation on minority on the board. The annual report shows 
only the names of the directors but no auto-biographic information regarding their academic 
history or work experience has been disclosed which makes it tough for investors to 
determine the skill and expertise of a certain director. Adequate disclosure about board 
meetings and attendance by directors is given in the annual reports. Five board meetings are 
held during the year, four of the directors have attended all the meetings, three of them have 
attended three meetings and one of them has attended four meetings during the year. 
Percentage of attendance during the year is 82.5%. Statement of compliance with code of 
corporate governance gives the disclosure about the compliance of firm with the respective 
code and governance issues. Company doesn‘t have any remuneration, nomination or any 
other committee except for audit committee. Audit committee consists of five directors out of 
which three are non-executive directors. But there is no disclosure given on the duties and 
responsibilities of audit committee in the annual report.  
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2.3.3. Disclosures and Internal Control 
 
Company has disclosed last six year‘s key financial figures regarding its performance. 
Company has disclosed strategic information in the director‘s report to shareholders. Industry 
statistics, Industry performance, significant events, long term planning and future investment 
projects are discussed in the annual statements. No dividend policy is given by the company 
in annual reports and company has not announced a dividend for year 2008 and stated that 
cash flows are required for further expansion. Company has given a detailed disclosure about 
the CEO, full time working directors and executives‘ remuneration break-up for last two years 
in the notes to the financial statements (note 35, 35.1). The aggregate amount paid, item wise 
break-up like salary, provident fund, housing etc., number of persons getting a particular 
compensation package, remuneration paid to other (non-full time) directors was disclosed. 
Company has disclosed its transaction with the related parties in notes to the accounts (Note 
36). Directors have stated that they are aware of their duties and responsibilities and 
company‘s corporate governance practices are up to mark. Company has outsourced its 
internal audit function to a charted accountant firm named as Ferguson and Company. For 
Internal control policy and internal control Function, Company relies on the above said firm. 
Ford Rhodes Sidat Hyder & Co, a charted accountancy firm is an independent auditor of the 
company. Audit firm is an independent firm and is fulfilling the requirements of Pakistani 
law, as the firm has been given a satisfactory rating by ICAP and IFAC. Partners in the audit 
firm and their families don‘t hold any share in the company. In auditor‘s report to 
shareholder, auditors have given their opinion on the financial accounts and corporate issues 
of the company. Management‘s report (CEO) to shareholders is not found in the annual report 
of the company. Company has applied international financial reporting standards for the 
preparation of its accounts. Significant accounting policies are also disclosed in the notes to 
annual reports. The appointment or reappointment of auditor is done in Annual General 
Meeting (AGM). The annual report contains notice for AGM where the shareholders are 
notified of this transaction. Annual reports contain notice and agenda of AGM, which mainly 
include normal matters of concern to AGM along with any special business like amendments 
in articles of association etc. to be conducted. In case, it is not possible for shareholder to 
attend AGM, he can fill in proxy form which is annexed to annual report to authorize 
someone else to represent him/ her and to participate in voting. 
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2.3.4. Shareholder’s Rights: 
 
Company has ordinary shares and Global Depository Receipts in its share capital. GDR‘s 
have no voting rights. These are issued at London Stock Exchange as company is registered at 
this stock exchange as well. There is no minority shareholder representation on the board of 
the company. Company has not announced any dividend for the year and no dividend policy 
is given in the annual report of the company. 
 
2.3.5. Corporate Social Responsibilities 
 
Company has announced that it focuses on corporate social responsibility but no policy 
regarding environment or society is disclosed in the annual report. Donations are treated as 
administrative expenses in the annual reports however there is no detail given regarding these 
donations except company discloses that directors have no interest in any trusts to which 
donation was made. Annual report has been prepared in accordance with the Company 
Ordinance 1984 and listing requirements of KSE. Apart from company documents, 
information is readily available on the company website. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4. Engro Chemicals 
 
2.4.1. Ownership Structure 
 
Pattern of shareholding is clearly defined in the annual report of company. Detailed 
classification of shareholders such as individuals, investment companies, insurance 
companies, joint stock companies, modaraba companies, leasing companies, charitable trusts, 
mutual funds and others is given in the pattern of shareholding. Shareholding of directors, 
executives and their families are also disclosed along with the shareholding of associated 
companies. Dawood Hercules Chemicals Ltd is the associated company of Engro Chemicals 
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that is holding more then 10% voting rights in the company. There is a strong shareholding 
concentration witnessed in the company as the top ten shareholders are holding 56.53% of the 
total shares of the company, which are only 0.076% of total number of shareholders. 
Directors, executives and their spouses are holding 8.96% of the shareholding in the 
company. Associated companies are holding 41.75% of total shares. Directors have actively 
taken part in trading of shares during the year that is extensively disclosed along with price of 
each share traded by them in the annual report.  
 
2.4.2. Board 
 
There are 10 directors at the board out of which five are non-executive directors. However 
non-executive directors are not specified separately. None of the directors is serving on more 
then ten listed companies as a director (as required by the law in Pakistan) and there is a 
separate disclosure given in which company states regarding the directorship of company‘s 
directors on the other companies. Board has formed two committees, a compensation 
committee and audit committee. Compensation committee consists of four directors; three of 
them are non executive directors. Nine meetings of Compensation committee are held during 
the year. Responsibilities and duties of Compensation committee are clearly defined. Audit 
committee consists of four non executive directors. Five meetings of audit committee are held 
during the year. Role and responsibilities of audit committee are clearly defined. Company 
further developed operational committees to effectively manage day-to-day operations and 
management affairs of company. These committees include Management committee, 
corporate health, safety and environment committee and compensation, organization and 
employee development committee. CEO is the chairman of all these committees. Proper 
record of meetings and attendance is provided in the annual reports. During the year seven 
board meetings are held. Four directors had attended all the meetings during the year, four 
had attended six meetings during the year, one had attended five meetings and one had 
attended four meetings. Percentage of attendance at the meetings during the year is 87%. 
 
2.4.3. Disclosures and Internal Control 
 
Company has disclosed last ten year‘s key financial figures regarding its performance. 
Company has disclosed strategic information in the director‘s report to shareholders. Industry 
statistics, Industry performance, significant events, long term planning and future investment 
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projects are discussed in the annual statements. The company in annual reports gives no 
dividend policy however company has announced dividend for year 2008. Company has 
given a detailed disclosure about the CEO, full time working directors and executives‘ 
remuneration break-up for last two years in the notes to the financial statements (note 35). 
The aggregate amount paid, item wise break-up like salary, provident fund, housing etc., 
number of persons getting a particular compensation package, remuneration paid to directors 
was disclosed. Company has disclosed its transaction with the related parties in notes to the 
accounts (Note 39, 39.1, 39.2). Directors have stated that they are aware of their duties and 
responsibilities and company has implemented acceptable corporate governance practices. 
Company has applied internal audit function and internal control policy but no disclosure 
regarding internal control policy is described in annual reports. KPMG Taseer Hadi & Co. is 
the statutory auditor of the company. Auditor firm is an independent firm and is fulfilling the 
requirements of Pakistani law, as the firm has given a satisfactory rating by ICAP and IFAC 
and partners and their families don‘t hold any share in the company. External auditors of the 
company have given a positive opinion on the compliance of company with the best practices 
of corporate governance. Company has applied international financial reporting standards for 
the preparation of its accounts. Significant accounting policies are also disclosed in the notes 
to annual reports. The appointment or reappointment of auditor is done in Annual General 
Meeting (AGM). The annual report contains notice for AGM where the shareholders are 
notified of this transaction. Annual reports contain notice and agenda of AGM, which mainly 
include normal matters of concern to AGM along with any special business like amendments 
in articles of association etc. to be conducted. In case, it is not possible for shareholder to 
attend AGM, he can fill in proxy form which is annexed to annual report to authorize 
someone else to represent him/ her and to participate in voting. 
 
Shareholder’s Rights: 
 
Company has one class of shares. All the shares in the shareholder‘s equity of the company 
are ordinary shares and carry equal voting rights. There is no minority shareholder 
representation on the board of the company. Company has announced the dividend for the 
year however no dividend policy is given in the annual report of the company.  
 
2.4.4. Corporate Social Responsibility  
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Company has emphasized strongly on the environmental, health and safety matters. Company 
has provided a detailed environmental, health, safety and social policy. Company is running 
eight society welfare projects and it has donated thirty non profit trusts for the uplift of 
environment and society. Detailed description on company‘s corporate social responsibility 
projects is given in the annual report. 
 
Appendix 3. Sweden Company-Level Matrix 
 
In appendix is all empirical results in its extensive form presented, this is how the results of 
Swedish companies were collected, both as in notes of the company and in a combined 
matrix.  
 
Variables Volvo SSAB Atlas 
Copco 
Tele2  Best 
Practice 
Ownership 
Structure 
     
Directors/ 
Executive 
Shareholding 
0.034% 0.035% Disclosed 
>1% 
Disclosed and 
minimal 
 
Top ten 
Shareholders 
45.1% 38% 36% Top fifteen, 
73.3% 
 
Breakdown of 
shareholdings 
Disclosed, 
wit no 
categories 
Disclosed, 
with 
categories 
Disclosed, 
with 
categories 
Disclosed 
with no 
categories 
 
Board       
Chairman/CEO 
Separation 
Separate Separate Separate Separate  
Board Size 14 11 13 8  
Non-Executive 
Directors 
7 7 non 
executive 
excluding 
union rep. 6 
12 non-
executive 
excluding 
union rep. 5 
All non-
executive 
directors, 5 
independent 
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independent independent  
Director 
effectiveness/ limit 
on representing no. 
of boards  
Disclosed 
by 
company, 
No Limit 
Disclosed by 
company, 
No Limit 
Disclosed 
by 
company, 
No Limit 
Disclosed by 
company, No 
Limit 
 
Meetings and 
Attendance of 
Directors 
8 meetings, 
81.7% 
14 meetings, 
95.9% 
8 meetings, 
83% 
21 meetings 
including 
phone and 
mail, 92.8% 
 
Board Committees Three Three Three Three  
Disclosures and 
Internal Control 
     
Director/ Executive 
Remuneration 
(Executive 
remuneration break-
up) 
Disclosed, 
given 
Disclosed, 
given 
Disclosed, 
given 
Disclosed, 
given 
 
Directors‘ 
responsibilities 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
Directors 
qualification and 
Biography 
(Education) 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
Audit remuneration Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
Internal Audit and 
Internal control 
policy 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
Rights of various 
share classes 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
Shareholding 
pattern 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
Financial and 
operational 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
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information 
Strategic 
information 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
Auditor‘s 
appointment and 
report to 
shareholders 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
Shares Traded by 
Directors/Executive 
Not 
Disclosed 
Not 
Disclosed 
Not 
Disclosed 
Disclosed  
Related party 
transaction 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
Governance related 
disclosures 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
      
Website Reporting Available Available Available Available  
Significant 
Accounting 
standards/ Policies 
IFRS IFRS IFRS, RFR IFRS, RFR  
Firm-Industry 
performance 
analysis 
Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Not Disclosed  
Shareholder’s 
Rights 
     
Single/Dual Class 
Shares 
Dual Dual Dual Dual  
Minority 
shareholders‘ Board 
representation 
Not 
Disclosed  
Not 
Disclosed 
Not 
Disclosed 
Not Disclosed  
Dividend policy and 
history 
Disclosed Not 
Disclosed 
Not 
Disclosed  
Disclosed  
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
     
Environment, Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed Disclosed  
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Health and Safety 
Policy of Company 
Table 4.3. 
 
3.1. Volvo 
 
3.1.1. Ownership Structure 
 
There are two classes of shares in the company, one is series ―A shares‖ and the other is 
―series B shares‖. Both the series have different voting rights in the company. Series A shares 
carries the right to one vote against one share while series B shares carries the right to one 
tenth of vote against one share. There is a strong shareholding concentration in the company, 
as top ten shareholders are holding 45.1% shares of the company with voting rights of 60.8% 
in the company. However detailed disclosure is not presented in a separate section in which 
company describes all the shareholders in categories such as individuals, investment 
companies, insurance companies, joint stock companies, leasing companies, charitable trusts, 
mutual funds and others. Directors and executives are holding 0.034% shares in the company. 
However no disclosure is given regarding their spouse or minor children holdings in the 
company. There is no disclosure given in the annual report regarding the directors and their 
spouse trading of shares during the year.   
 
 
 
 
3.1.2. Board 
 
There are fourteen members on the board. Nine of these directors are elected at the annual 
general meeting. Five members at the board are appointed from employee organizations, out 
these five members two are deputy members. Seven out of nine elected members on the board 
are independent non executive directors. Their names are mentioned along with the detailed 
criteria of independence according to Swedish law. Auto biography of directors is disclosed in 
detail in the annual report. Director‘s directorship on the other companies and institutions are 
also disclosed. There are three board committees, election committee, audit committee and 
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remuneration committee. Election committee consists of six members. These members are 
nominated by the major shareholders of the company. Purpose of the election committee is to 
nominate suitable candidates for election of board of directors. Audit committee consists of 
three members which are all independent members. Remuneration committee consists of three 
independent directors. Roles and responsibilities of all the committees are disclosed in detail 
in the annual report. During the year eight meetings are held. Meetings of board and 
committees held during the year are fully disclosed. There are eight meetings held by the 
board during the year with an 81.73% percent attendance.      
 
3.1.3. Disclosures and Internal Control 
 
Company has disclosed last eleven year‘s key financial figures regarding its performance. 
Company has disclosed strategic information in the director‘s report to shareholders. Industry 
statistics, Industry performance, significant events, long term planning and future investment 
projects are discussed in the annual statements. Detailed dividend policy is provided in the 
annual report, company has announced dividend for the year 2008. Company has established 
a remuneration committee. Clear remuneration policy and remuneration paid to directors and 
executives is also disclosed in detail in the annual report. Transactions with related parties are 
disclosed in the notes to the accounts in the annual report (note 32). Detailed disclosure is 
given in the notes to the accounts on the number of employees in the company, women 
percentages in the total employees and their wages. Auditors remuneration is disclosed in the 
notes to the account (note 35). Company has prepared its financial statements according to 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Directors have stated that they are aware 
of their duties and responsibilities and company has implemented acceptable corporate 
governance practices. Company has a separate internal audit department. Separate report on 
internal control policy and audit is presented in the annual report as it is mandatory by 
Swedish company act and Swedish code of corporate governance. Detailed internal control 
policy along with risk management procedures are described in this report. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers AB is the statutory auditor of the company. PricewaterhouseCoopers 
AB is elected in annual general meeting of the company in 2007 for three years. The next 
election in regard to auditor‘s election will be held in 2010. PriceWaterhouseCoopers AB has 
given a satisfactory rating by ICAP and IFAC. Auditors have given their opinion on annual 
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accounts, the consolidated accounts, the accounting records and the administration of the 
Board of Directors and the President of AB Volvo for the year 2008.   
 
3.1.4. Shareholder’s Rights 
 
Single and dual share classes, Volvo has dual shares, A and B shares. The B share has one 
tenth of voting power compared to the A-share. Thereby is Volvo utilizing the cap in 
legislation of maximum voting power.  There is no minority representation on the board of 
directors. Dividend history for five years is disclosed with both ordinary and extra dividend 
amounts per share. Detailed disclosure of dividend is provided however no dividend policy is 
disclosed by the company. 
 
3.1.5. Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Company strongly focuses on the environmental, health and safety matters. Company has 
provided a detailed environmental, health, safety and social policy. In this policy company 
discusses its methods and controls for the environment and society protection. Annual report 
has been prepared in accordance with the Swedish company act and listing regulations of 
Stockholm exchange. Apart from company documents, information is readily available on the 
company website. 
  
 
 
 
 
3.2. SSAB 
 
3.2.1. Ownership Structure 
 
There are two classes of shares in the company, one is series ―A shares‖ and the other is 
―series B shares‖. Both the series have different voting rights in the company. Series A shares 
carries the right to one vote against one share while series B shares carries the right to one 
tenth of vote against one share. There is a moderate shareholding concentration in the 
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company, as top ten shareholders are holding 38% shares of the company while 68% of 
shareholders are holding 1000 or fewer shares. However voting rights of top ten shareholders 
are not disclosed separately. Detailed disclosure is presented in a separate section in which 
company describes all the shareholders in categories such as individuals, investment 
companies, joint stock companies, mutual funds and others. Company has a strong 
institutional share holding as top ten shareholders in the company are all institutional 
shareholders. It is observed that very small percentage of shares is held by the directors. 
Directors are holding 0.035% shares in the company. Shares related to directors also include 
closely related persons with directors (spouse or minor children holdings in the company). No 
disclosure is given regarding the shareholding of employee representation on board. 
Furthermore series of shares held by directors in the company are not disclosed as well. There 
is no disclosure given in the annual report regarding the directors and their spouse trading of 
shares during the year. Breakdown of shareholdings is disclosed and categorized in terms of 
various shareholding ranges.  
 
3.2.2. Board 
 
The chairman of board and CEO positions are held separately in the company. Company‘s 
board consists of eleven members out of whom eight are elected, remaining three are 
employee representatives. Employees unions have also appointed three alternate employee 
representatives to act on the board. There are seven independent non-executive directors out 
of eight elected board members while there are six independent directors in relation to the 
major shareholders out of elected board members. Company explicitly discloses the 
independence of each board member by disclosing their association with the company or with 
associated companies. No minority representation is disclosed on board. Board meeting held 
have been disclosed and the attendance of the respective director has also been mentioned. 14 
meetings are conducted in total whereby percentage of attendance of directors is 95.92%. 
Meetings were held under an approved agenda provided to directors beforehand. Auto 
biography of directors is disclosed in detail in the annual report. Director‘s directorship on the 
other companies and institutions are also disclosed. There are three board committees, 
nomination committee, audit committee and compensation committee. Nomination committee 
consists of six members. Nomination committee is responsible for the nomination of 
appropriate candidates for the board of director‘s election. Chairman of the nomination 
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committee is a representative of major shareholders in the company. Audit committee consists 
of three members which are all independent members. Compensation committee consists of 
two independent directors however CEO is co-opted to the committee but he doesn‘t 
participate in matters concerning his own remuneration and employment terms. Roles and 
responsibilities of all the committees are disclosed in detail in the annual report. 
 
3.2.3. Disclosures and Internal Control 
 
Company has disclosed last five year‘s key financial figures regarding its performance. 
Company has disclosed strategic information in the director‘s report to shareholders. Industry 
statistics, Industry performance, significant events, long term planning and future investment 
projects are discussed in the annual statements. Detailed dividend policy is provided in the 
annual report, company has announced dividend for the year 2008. Company has established 
a remuneration committee. Clear remuneration policy and remuneration paid to directors and 
executives is also disclosed in detail in the annual report. Transactions with related parties are 
disclosed in the notes to the accounts in the annual report (note 4, 8). Detailed disclosure is 
given in the notes to the accounts on the number of employees in the company, women 
percentages in the total employees and their wages. Auditors remuneration is disclosed in the 
notes to the account (note 2). Company has prepared its financial statements according to 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Directors have stated that they are aware 
of their duties and responsibilities and company has implemented acceptable corporate 
governance practices.  Company has a separate internal audit department. Separate report on 
internal control policy and audit is presented in the annual report as it is mandatory by 
Swedish company act and Swedish code of corporate governance. Detailed internal control 
policy along with risk management procedures are described in this report. Company has 
established risk management committee to perform risk management related duties in the 
company. PricewaterhouseCoopers AB is the statutory auditor of the company. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers AB is elected in annual general meeting of the company in 2007 for 
four years. The next election in regard to auditor‘s election will be held in 2011. Auditor 
PricewaterhouseCoopers AB has given a satisfactory rating by ICAP and IFAC. Auditors 
have given their opinion on annual accounts, the consolidated accounts, the accounting 
records and the administration of the Board of Directors and the President of AB Volvo for 
the year 2008.   
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3.2.4. Shareholder’s Rights 
 
Single and dual share classes, SSAB has dual shares, A and B shares. The B share has one 
tenth of voting power compared to the A-share. Thereby is SSAB utilizing the cap in 
legislation of maximum voting power.  There is no minority representation on the board of 
directors. Dividend history is disclosed. Detailed disclosure of dividend is given. Company 
has a policy of 50% of earnings to pay as dividend on average for each year. 
 
3.2.5. Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Company has a detailed environmental policy, specifically on the omissions related to steel in 
the air and water. Company has also developed a policy on health and safety matters and 
maintained a detail data on employee sickness, age, structure and accidents. Company has 
developed code of ethics which is available at the company‘s website. Company‘s code of 
ethics is in conformity with the UN declaration on human rights. Company has provided a 
detailed environmental, health, safety and social policy. Annual report has been prepared in 
accordance with the Swedish company act and listing regulations of Stockholm exchange. 
Apart from company documents, information is readily available on the company website. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Tele2 
 
3.3.1. Ownership Structure 
 
The shareholding of executive management and board of directors is disclosed. Minimal 
direct shareholding of board or executive management. The fifteen are presented at the 
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company‘s website. Holding 73.3% of the voting power and 57.3% of the capital. All fifteen 
largest shareholders are presented with names and number of A and B shares. 
 
3.3.2. Board  
 
The chairman of board and CEO positions are held separately in the company. The board of 
directors is of the numbers eight. No of the directors is apart of the executive management, 
three are considered non-independent. Two are considered non-independent to the largest 
shareholder of Tele2. The board met 10 times on different locations in Europe, a part from 
this they had 8 meetings by mail and three by phone. Totally 21 meetings, the attendance was 
92.8 percent. Within in the board a remuneration committee and an audit committee have 
been appointed. The nomination committee and its members are disclosed.  
 
3.3.3. Disclosures and Internal Control 
 
Disclosure of senior executive remuneration, disclosed in form of basic salary, variable 
remuneration, other benefits, other remuneration, pension expenses, and total remuneration. 
Remuneration guidelines for senior executives are disclosed. Disclosure of board 
remuneration, individual remuneration, both as board directors and committee participation. 
Detailed information of directors‘ qualifications and biography including other and previous 
assignments, education, age, citizenship, shareholding including related legal and natural 
persons.   Auditor remuneration is disclosed with name and different assignments both for 
2008 and 2007. Internal Audit and Internal control policy, report of internal control has been 
made regarding the financial report Information regarding the three classes of shares is 
submitted. A, B and C, A has ten times the voting power than B and C. C is not entitled to 
dividends. Shareholding pattern is disclosed The administration report, financial, operational 
and strategic information is disclosed. Markets are presented geographically, key financial 
ratios, five year history is presented, risks of the company, environmental policy, work of the 
board, Reports to shareholders, the administration report is submitted, corporate governance 
report as well. The auditor‘s report is submitted. Insider transaction is disclosed at company‘s 
website. Related party transactions are disclosed under a separate head, in note 39 in the 
annual report of Tele2 2008. Information is provided with partners and actions, joint ventures 
and associated companies. Financial data is provided for all transactions between Tele2 and 
related parties. The website contains information regarding board and executives and detailed 
 143 
information. No test if they update within seven days has been done. Significant Accounting 
standards, IFRS is adopted and translations from IFRIC. Insider transaction is disclosed at 
company‘s website.  
 
3.3.4. Shareholder’s Rights 
 
A-, B-, and C-class shares, all classes have a quota value of 1.25 per share. Class C shares 
aren‘t entitled to dividend. Class A and B have the same right to company‘s net assets and 
profits. Class A shares have a voting power of ten times class B and C.  No minority board 
representation, however are a few represented on the company‘s nomination committee. 
Tele2 intends to on a medium term pay a progressive ordinary dividend to its shareholders. 
The board decided to propose an increase of 11% of the ordinary dividend. The dividend 
history is presented in the administration report for five years however dividend policy is not 
disclosed by the company. 
 
3.3.5. Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Tele2, in line with its costs consciousness promotes a sustainable development of the 
environment by reducing resource consumption and environmental impacts of its operations.    
 
3.4. Atlas Copco 
 
3.4.1 Ownership Structure 
 
Holdings of directors, executive and their relatives along with the number and class of shares 
held have been disclosed. It is found that very small amount of shares of either type is owned 
by above mentioned persons (less than 1%) (p.121). CEO is found to have stock options too 
(Anglo Saxon thing). A very strong concentration if power is observed in this company as 
only 1.1% of total shareholders constitutes almost 90% of total capital thereby high voting 
position too. Top ten shareholders have been disclosed individually in terms of percent of 
shares and voting rights held (p.136-137). In this case, top ten shareholders hold 36% of the 
voting rights and 34% of total number of shares. Shares held by non-Swedish investors are 
also disclosed with 47% for voting rights and 43% is for number of shares. The largest 
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associated company holds 22.3% of voting rights and 16% of total number of shares. 
Breakdown of shareholdings has also been disclosed and have been categorized in terms of 
various shareholding ranges. Country wise break up has also been disclosed.  
 
3.4.2 Board 
 
The chairman of board and CEO positions are held separately in the company. The 
company‘s board consists of thirteen members out of whom nine are elected, are union 
representatives with one personal deputy each and 1 honorary chair (p.120). Company 
explicitly discloses the independence of each board member by disclosing their association 
with the company or with associated companies. Apart from CEO and president, and union 
representatives, 5 directors are independent and 3 are non-independent, 2 are board members 
of a associated company and 1 is employed by the same associated company. No minority 
representation is given on board. Board meeting held have been disclosed and the attendance 
of the respective director has also been mentioned. 8 meetings were conducted in total 
whereby attendance of directors was 83%. Meetings were held under an approved agenda 
provided to directors beforehand. Board Committees, Atlas Copco are having three different 
committees. Remuneration and audit committee where there are three members in each 
committee from the board. There‘s also a nomination committee. 
 
3.4.3. Disclosures and Internal Control 
 
Remuneration to board director are disclosed individually and to remuneration and audit 
committee. Remuneration to the executive management covers base salary, variable 
compensation, pension premiums, and other benefits. Remuneration policy to board directors, 
CEO, president, and group management are disclosed individually. CEO and group 
management also holds stock options. Directors‘ responsibilities, the rules of procedure and 
written instructions for board and its committees are also disclosed (p.118). Detailed 
biographic information about academia and past experiences has been disclosed by the 
company, both board directors and executive management. Audit remuneration is stated as 
audit fee and other fees to KPMG, also audit fees is stated to other audit firms. Company 
discloses a detailed internal control policy for financial reporting (p.126-127). Directors‘ 
report discloses potential risks through a risk assessment process, which are managed and 
documented through control activities at various levels of group‘s business. Company has 
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explicitly disclosed their internal control process namely Prokura in the annual report which 
assigns business controller at business, division and group level. It ensures the 
implementation of business control process and reporting of risks observed. Likewise, many 
other procedures like internal audit, business board and company review meetings, control 
self assessment etc. along with their scope and frequency of occurrence has been disclosed in 
the annual report. Rights of various share classes, there‘re A and B classes of shares, A shares 
have higher voting rights than B-class. Share holding pattern has been disclosed by 
categorizing shareholders based on numbers of shares held by them. No pattern in terms of 
nature of holding entity e.g. foreign investment, financial institution, insurance companies etc. 
have been disclosed explicitly. A very detailed analysis of financial and non-financial 
information is available in the company. Information such as group introduction, segment 
wise revenue generation, industry-firm comparison, financial and non-financial goals and 
targets, strategic policies, operational performance etc. has been provided in detail (p.10 
onwards and at other places too). Reports to shareholders, the company has disclosed 
auditor‘s report, director‘s report, sustainability report and internal control policy report in its 
annual reports. However management letter and code of ethics of company are not disclosed.  
Auditor‘s appointment, the auditor is elected at the annual general meeting on the proposal by 
nomination committee (p.117). The current auditor KPMG are also re-elected in compliance 
with the above-mentioned process until 2010 annual general meeting. The annual report 
discloses the related party transactions under a separate head. Company also provides details 
and ownership stake about the related companies directly controlled by the parent company, 
holding companies and operating subsidiaries (p.78, A.22, 23) along with the nature and 
number of transaction for last two years (note 28). Also, the largest associated company along 
with their voting rights and percentage shares held has been disclosed (p.78, 25, note 14). 
Likewise, information about board members and management team has also been presented 
(p.120-121 and 124-125). Governance related disclosures are all found in the specific 
corporate governance report in the annual report and at the Atlas Copco website. Website 
reporting is available with specific corporate governance section. Accounting policies are 
based on IFRS and financials have been constructed using them. Statements have also been 
constructed in accordance with Swedish standards RFR 1.1 for some additional disclosures 
(p41-47). In case where new or amended interpretations have been applied, the relevant 
disclosure has been given explicitly. Annual report contains a detailed item wise description 
of accounting policies adopted for the preparation of financial statements. Firm-Industry 
analysis along with various other analyses has been provided in the annual report. Shares 
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traded by directors and executives are not disclosed, an insider reference to FI is reported on 
the Atlas Copco website. 
 
3.4.4. Shareholder’s Rights 
 
Single and dual class shares, there‘re A and B classes of shares, A-class shares have higher 
voting rights than B-class. Associated companies, which are also the largest, related party to 
the company holds over 22% voting rights. Top ten shareholders of company holds almost 
35% of total voting rights where as others hold almost 65% voting rights (p.133). No 
representation of minority shareholders on the board. Company discloses the dividend 
recommended and the policy (30%-40% of EPS) in annual report. Annual dividend growth 
rate for past ten and five year has also been disclosed which equals almost 14% and 19% 
respectively. Firm discloses information having significance for the investors in the annual 
repot. The company explicitly disclosed establishment of new division, reduction in 
manpower, change of president and CEO, orders received, shares repurchasing etc. under a 
separate head for the last year. A detailed disclosure regarding acquisitions made in last year 
have been made and relevant information like business area, number of employees, revenue 
generation etc. have also been provided. 
 
3.4.5. Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
A comprehensive sustainability report has been mentioned in the annual report (p98). Existing 
and new memberships have been told. Key events in this regard for last year have been 
disclosed. Companies approach towards this area has been explicitly disclosed which 
elaborates the prime areas on which company focus. Various roles, responsibilities, training 
tools, violation reporting mechanisms, socially responsible programs currently running, 
current and future goals etc. form part of the sustainability report. 
